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M.C. Escher (1960), Circle Limit IV. Woodcut in black and ocre
One concept corrupts and confuses the others. I am not speaking of the
Evil whose limited sphere is ethics; I am speaking of the infinite.
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Introduction
[G]ewiß die meisten paradoxen Behauptungen, denen wir auf dem Ge-
biete der Mathematik begegnen, sind Sätze, die den Begriff des Un-
endlichen entweder unmittelbar enthalten oder doch bei ihrer ver-
suchten Beweisführung in irgendeiner Weise sich auf ihn stützen.
Noch unstreitiger ist es, daß gerade diejenigen mathematischen
Paradoxien, die unsere größte Beachtung verdienen, weil die Entschei-
dung hochwichtiger Fragen in mancher anderen Wissenschaft, wie
in der Metaphysik und Physik, von einer befriedigenden Wider-
legung ihres Scheinwiderspruches abhängt, unter dieser Gattung
sich finden.
- Bernard Bolzano (1851)
Mathematics plays a central role in science. But how is it possible that math-
ematics helps us understand the physical world? How the connection between
mathematics and the world is to be accounted for remains one of the most chal-
lenging problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and general
philosophy (Mancosu 2008).
Understanding how idealization works is an integral part of addressing this
problem. Idealization is, roughly, the representation of reality in a deliberately
simplified or distorted manner. Examples of idealization in science are abstracting
the problem by leaving out certain features of the real situation, or approximating
the real situation by using values for variables that are wrong but in some sense
‘close enough’ to the real situation, or by using approximating mathematical tech-
niques (Ladyman 2008). It is a central problem in philosophy of science how to
account for the fact that our best scientific theories, while invoking such simplifi-




Particularly puzzling are infinite idealizations, i.e. mathematical representa-
tions of a physical system in which some property of the system, which in reality
is finite, is idealized as infinite. Examples are representing matter as continuous,
modeling a system as having an infinitely big particle number and volume, or
considering a process during an infinite amount of time. Infinite idealizations are
ubiquitous in science, but pose numerous questions of a philosophical nature and
often lead to paradoxes. These paradoxes are usually of a conceptual, rather than
technical, nature: the mathematical formalism works fine, but problems arise con-
cerning the interpretation of the formalism. An example is the well-known ‘para-
dox of phase transitions’: our best theories of phase transitions are in statistical
mechanics, where phase transitions only occur in the so-called ‘thermodynamic
limit’, i.e. in systems idealized to have an infinite particle number and volume.
As it was famously put by Callender (2001), it thus seems that these theories give
us a mathematical proof that the finite systems around us cannot display phase
transitions. But we see water boil into vapor or freeze into ice on a daily basis,
so something must have gone wrong here!
The paradoxes surrounding infinite idealizations in physics show that – at least
in these particular cases – something is different than we expected in our thinking
about how mathematics applies to the physical world. Investigating them might
thus help us to better understand the applicability of mathematics in general,
and the role and character of infinite idealizations in particular. Why is infinite
mathematics so useful in modeling a finite world? How can an infinite value be
‘close enough’ to any finite value? Are infinite idealizations always used for mere
convenience, i.e. to simplify the mathematics, or are there cases in which they
are ‘essential’? Can (apparent) reference to infinity in the physics be ‘explained
away’ in finite terms? In recent philosophy of science, infinite idealizations and
their paradoxes are discussed in order to clarify these and other questions con-
cerning the applicability of mathematics and the character and role of (infinite)
idealizations in science. Getting clear on these issues is complicated by the fact
that infinite idealizations relate to other philosophical issues, such as for example
intertheory relations and scientific explanation, and thus one’s understanding of
infinite idealizations generally depends on one’s take on these other issues.
Importantly, in the philosophical debate on infinite idealizations in science, it
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is largely taken for granted that ‘infinity’ means actual infinity. Actual infinity
is the concept which underlies set theory and – consequently – regular present-
day (i.e. ‘classical’) mathematics and physics. However, there seems to be no a
priori reason why it should be (mathematical physics based on) set theory which
applies (best) to the physical world (cfr. Isham & Butterfield 2000). It is clear
that set theory and its notion of actual infinity are not indispensable to science:
various developments in mathematics show that much more modest means suf-
fice. Furthermore, it has long been recognized by philosophers of mathematics
and philosophically minded mathematicians that set theory and the notion of
actual infinity have their own philosophical problems, and that there are good
philosophical reasons to prefer alternative foundational schemes.
With this in mind, the philosophical problems with infinite idealizations ap-
pear in a different light. For if the paradoxes arise only in physics based on set
theory, i.e. if they are relative to classical mathematics, then these philosophical
problems are not a problem for idealization or applicability per se, but rather for
a specific kind of idealization or applicability – i.e. the application of mathematics
based on set theory to the physical world. Therefore, as I see it, we should investi-
gate whether the paradoxes arising from infinite idealizations disappear or change
if the physics is formulated in a different mathematical framework, based on a dif-
ferent notion of infinity. Are the philosophical problems with infinite idealizations
relative to classical mathematics and its notion of infinity?
Thus, in my view there are two related problems:
A. How do infinite idealizations help us understand the finite world?
B. What is the nature of the notion of infinity used in classical mathematics?
The first question is topic of debate in philosophy of science; the second is a
central topic in the philosophy if mathematics. Surprisingly, however, the two
questions are hardly ever discussed in relation to one another. Sporadically, this
is recognized in the literature. Fletcher (2002, p. 3) writes, for example: “These
questions of the nature of infinity in pure mathematics cannot be seen in isolation
from applied mathematics and physics. It is a great defect of the literature on
the paradoxes of mathematical infinity that it ignores the paradoxes of physical
infinity, and vice versa.” Waaldijk (2005, p. 24) – after noticing that in many
discussions in modern physics it is taken for granted, without explanation, that
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classical mathematics is the only means available when describing the real world –
asserts that one “cannot emphasize enough that the foundational issues of modern
mathematics are of vital importance to the foundational issues of physics (and
vice versa).” One outstanding work in which these questions are addressed to-
gether, is the great Bernard Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite (Paradoxien des
Unendlichen, 1851). Although we will hardly discuss his work directly, Bolzano
very much inspired this thesis, and it is to acknowledge this influence that I choose
the title.
Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to take question A and B together, and
ask:
Central question: Are the philosophical issues surrounding infinite ideal-
izations in physics relative to classical mathematics and its notion of infinity?
We will set out to answer this question specifically for two cases of philosophi-
cally paradoxical infinite idealizations in physics. The two case studies that
we will undertake in this thesis, are (1) the paradox of phase transitions, and (2)
the paradox of ‘Norton’s Dome’, i.e. a case of indeterminism in Newtonian me-
chanics. Both paradoxes are well-known in the philosophy of science literature.
We will approach these paradoxes in this thesis by focussing on the underlying
mathematical framework, and in particular, on the notion of infinity employed
in the physics. We will aim to understand in which sense and for which reason
the infinite idealizations in the case studies are necessary or desirable, and what
makes these idealizations philosophically problematic. This will allow us to see
whether developing the physics in an alternative mathematical framework would
be philosophically beneficial.
To be clear, in this thesis we will undertake philosophical reflection on the
question whether or not the philosophical paradoxes in the case studies are rela-
tive to classical mathematics and its notion of infinity. Ideally, of course, I would
deepen my investigation and strengthen my argumentation by actually developing
the relevant physical theories in mathematics based on alternative foundational
schemes, and show how the philosophical problems change or disappear accord-
ingly. Since it is unfeasable to undertake that work in this thesis, I will rely on
the work of mathematicians, physicists, and other philosophers of mathematics
and physics for the technicalities regarding the relevant mathematics and physics.
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The original contribution of this thesis consists in bringing two fields – phi-
losophy of science and philosophy of mathematics – together in order to think
about infinite idealizations in a new way.
The thesis is set up as follows. It has three parts. Part I is called Infi-
nite idealizations: Philosophical issues, and consists of one chapter with the same
name. The goal is to introduce the reader to the philosophical issues around the
use of infinite idealizations in science in general. We will introduce these issues
by means of a summary of the debate on infinite idealizations in the philoso-
phy of science literature. Part II is Mathematics: The science of the infinite.
The goal of the second part is to introduce the reader to philosophical issues
surrounding the mathematical infinite. It consists of two chapters. In chapter
2 we will discuss several different mathematical conceptions of the infinite and
the corresponding mathematical systems that are built upon them. In chapter
3 we will focus on philosophical issues concerning (various developments of) the
mathematical continuum. Both the first and the second part have an introductory
character and serve as a preparation for Part III: Two paradoxes of the applied
infinite, in which we will discuss two case studies of physical theories involving
infinite idealizations which turn out to be philosophically problematic. These are:
statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions (chapter 4), and a case of inde-
terminism in Newtonian mechanics known as ‘Norton’s Dome’ (chapter 5). Part
II and Part III consist of multiple chapters, and have therefore their own intro-
duction and conclusion. In the conclusion of Part III we will draw consequences
from the case studies in relation to all the other material discussed in this thesis,










The aim of this chapter is to provide context for the discussion of the case studies
which take central stage in this thesis. This chapter will be mainly expository;
a critical assessment of the literature will be done specifically with regard to the
case studies, and thus will be postponed until Part III of this thesis.
In recent philosophy of science, infinite idealizations in science in general,
and in physics in particular, have received a considerable amount of attention.
They are relevant, and have been discussed, in various contexts. Part of these
contexts concern more general debates, such as with regard to the applicability of
mathematics (for example, questions such as: how does infinite mathematics apply
to the finite physical world?), the practice of idealization in general (e.g. under
which conditions are infinite idealizations admissible?), the realism-antirealism
debate (e.g. do theories containing infinite idealizations give us (approximate)
truth?), and debates about scientific explanation (e.g. if infinite idealizations are
false assumptions, then how can they be part of an explanation?). Another part
of these contexts are more specific, such as the debate on intertheory relations
(e.g. do newer, more refined theories reduce to older, less encompassing theories
in some sort of limit?), and on emergence (e.g. if limits are essential to represent a
certain phenomenon, does this mean that this phenomenon is emergent, i.e. cannot
be explained in terms of what happens at a lower level?). In this literature, we
find, on the one hand, authors which consider infinite idealizations (in some cases)
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necessary and give them substantial philosophical import (e.g. Batterman 2002,
Batterman 2005, Liu 1999, Shech 2013), as well as, on the other hand, authors
which deny their necessity in all cases, and search for ways to ‘explain away’ the
apparent reference to infinity (e.g. Norton 2012, Norton 2014, Norton 2016, Bangu
2009, Pincock 2014).
In this chapter we will discuss, to start, different views on what infinite ide-
alizations are – in particular, whether we should understand them as introducing
false assumptions into a model, or rather as simplifications of a model, i.e. the
elimination of details (section 1.1). We will see that part of the debate on this
matter centered around the issue of consistency, for infinite idealizations are of-
ten understood to introduce inconsistencies within a theory (subsection 1.1.1).
We will also discuss a view according to which this focus on consistency between
theories is misguided (subsection 1.1.2), and an account of – on the assumption
that the world is consistent and our scientific theories (to some extent) describe
this world – how it can be that different scientific theories are inconsistent with
each other (subsection 1.1.3). In the second section we will discuss how it can
be that infinite idealizations work, i.e. contribute to empirical adequacy of the
theory containing them (subsection 1.2.1), and an account of what distinguishes
legitimate from illegitimate idealizations (subsection 1.2.2).
1.1 What are infinite idealizations?
Idealization, in general, can be understood as the deliberate simplification or
distortion of reality with the objective of making it more tractable (Frigg &
Hartmann 2006). In the literature, there have been given several classifications
of different kinds of idealizations, characterized by the degree and manner in
which they distort and/ or simplify. Idealizations which primarily simplify have
been called abstractions (Cartwright 1989), Aristotelian idealizations (Frigg &
Hartmann 2006), or minimalist idealizations (Weisberg 2007). These idealizations
consist in ‘stripping away’, in our imagination, all properties from a concrete ob-
ject that we believe are not relevant to the problem at hand, so that we can focus
on a limited set of properties in isolation. An example is a classical mechanics
model of the planetary system, describing the planets as objects only having shape
and mass, disregarding all other properties (Frigg & Hartmann 2006). Another
1.1. WHAT ARE INFINITE IDEALIZATIONS? 11
example is the Ising model, an important model in the study of phase transitions,
in which atoms, molecules, or other particles are represented as points along a
line which can be in one of two states. The model is extremely simple, building in
almost no realistic detail about the substances being modeled but the interactions
and structures that really make a difference, or the core causal factors giving rise to
the target phenomenon (Weisberg 2007). Idealizations which primarily distort are
commonly called Galilean idealizations, because it was characteristic of Galileo’s
approach to science to use simplifications of this sort whenever a situation was too
complicated to tackle (McMullin 1985, Frigg & Hartmann 2006, Weisberg 2007).
Examples are the assumption that the Earth is flat over a short distance or that
a rolling ball is perfectly spherical (McMullin 1985). Galilean idealization is per-
formed due to the present computational limitations, and there is the hope that
ultimately the simplifying assumptions can be removed, making the theory more
realistic (McMullin 1985, Weisberg 2007). In sum, whereas in primarily simplify-
ing, Aristotelian idealizations certain properties which are deemed irrelevant are
disregarded and this simplification is taken to be permanent, primarily distorting,
Galilean idealizations involve false assumptions about the physical system, which
one aims to ultimately remove.
So how about infinite idealizations? Should we understand them as simplifi-
cations, i.e. do they eliminate details, or rather as distortions, i.e. do they involve
false assumptions (or both)? In the literature there seems to be no agreement on
this issue, and the same infinite idealizations are by some identified as distortions
and others as simplifications. An example is the analysis of water waves, in which
the ocean is idealized as infinitely deep. This example was put forward by Maddy
(1992) in the context of the indispensability arguments for mathematical realism,
and then inspired a discussion of how to interpret infinite idealizations. The ex-
ample makes it clear that infinite idealizations relate to the issue of consistency
between different mathematical theories.
1.1.1 A question of consistency?
Do our best scientific theories commit us to the existence of mathematical objects?
Much of the current thought on mathematical ontology involves in some way
or another the famous Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.1 The use of
1 The argument is formulated in Putnam (1967). Putnam attributes the argument to Quine.
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mathematics in science is often appealed to as the main reason to be some kind
of realist about mathematical entities. The general idea of the indispensability
argument has been formulated by Maddy in the following way:
“We have good reason to believe our best scientific theories, and
mathematical entities are indispensable to those theories, so we have
good reason to believe in mathematical entities. Mathematics is thus
on an ontological par with natural science. Furthermore, the evidence
that confirms scientific theories also confirms the required mathemat-
ics, so mathematics and science are on an epistemological par as well”
(Maddy 1992, p. 78)
However, scientific theories eliminate detail and precision, and often involve
assumptions which are known not to be true. As Maddy famously argued, any
freshman physics text is “littered with applications of mathematics that are ex-
pressly understood not to be literally true: e.g., the analysis of water waves by
assuming the water to be infinitely deep or the treatment of matter as continu-
ous in fluid dynamics or the representation of energy as a continuously varying
quantity” (Maddy 1992, p. 281). She continues to note that “this merely useful
mathematics is still indispensable; without these (false) assumptions, the theory
becomes unworkable” (ibid). In other words, as argued by Maddy, the indis-
pensability argument for mathematical realism is blocked by acknowledging that
science involves idealization: if false assumptions are part of our best scientific the-
ories, and we do not accept their truth even though they are indispensable, then
the same position is available for the mathematical entities that are indispensable
to those theories.2
Colyvan used Maddy’s observation to argue that idealization comes down
to inconsistency between different pieces of theory (2008, 2009). In relation to
Maddy’s example of the analysis of water waves, Colyvan points out that – besides
2 There is another problem with the indispensability argument: if our best scientific theories
were to commit us to the existence of mathematical entities, then to which mathematical entities
exactly? Both Quine and Putnam were led to accept significant portions of set theory on the basis
of the indispensability argument. However, as pointed out by Feferman (1998, p. 285), neither
of them undertook a detailed examination of how much mathematics is needed for scientifically
applicable mathematics to arrive at their positions, nor did they consider whether any of the
alternative foundational schemes ought to be preferred on philosophical grounds. This problem
with the indispensability argument will not concern us in this chapter; we will come back to it
in Part II of this thesis.
1.1. WHAT ARE INFINITE IDEALIZATIONS? 13
assumung an infinitely deep ocean in the calculations – we also deploy sonar to
determine the finite depth of the ocean. According to him, “what we are really
dealing with here is a contradiction between two pieces of theory. Taking the
conjunction of the two pieces of theory, we have it that oceans are both infinitely
deep and not infinitely deep” (Colyvan 2008, p. 117). Colyvan is willing to bite
the bullet, and accept the indispensability argument’s implication that sometimes
we ought to believe in the existence of inconsistent objects.
However, about the water wave case, Colyvan notes that
“there is nothing too troubling here. The sonar theory is surely
correct and the assumption of infinitely deep oceans is a mere idealisa-
tion. It is clear what we ought to believe here (and that was Maddy’s
point). It is just that hard-nosed Quineans, she suggests, have trouble
delivering the right answer” (Colyvan 2008, p. 117, fn. 4).
Colyvan agrees here with Maddy that in the water wave case, despite the fact that
there is a contradiction between two pieces of theory, it is clear what we ought to
believe: we believe sonar theory’s affirmation that the depth of the ocean is finite,
and not the assumption of an infinitely deep ocean which is part of the (otherwise
accurate) analysis of water waves.
This is the spirit in which many scholars think about infinite idealizations. In
fact, several scholars use the fact that infinite idealizations give rise to contradic-
tions between different pieces of theory as a reductio against that idea that we
should take the assumptions involved in infinite idealizations as literally true. For
example, Norton famously argued that if we should believe statistical-mechanical
theories of phase transitions – which, as we will see in chapter 4, require the
thermodynamic limit and model phase transitions as discontinuous changes in the
system’s thermodynamic properties – then we should consider the atomic theory
of matter disproved:
“If the atomic theory of matter is true, then ordinary thermal
systems of finitely many components cannot display discontinuous
changes in their thermodynamic properties. The changes they mani-
fest are merely so rapid as to be observationally indistinguishable from
discontinuous behavior. Indeed, if we could establish that the phase
transitions of real substances exhibit these discontinuities, we would
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have refuted the atomic theory of matter, which holds that ordinary
thermal systems are composed of finitely many atoms, molecules, or
components. It must be feared that a similar refutation is at hand,
if the positing of infinitely many components is necessary to recover
other observed behaviors of phase transitions” (Norton 2012, p. 225).
Certainly, no one would consider giving up the atomic theory of matter for the
reason that statistical-mechanical accounts of phase transitions require an infi-
nite system. It is clear here what to believe: that real systems which display
phase transitions are composed of finitely many components – and if statistical
mechanics tells us otherwise, then we should look for a different interpretation of
statistical mechanics’ appeal to infinite systems, argues Norton.3
Similarly, Butterfield (2011) argues – against Batterman (2002, 2005, 2010)
– that many limits, such as the thermodynamic limit, in which a parameter N ,
encoding physical degrees of freedom or some analogous concept, goes to infinity,
should not be taken to be physically real. For, as he argues, as N becomes
very large, the model becomes unrealistic: it runs up against either the micro-
structure of space and its contents (atomism), or the macro-structure of space
and its contents (cosmology). As Butterfield stresses, “these break-downs are not
internal to the model, but in relation to the actual world” (2011, p. 10).4 Again,
for Butterfield, it is clear what to believe, and this is the reason not to take infinite
idealizations as literally true of the concrete systems they represent.
The fact that, in cases in which infinite idealizations lead to two (seemlingly)
contradicting pieces of theory, it is so clear what to believe, led Pincock (2014)
to argue that we do not actually believe both contradicting pieces of theory. In
particular, he seems to argue, we do not believe the false claims which are part
of the idealization. In case of the analysis of water waves, according to Pincock,
“we do not ever assume that the ocean is infinitely deep” (Pincock 2014, p. 2958).
This is because, as Pincock puts it, “false assumptions take us from an interpreted
part of a scientific representation to an idealized representation where the partic-
3 Norton proposes to solve this problem by distinguishing between two different ways in which
infinite idealizations can be used, one of which he calls approximations and the other idealizations.
We will discuss Norton’s proposal in section 1.2.2.
4 It is not clear to me what exactly Butterfield means by a model running up against “the
actual world”. I suppose that we should read this as these models running up against certain
propositions which we take to be true of the actual world, or against other models or theories
which we take – in some sense – to represent the actual world more accurately than these models.
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ular part is no longer interpreted” (Pincock 2014, p. 2963). Thus, in Pincock’s
view, the false assumption of an infinitely deep ocean, i.e. H = ∞, changes the
representation in which H denotes the depth of the ocean to one in which H
is a place holder. As he puts it himself, the infinite idealization transforms the
representation so that it has merely schematic content (ibid.). Thus, according to
Pincock, infinite idealizations should not be understood as false assumptions, but
rather as a way to ignore certain aspects of the physical system which are deemed
irrelevant.
In sum, we have seen that according to Colyvan, Norton, and Butterfield, the
issue of consistency raised by idealizations – i.e. the problem that the assump-
tions which are part of the idealization contradict propositions of other sciences
– is solved by in some sense attributing less truth to the infinite idealizations. In
particular Norton and Butterfield argue that we should not take infinite ideal-
izations to be physically real, i.e. literally true of concrete systems. The reason
for this seems to be for all three of them that, in case of contradicting pieces of
theory, it is clear what to believe: not the infinite idealization. It seems thus that
all three of them understand infinite idealizations as distortions, i.e. they involve
assumptions which are false about the concrete systems they represent. Pincock,
to the contrary, argues that in infinite idealizations the parameter taken to infinity
is decoupled from its interpretation. Thus, Pincock seems to understand infinite
idealizations not as distortions, but rather as simplifications, namely ignoring the
parameter which is taken to infinity. There is another argument offered in the
literature to the effect that – at least to some extent – infinite idealizations, in
particular the thermodynamic limit of statistical mechanics, are simplifications,
namely that they involve the abstraction of finitary effects. We will discuss this
argument in section 1.2.1.
Further, the consistency discussed in the context of infinite idealizations can
be distinguished in two different kinds. First, there is inconsistency between
different pieces of theory. This is the kind of inconsistency about which Maddy
wrote, and about which Colyvan and Pincock were thinking: within the theory
of water waves there are two contradicting propositions: one asserting a finitely
deep, and one an infinitely deep ocean. Butterfield and Norton (at least in the
above quote) seem to be concerned with inconsistencies between different theories,
namely infinite component limits being inconsistent with atomism or cosmology.
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We could call the first kind of inconsistency, i.e. inconsistency internal to a theory
or model, internal inconsistency, and the second kind, i.e. the inconsistency of
infinite idealization with the truths of another theory, external consistency. We
will discuss internal inconsistencies in more detail in section 1.2.2. Before turning
to that, we will first discuss an argument to the effect that external consistency
is not the right way to think about infinite idealizations – and about physics in
general.
1.1.2 Against external inconsistency: Physics as a patchwork
Why would it matter that infinite idealizations lead to external inconsistencies?
Without doubt, the theories with which these infinite idealizations are inconsis-
tent involve idealizations themselves, so why would consistency between different
physical theories be relevant at all?
According to Batterman (2014), these worries about inconsistency between
different physical theories and about the global unity of physics stem from a mis-
guided but highly common picture of physics – he calls it Physics with a capital
“P”. According to this picture, microlevel theories, i.e. theories that talk about
the atomic and subatomic makeup of the things we see around us, are privileged:
they are considered to be “fundamental”, and are associated with what is “real”,
“true”, and “physical” (Batterman 2014, p. 2974). Macrolevel phenomena can
according to Physics be explained in terms of these microlevel theories. According
to Batterman, many philosophers and physicists think about physics in this way
(despite recent debates about emergence and failure of reduction), and it is ex-
actly this picture which urges us to look for logical consistencies between different
theories in physics:
“If we maintain the hierarchical structure we become distracted by
claims of logical inconsistency. These are, for well established theories,
not in the least bit important. Physics should be seen as a patchwork
of various theories each quite accurately characterizing and explaining
their various domains of applicability. Typically, these are determined
by the importance or unimportance of various lengths or time scales.
Interesting problems arise at the borderlands between the members
of this patchwork, but it is a mistake to look at those problems only
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through the lens of model theory with its measure of consistency”
(Batterman 2014, p. 2991).
According to Batterman, focus on logical consistency between physical theories
is a consequence of the mistaken view of physics as Physics. If we take physics
for what it is, namely a patchwork of various theories, Batterman argues, then we
will see that looking for consistency is a mistake.
According to Batterman, that physics should be understood as a patchwork
follows from, among other things, the fact that many macrolevel theories cannot
be reduced to microlevel theories in any sense. Batterman gives an example of such
a case: the micro- and macrolevel theories of breaking drops, i.e. water dripping
from a faucet (Batterman 2014, cfr. Batterman 2005). As Batterman explains, in
Navier-Stokes theory, which describes the shape of the drops from a macroscopic
point of view, the phenomenon of the breakup – i.e. the moment in which a single
mass of water changes into two or more droplets – is represented by a discontinuity
that is characterized by divergences in both the fluid velocity and in the curvature
of the interface at the point of snap-off (Batterman 2014, p. 2977).5 In the
microlevel theory, the theory of molecular dynamics, to the contrary, there is no
such discontinuity. Thus, the (supposed) inconsistency between these two theories
consists in Batterman’s view in the fact that the macrolevel theory represents the
breakup by a singularity, whereas there is no such singularity in the microlevel
theory (Batterman 2014, p. 2980, n. 7).
Now, from the view point of Physics, the continuum Navier-Stokes theory is
an idealization: we know that water drops are “really” just finite collections of dis-
crete molecules. The continuum Navier-Stokes theory is from this view point just
an idealization which is appropriate to the macroscopic scale (Batterman 2014,
p. 2979). However, as Batterman argues, Navier-Stokes theory has important ex-
planatory virtues, namely, it explains what is known as “universality”, i.e. the fact
that many different systems – sometimes radically different in their microstruc-
tural makeup – can exhibit identical or nearly identical phenomenological behav-
ior (Batterman 2014, p. 2976). There is, as Batterman writes, no way to account
5 Batterman argues furthermore that this representation is correct: the qualitative topological
changes that we see at the macrolevel should be represented mathematically by singularities
(Batterman 2014, p. 2983). Similarly, the qualitative changes occurring at phase transitions
should according to Batterman be represented mathematically by singularities. We will discuss
this view in the context of phase transitions in section 4.2.
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for universality from the molecular dynamical theory (Batterman 2014, p. 2983).
Thus, what according to Physicists are “inconsistencies” arising from idealization,
have a very important theoretical and explanatory role. It is wrong, according to
Batterman, to see these inconsistencies as problematic.
The fact that the microlevel theory is discrete, does not only imply that the
breakup of the drop is not modeled as a discontinuity, but also that the represen-
tation of drops in the microlevel theory is slightly different from the representation
in the macrolevel theory. That is, as Batterman puts it, the very idea of a well-
defined drop with boundaries does not apply in the discrete theory of molecular
dynamics (Batterman 2014, p. 2980, n. 7). We could thus say that the micro- and
macrolevel theory both employ a (slightly) different conception of “drop” – and
consequently of other concepts, such as “breakup”. In noting that the mathemati-
cal counterparts of physical concepts change passing from one “patch” to another,
Batterman sides with Wilson (2006). Wilson speaks of “theory facades” as the
proper way to understand the organization of physical theories.6 In the view of
both Batterman and Wilson, different theoretical descriptions fit the phenomena
in various ways, yet breakdown if pushed too far. As Batterman writes, such
a picture of the theories of physics – as facades that work exceptionally well in
restricted domains, but that cannot be extended indefinitely without conceptual
change – eliminates broad worries about logical inconsistency between theories
(Batterman 2014, p. 2991).
Thus, in Batterman’s view, and contrary to the views that we discussed in the
previous section, we should interpret the inconsistencies between different theories
which result from infinite idealizations in macrolevel theories not as a reason to
take these infinite idealizations (or the macrolevel theories to which they belong)
as any less true than microlevel theories, but rather we should give up the global
unity of physics and the related idea that macrolevel phenomena can be explained
in terms of microlevel theories – that is, we should give up Physics.
6 We will see in chapter 5 that according to Wilson, not only physics as a whole consists
of such facades, but that this is also the case for parts of physics that often – naively – are
understood as one theory. This is the case, according to Wilson, for “classical” or “Newtonian
mechanics”, which in his view actually divides into three different formalisms: point particle
mechanics, the physics of rigid bodies and perfect constraints, and continuum mechanics – each
of them with descriptive gaps which reach all the way to their cores, and which often give mutually
incompatible analyses of the same issue. Wilson calls Newtonian mechanics therefore “a stool
constructed of six or seven legs of unequal length” (Wilson 2009, p. 174, cfr. Wilson 2013).
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1.1.3 Sources of inconsistency: Modeling practice
If the physical world is consistent, then how is it possible that different theories
which describe this world are inconsistent? In the literature, this question has –
at least partly – been answered in terms of an analysis of the practice of modeling
and theory building. It has been argued in various ways, that scientists do not
usually deal with phenomena, or events in the world simpliciter, but rather with
phenomena interpreted by means of theory and organized in stable patterns. This
practice of organization of and pattern-seeking in the data makes that theories
are not simply a record of the data collected in experiments: theory and data
stand in a much more complex relationship. As Ladyman (2008) argues, no real
system that is measured ever exactly fits the description of the phenomena that
become the target of the theoretical explanation.
The complex relationship between results of measurement on the one hand,
and theory on the other, has been brought to attention by Patrick Suppes in his
seminal paper “Models of Data” (1962).7 Famously, Suppes argued that there is
a hierarchy of models of different types that connect data to theory:
“[E]xact analysis of the relation between empirical theories and
relevant data calls for a hierarchy of models of different logical type.
Generally speaking, in pure mathematics the comparison of models
involves comparison of two models of the same logical type, as in the
assertion of representation theorems. A radically different situation
often obtains in the comparison of theory and experiment. Theoret-
ical notions are used in the theory which have no direct observable
analogue in the experimental data” (Suppes 1969, p. 25).
Understanding how theory and experiment connect to each other in Suppes’ view
requires understanding the links between the different kinds of models in this
hierarchy.8 There are three levels of models in Suppes’ system: models of theory,
7 The paper is reprinted in (Suppes 1969), which is the version that I will be refering to.
8 A model of a theory according to Suppes is a possible realization in which all valid sentences
of the theory are satisfied, and a possible realization is an entity of the appropriate set-theoretical
structure (1969, p. 24). According to Suppes, the logician’s notion of a model is the basic and
fundamental concept of model and is needed for an exact statement of any branch of empirical
science (cfr. 1969, p. 17).
20 CHAPTER 1. INFINITE IDEALIZATIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
models of experiment, and models of data. The idea9 is that as one descents from
the hierarchy, one gets closer to the data and the actual details of the experimental
experience. Models of theory are at the top of Suppes’ hierarchy and are the most
abstract models. They contain idealizations and notions which have no directly
observable analogue, such as continuous functions and discontinuities. One step
down the hierarchy we find models of the experiment, which contain reference
to a particular experiment, although they also contain the idealizations that are
part of the model of the theory. The experimental model is to say what the
theory would entail in the specific experimental set-up under consideration, and
would contain, for example, possible values of the volume and pressure in this
particular experiment (cfr. Harris 2003). Below the model of the experiment we
find in Suppes’ hierarchy the model of the data (also ‘data model’). In the data
model, the experimental results are summarized and put in such a form that
they allow for application of analytical methods and statistical assesment of fit
between predictions and actual data. Data models would for example contain
readings of volume and pressure taken during a particular run of an experiment.
Importantly, data models are already ‘polished’, in the sense that what seem to
be ‘experimental errors’ are filtered out, and stationarity (i.e. whether the present
parameters are constant over time or trials) is tested.
In recent literature, it has been stressed even more that data models are al-
ready theory-laden.10 As is argued in this literature, in practice scientists use
elements of the theory and other features of interest to guide the production of
data models. There are always competing patterns in data, and scientists must
choose one pattern over other competing patterns. Which pattern in the data
gets singled out is guided by the interest of the scientist and incorporates already
elements of theory. As argued by McAllister (1997, p. 224): “[I]nvestigators dis-
cover the patterns that are exhibited in data sets, but stipulate that some of these
correspond to the phenomena.”
In sum, there are various steps between the “raw” data collected in experi-
ments and the final theory which is inferred from them at which these data are
“shaped”. Ascending in Suppes’ hierarchy of models from the data model to the
9 Suppes’ paper is sketchy and leaves much to be clarified. A better worked-out exposition of
Suppes’ ideas – taking his points in some respects a bit further – can be found in (Mayo 1996). A
discussion of Suppes’ ideas and an account related to it can also be found in (van Fraassen 2008).
10 See Cartwright (1999), Harris (2003), McAllister (1997), Morrison (1999).
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model of theory, at each step the model becomes more and more abstract and ide-
alized. Models of the data are different from models of the theory, for example in
that models of the theory contain notions (such as, e.g., probability measures, or
discontinuous changes in one or more variables) which are not directly observable
and are not part of the recorded data (Suppes 1969, p. 26). But, as stressed in
recent literature, already the construction of data models involves interpretation:
which pattern in the data gets singled out is guided by the interest of the scientist
and incorporates already elements of theory. In singling out the patterns in the
data which are to be captured in the data model, and in the process of abstraction
which leads from data models to models of theory, there are many choices to be
made which can give rise to theories with very different characteristics. For these
reasons, different theories which model a consistent world can be inconsistent with
each other.
1.2 What are legitimate infinite idealizations?
We have seen in the previous section that idealizations in general, and infinite
idealizations in particular, are in some sense falsifying in nature: they consist
in the deliberate simplification or distortion of reality with the goal of improving
tractability. But how much and in which manner may we distort and simplify real-
ity so that we still have a legitimate idealization? What distinguishes a legitimate
infinite idealization from an outright falsehood?
Physicists themselves seem not to worry about this kind of questions; they
rely on an intuitive understanding of how far they can take idealizations.11 They
might – seriously or less seriously – justify idealizing systems as infinitely large
by saying that finite systems are so big that they are “nearly infinite”. It is a
task for philosophers of science to make these intuitions explicit. Part of under-
standing what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate infinite idealizations, is
understanding why infinite idealizations work when they do. In subsection 1.2.1,
we will see that there is indeed a sense in which concrete systems are “nearly infi-
nite”, which explains the success of certain infinite idealizations. Care is needed,
however: whereas legitimate idealizations can be obtained by some limiting pro-
11 For example, mathematically rigorous existence proofs for the thermodynamic limit are
rare in physics; in general, physicists are satisfied if it is intuitively clear that certain properties
converge and thus their limits exist (Griffiths 1972).
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cesses, by others we obtain illegitimate idealizations or no idealization at all. In
subsection 1.2.2, we will discuss Norton’s distinction between idealization and ap-
proximation, and his proposal of how to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
infinite idealizations.
1.2.1 “Nearly infinite” systems: Working in the limits
Infinite component limits, such as the thermodynamic limit, are common place in
statistical mechanics, which aims to explain the thermal properties of materials
in terms of the behavior of the microscopic components of these systems. These
microscopic components of the systems under consideration are usually very large
in number, which means that we cannot hope or wish to follow any motion of
their individual constituents, but that instead we must describe their average or
typical properties through some sort of statistical treatment. Physicists commonly
justify working with infinite component limits by arguing that since the systems
we see around us have very large N , they are “effectively” or “nearly” infinite
(Mainwood 2005, p. 26). However, to say that a number is “nearly infinite” does
not make sense: every finite number, no matter how big, is closer to zero than to
infinity.12 So, what do these physicists mean?
According to Bangu (2009), in most cases,
“. . . what motivates the physicists’ relaxed attitude in this matter
is not a suspect metaphysical easiness with infinities but rather an
outright dismissal of the whole finite versus infinite business on the
basis of considerations having to do with the limits of experimental
accuracy. Since it is virtually impossible to point out observable differ-
ences between the behavior of infinite systems and systems featuring
a really big number of components (of the order of 1023 or larger),
the philosophers’ worry (do finite systems really undergo [phase tran-
sitions]?) becomes immaterial. As the physicist Baierlein once joked,
“It all works because Avogadro’s number is closer to infinity than to
ten”” (Bangu 2009, p. 495).
12 To see this, take an interval with 0 and ∞ as it endpoints, and locate any finite number
on this interval. Every finite number will be mapped to zero, for if not, by the Archimedean
principle, a certain multiplication of the number will exceed infinity, which is impossible (cfr.
Bell 2005, Lisker 1996). Therefore, every finite number is closer to zero than to infinity.
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Thus, according to Bangu, the reason why infinite component limits work, and
why, according to physicists, its use is justified, has to do with limits to experi-
mental accuracy: it is, as he points out, virtually impossible to detect observable
differences between the behavior of infinite systems and systems consisting of a
really big number of components, i.e. of the order of 1023 or larger. This has
to do with the fact that the thermal properties of statistical mechanical systems
are a function of the number of their components, and that these properties set-
tle down to stable values if the number of components becomes very large (cfr.
Norton 2014, p. 197). Mathematically, these stable values can be approximated
quite closely by taking a limit of the property, and the difference between the val-
ues of these properties for infinite systems and those for very large finite systems
is often smaller than the measurement error. Therefore, the limiting properties
provide a good approximation to the properties of finite systems. Thus, in other
words, infinite component limits in statistical physics are justified by the facts
that the properties of systems are a function of the number of components, and
the values of these functions for big systems are so close to the values of these
functions for infinite systems, that no difference between the limiting values and
the values for big component numbers can be discovered.
It can be argued that macroscopic thermal systems are also “nearly infinite”
in another sense. For finite and infinite systems are qualitatively different from
each other (at least) in that the former, but not the latter, have boundaries. As
it turns out, macroscopic systems are generally so large that boundaries have no
significant effect on their thermal properties, so that boundary effects can safely
be ignored (Lui 2001). Infinite component limits can thus also be considered as
abstraction from finitary effects (Butterfield 2011, p. 19). Since boundary effects
are absent in infinitely large systems, and boundary effects are in concrete systems
largely insignificant, concrete systems can also for this reason be called “nearly
infinite”.
In sum, concrete, and thus finitely large, thermal systems can thus be said to be
“nearly infinite”, not in the sense that their component number is almost infinite,
but rather in the sense that their properties are empirically indistinguishable from
the properties of infinitely large thermal systems. This has to do both with the fact
that the values of the functions describing their thermal properties are empirically
indistinguishable from the values of these functions for infinite systems, and with
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the fact that for large thermal systems, boundary effects can be ignored. Thus,
in this manner, idealizing systems as infinitely large can be justified.
Not all infinite idealizations involve idealizing a system as infinitely large;
another example is treating collections of discrete particles as if they formed a
continuous substance. Many classical continuum models of fluids and solids, for
example, are obtained by taking a limit of a classical atomistic model as the num-
ber of atoms N tends to infinity (in an appropriate way, e.g. keeping mass density
constant), but without letting the system size go to infinity (Butterfield 2011,
p. 19). Such continuum models are mathematically often much more convenient
than their discrete counterparts.13 Why do infinite idealizations of this type work?
It is often the case that idealizing a molecular structure as a continuum
works because it turns out that the microscopic makeup of the system is ir-
relevant for the phenomenon under consideration. The phenomenon of “uni-
versality” is an example: many different systems with completely different mi-
croscopic makeup exhibit identical behavior (Batterman 2002). An example of
such universal behavior we discussed in section 1.1.2 above: Navier-Stokes theory,
which describes the motions of fluids from a macroscopic point of view and mod-
els fluids as a continuum, shows universality of the shape of breaking droplets
(Batterman 2005, Batterman 2014). Thus, in analogy with understanding ide-
alizations of finitely large systems as infinitey large as abstraction from finitary
effects, we can understand the idealization of discrete systems as a continuum as
an abstraction of the microscopic structure.
13 An example is given by (Butterfield 2011, section 3.3.3): Consider the mass density (i.e. the
ratio of the mass of the fluid to its volume) varying within a fluid. For an atomistic model of
the fluid, that postulates N atoms per unit volume, the average mass-density might be written
as a function of both position x within the fluid, and the side-length L of the volume L3 centred
on x, over which the mass-density is computed: f(N, x, L). Now, for fixed N , this function is
very sensitive to x and L, meaning that if atoms are or contain point-particles, the function will
jump when L is varied so as to include or exclude one such particle. Thus, such a function in
the atomistic model will not be continuous. But by taking a continuum limit N → ∞, with
L → 0 (and atomic masses going to zero appropriately, so that quantities like density do not
“blow up”), we can define a continuous, maybe even differentiable, mass-density function ρ(x)
as a function of position. As such, in the continuous model we can enjoy all the convenience of
the calculus.
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1.2.2 Consistency again: Idealization versus approximation
How much and in which manner may we idealize, so that we still have a legitimate
idealization? An account of what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate ideal-
izations has been proposed by Norton (2012, 2014). His proposal builds on the
recognition – which was already longer present in philosophy of science literature14
– that there are two ways of using limits: as what Norton calls idealizations, and
as what he calls approximations. The key difference is referential: idealizations
carry a novel semantic import not carried by approximations. As we will see,
according to Norton, a minimal condition for legitimate idealizations is that they
are consistent – or to be more precise, limits can be used as idealizations only if
they give rise to a consistently describable system (Norton 2014, p. 200). In this
subsection, we will discuss Norton’s proposal to distinguish between idealizations
and approximations in some detail. This idea will be relevant again for both our
case studies: the paradox of phase transitions (chapter 4), and the paradox of
Norton’s Dome (chapter 5).
In order to clarify the distinction between idealizations and approximations as
Norton proposes it, we will discuss an example of his (Norton 2014, section 2).
Dilute gases under normal conditions of temperature and pressure conform quite
closely to the ideal gas law:
(1.1) PV = nRT
where P is the pressure, V the volume, n the number of moles, T the temperature,
and R is the ideal gas constant. While often good, the fit of the ideal gas law
to real systems is never perfect, Norton explains. Errors become larger if, for
example, one consideres regimes of high pressure and high density.
Now, according to Norton, we can see the ideal gas law in two ways: as an
idealization or as an approximation. In his terminology, an approximation is an
inexact description of a target system. It is propositional. An idealization is a
real or fictitious system, distinct from the target system, some of whose prop-
erties provide an inexact description of some aspects of the target system. (As
Norton stresses, these are not definitions; they merely specify important proper-
ties.) Thus, the ideal gas law as an approximation is a proposition which describes
14 E.g. Frigg & Hartmann (2006), Butterfield (2011). For an overview, see Mainwood (2005).
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some target system inexactly. So seen, the ideal gas law is an empirical general-
ization, according to Norton. As an idealization, to the contrary, the ideal gas law
introduces a fictitious system of which the ideal gas law is an exact description.
This system consists of very many non-interacting spatially localized components.
The system is fictitious since there are no real systems like that: all molecules
occupy some volume of space and interact at least weakly with other molecules.
This fictitious system, Norton explains, is an idealization of the target systems
of real dilute gases and dilute solutions, because it looks like those systems in
the particular aspects that interest us; that is, in the relationship between their
pressures, temperatures and other magnitudes in the ideal gas law.
We can always demote an idealization into an approximation by discarding
the idealizing system and preserving only the relevant propositions that describe
it (Norton 2014, section 2). A corresponding promotion from approximation to
idealization will not always be possible, for idealizations do not always exist.
Whether an idealization exists or not depends, as Norton sees it, on two things:
(1) whether they can exist at all, i.e. whether the limiting process results in a
system that is consistent, and, if yes, (2) whether these idealizations have the
intended properties, i.e. whether they resemble finite systems in the ways that
interest us (Norton 2012, Norton 2014). Norton gives two simple mathematical
examples to illustrate how (1) and (2) can fail, together with a third in which
everything goes as desired (Norton 2012, section 3). We will repeat his examples
here.
The case in which everything goes as desired is the following. Consider a
sphere of unit radius. It is elongated into a capsule, a cylinder with spherical
end caps, as shown in figure 1.1. Its total length grows through the sequence of
cylinder lengths a = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .. In the infinite limit, i.e. letting the cylinder
length go to infinity, the capsule becomes an infinite cylinder of unit radius. Now
we are interested in the following property: what is the ratio of area to volume
of these capsules? As Norton explains, the surface area of a capsule of cylinder
length a is 2πa+ 4π, and its volume is πa+ 4π3 . Hence, the ratio of surface area
to volume is 2πa + 4π / πa + 4π3 , and the ratio approaches a limiting value of 2
as a goes to infinity. The limiting system, i.e. the infinite cylinder, has a ratio of
area to volume of 2. Thus, we see that the limit of the properties of the sequence
of capsules agrees with the corresponding properties of the limiting system.
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Figure 1.1: Limit property and limit system agree (after Norton, 2012)
Norton clarifies his example with a general scheme:
System 1, System 2, System 3, . . . , Limit System;
Property 1, Property 2, Property 3, . . . , Limit Property.
Limit system and limit property cohere in this case, for the limit property is the
corresponding property of the limit system. Therefore, according to Norton, the
infinite cylinder is an idealization of the larger capsules.
Things are different in the following example, i.e. a case in which there is no
limit system. Consider a unit sphere whose radius r grows as r = 1, 2, 3, . . ., as
shown in figure 1.2. The area of the sphere is 4πr2, and its volume is 4πr3/3.
Again, we are interested in the ratio between the area and the volume. As Norton
explains, the ratio of surface area to volume is 4πr2 / 4πr33 =
3
r , and this ratio
goes to zero as the radius r goes to infinity. Hence, the sequence of properties has
a limiting value, i.e. zero. The sequence of systems, that is, of spheres, however,
has no limit system. For, as Norton explains, a sphere is a set of points equally far
away from some center; an infinitely large sphere would consist of points infinitely
far away from the center, but there are no such points: all points in the space
are some finite distance from the center. As Norton argues, talk of an “infinitely
large sphere” is literally nonsense; an infinitely large sphere is impossible.
Figure 1.2: There is no limit system (after Norton, 2012)
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The scheme that we have in this case is:
System 1, System 2, System 3, . . . , (No Limit System);
Property 1, Property 2, Property 3, . . . , Limit Property.
In this case there is a limit property, but it is not a property of a limit system,
because a limit system does not exist. As Norton explains, the zero area-to-volume
ratio is not a property of an impossible infinite sphere, but rather it is a property
of the set of all finite spheres; it is the greatest lower bound of the ratios of the
set’s members. In this case, the limit property is thus an approximation: an
inexact description of the properties of the later, larger members of the sequence
of systems. The limit process provides no idealization, because there is no limit
system to bear the limit property.
In the third example there is a limit system, but it does not have the intended
properties. The example is the following. Consider once again a sphere of unit
radius. Uniformly expand it in one direction only, so it becomes an ellipsoid
with semimajor axis a. Continue the expansion, letting a go to infinity. The
limit system is a cylinder of unit radius, as shown in figure 1.3. The volume of
the ellipsoid is 4πa/3. The surface area of the ellipsoid nears a value of π2a,
arbitrarily closely for large a. We are once more interested in the ratio of surface
area to volume. As Norton explains, this ratio approaches π2a4πa/3 =
3π
4 as a goes to
infinity. However, as we have seen in the first example, an infinite cylinder, which
in the present example is the limit system, has a ratio of surface area to volume
of 2. Thus, the limit ratio of the sequence of expanding ellipsoids is not the same
as the corresponding ratio of the limit system, i.e. the infinite cylinder.
Figure 1.3: Limit property and limit system disagree (after Norton, 2012)
The scheme that we have in this case is:
System 1, System 2, System 3, . . . , Limit System;
Property 1, Property 2, Property 3, . . . , Limit Property.
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However, in contrast to the first example, in this case limit system and limit
property disagree: the limit property is not a property of the limit system. As
Norton argues, the limit property can be used to provide an approximation of the
systems leading up to the limit, for the limiting ratio of 3π4 is a close approximation
of the area to volume ratio of very large ellipsoids. However, the limit process
does not provide an idealization, for the limit system does not have the intended
properties: an infinite cylinder has an area to volume ratio of 2, which is a poor
approximation of the ratio for large ellipsoids.
To take stock, on Norton’s account, limiting processes result in idealizations,
i.e. limiting systems, when the properties of the limiting system are (1) con-
sistent, and (2) intended, that is, they correspond to the limiting properties of
the sequence of finite systems. When either of those conditions is not fulfilled,
i.e. when there is no limiting system or when the limiting system does not have
the intended properties, then one can use the limiting properties as approxima-
tions, i.e. propositions which inexactly describe large but finite systems. The kind
of consistency that Norton requires as a minimal condition for idealizations, we
could call – in contrast to what we called in section 1.1.1 external consistency,
i.e. the consistency of infinite idealizations within one theory with the propositions
of another theory – internal consistency, for it concerns the question whether the
system is in itself consistent, i.e. whether or not it has contradicting properties.
In cases in which the limit system in Norton’s view does not provide an ideal-
ization because the limit system does not have the intended properties, we see that
– in some sense – the limit system is qualitatively different from the systems in
the sequence up to the limit. As we have seen in Norton’s third example namely,
the systems with increasingly large semimajor axis a are ellipsoids, whereas the
limiting system with infinite a is no longer an ellipsoid, but a cyllinder instead.
This qualitatively different character of limit systems with respect to the finite
systems up to the limit is in the philosophical debate on infinite idealizations
related to the issue of novelty: infinite idealizations are often used to obtain rep-
resentations which in some respect are qualitatively different from the descriptions
of finite systems up to the limit. This is the case for example with systems in the
thermodynamic limit of statistical mechanics: only in the infinite limit systems,
and in none of the finite systems leading up to this limit, do the derivatives of
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the free energy change discontinuously.15 A related question which is debated on
the philosophical literature, is whether this qualitatively different, novel behav-
ior which arises in the limit should be interpreted as physically real. Norton’s
position that such infinite idealizations are actually not idealizations, but only
approximations, agrees with the position of Butterfield (2011), who argues that
the physically real behavior occurs before one reaches the limit. The limit system
itself, should according to both not be taken as physically real, but only as an
approximation of finite, concrete systems. An opposite position is taken by Batter-
man (2002, 2005, 2014), who argues that, in virtue of this novel behavior, infinite
idealizations are often necessary – i.e they cannot be eliminated or de-idealized –
in order to get a qualitatively accurate representation of a phenomenon.
15 This case will be discussed in chapter 4.
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Introduction to Part II
If in summing up a brief phrase is called for that characterizes the
life center of mathematics, one might well say: mathematics is the
science of the infinite.
- Hermann Weyl (1949)
In chapter 1 we have seen that idealization is a problem for the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument for mathematical realism (section 1.1.1). But idealiza-
tion is not the only problem with the indispensability argument. As we have seen,
according to the indispensability arguments we should believe in the existence of
those mathematical entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories,
but which mathematical entities are we talking about? That is, what exactly is
the mathematics that is essential to our best scientific theories? Both Quine and
Putnam were led to accept significant portions of set theory on the basis of the
indispensability argument, but neither of them undertook a detailed examination
of how much mathematics is needed for scientifically applicable mathematics to
arrive at their positions, nor did they consider whether any of the alternative foun-
dational schemes ought to be preferred on philosophical grounds (Feferman 1998,
p. 285).
This tendency to assume that set theory is indispensable to science is char-
acteristic for philosophy of science. But this assumption is mistaken: various
mathematicians have shown that much more modest means suffice. To name
two examples, Feferman (1998) showed, via proof-theoretical reduction, that it is
possible to directly formalize almost all, if not all, scientifically applicable math-
ematics in a formal system that is justified simply by Peano arithmetic, and Ye
(2011) developed almost all of the mathematics that is currently used in the
physical sciences within Strict finitism, i.e. a fragment of quantifier-free primitive
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recursive arithmetic with the accepted functions restricted to elementary recursive
functions. Furthermore, various arguments have been put forward to the effect
that these and other alternative mathematical frameworks are preferable to set
theory on philosophical grounds.
The goal of this second part is, first, to introduce set theory (and the mathe-
matics based on it, i.e. what we will call ‘classical mathematics’) and some of the
philosophical issues with it, and second, to show that there are good alternatives
to set theory which in some respects are philosophically preferable. Thus, this
second part is meant to show that classical mathematics should not be taken for
granted in philosophy of science. As such, this part will serve as a justification for
the project undertaken in this thesis, i.e. to look critically at the use of classical
mathematics in two – paradoxical – cases in physics.
Chapter 2 will be an introduction to both set theory and two of its alterna-
tives, i.e. constructive mathematics and nonstandard analysis, and will contain an
analysis of the differences between these frameworks in terms of their respective
ontologies. Chapter 3 will focus on issues surrounding the mathematical con-
tinuum. In this second part we will discuss some philosophical issues raised by
classical mathematics and some philosophical benefits of some of its alternatives
in general terms; in part III we will apply this discussion to the specific context
of the case studies.
Chapter 2
Ontology and the ideal in
mathematics
Mathematics is the science in which we don’t know* what we are talk-
ing about.
- Bertrand Russell
* Don’t care would be more to the point.
- Martin Davis1
Infinity occurs in many shapes and forms in mathematics. For example, the
transfinite numbers in set theory are very different from the infinity involved in a
limiting process limn→∞an, and from the infinite and infinitesimal quantities that
occur in nonstandard analysis. Historically, the infinite – both in the form of the
infinitely large and of the infinitely small – has always been at the center of crises
in foundations of mathematics (Dauben 1988). With the general acceptance of
set theory as the foundational framework for mathematics, it might seem as if
the infinite received its definite mathematical shape – and many see it indeed this
way.
A minority of mathematicians, however, objects to set theory. Such objec-
tions generally arise from fundamentally differing views concerning the nature of
mathematics and the objects with which it deals (Feferman 1998). In turn, these
differing views concerning the nature of mathematics lead to alternative views
1 Quotes after Dauben (1988).
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about the meaning of words such as or, of implication, and of quantification, and
consequently about what is a proof in mathematics.
In this chapter, we will discuss several of the different shapes that infinity
takes in mathematics. We will start with an introduction of the concept of infinite
number (section 2.1). Next, we will introduce set theory: the theory of the actual
infinite (section 2.2), constructive mathematics: the theory of the potential infinite
(section 2.3), and nonstandard analysis: the theory of the infinitesimal (section
2.4). Finally, we will compare these three mathematical systems with respect to
their ontology, and we will see that also in mathematics there is idealization.
2.1 Measuring the infinite: Infinite numbers
One of the central issues concerning mathematical infinity – an issue that occupied
the greatest minds in Western thought for millennia – is whether it can be mea-
sured (Mancosu 2009). That is to ask, in other words, can the concept of number
be extended to infinite sets? Throughout history various thinkers have come up
with different approaches to infinite sets in order to develop a general notion of
number – that is, a notion of number applicable to both finite and infinite sets
–, but nobody managed to do so in a mathematically satisfactory manner until
Cantor developed his set theory.
The reason for the trouble in developing a general notion of number is the
paradoxical character of the infinite. To be precise, the problem is that regarding
to the notion of size we have two pre-theoretic intuitions, which contradict each
other in case of infinite sets (cfr. Benci, Di Nasso & Forti 2006, Mancosu 2009,
Parker 2013). These intuitions are:
PW The whole is strictly bigger than any of its proper parts;
HP Two sets of which the elements can be put in one-to-one correspondence are
equally big.
We call the first PW for part-whole principle, the second HP for Hume’s principle.2
PW and HP are perfectly compatible as long as the sets under consideration are
2 Hume (Treatise I, iii, 1), was quoted by Frege when he gave his contextual definition of
cardinal number (Grundlagen, §63): “When two numbers are so combined as that one has
always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal.” The label
‘Hume’s principle’ was introduced by Boolos (1987), and is now common in neo-logicist literature
(cfr. Zalta 1998).
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finite, for finite sets can be put in one-to-one correspondence just in case none of
them is a proper part of another. For this reason, we are inclined to apply PW
and HP indiscriminately when thinking about the notion of size. With regard
to infinite sets, however, PW and HP are in conflict: infinite sets can be put in
one-to-one correspondence with a proper part of themselves, and thus a proper
part of an infinite set which is itself infinite (such as the set of squares, which is
a proper part of the set of natural numbers) is smaller than the whole set on the
basis of PW, but just as big as the whole set on the basis of HP.3 For long, it has
been generally acknowledged that it is impossible to develop a notion of size which
is applicable to both finite and infinite sets and which respects both pre-theoretic
intuitions PW and HP. Existing general accounts of size either sacrifice PW or
HP, or deny that it is meaningful to compare infinite sets with respect to their
size (cfr. Mancosu 2009).
As is well known, Cantor’s big accomplishment was to recognize that HP –
i.e. one-to-one correspondence between or equinumerosity of sets – is a fruitful
concept to study and could provide us with a measure for infinite sets just as it
does for finite ones (cfr. Potter 2004, pp. 153, 155). Of the pre-theoretic intuitions
concering the notion of size, Cantor fully endorsed HP, and weakened PW down
to (cfr. Benci et al. 2006, Mancosu 2009):
WPW The part is not bigger than the whole.4
On this basis, Cantor developed two general ways of counting, i.e. two concepts
3 A proper paradox can be formulated as follows (Mancosu 2009, p. 630): Assume that both
PW, if A is a subcollection of B then s(A) < s(B), and HP, s(A) = s(B) if and only if there is a
one-to-one correspondence between A and B, hold for infinite sets. Let B be the set of natural
numbers. Let A be the set of even numbers. Since A ⊂ B by PW we have that A is smaller than
B, s(A) < s(B). But A and B can be put in one-to-one correspondence. So, by HP, A and B
are equally big, s(A) = s(B). Hence s(A) < s(A). Contradiction.
4 Cantor himself was perfectly aware of the fact that his theory only partly reflected our
pre-theoretic intuition of size, for he stressed that in some sense the set of all natural numbers is
bigger, namely richer, than the set of even numbers, while in another sense, namely in the sense
of cardinality, both sets have the same size: “Let M be the totality (n) of all finite numbers n,
M ′ the totality (2n) of all even numbers 2n. Here it is definitely correct to say that according
to its entities M is richer than M ′; indeed, M contains in addition to the even numbers, which
make up M ′, also the uneven numbers M ′′. On the other hand, it is also definitely correct that
both sets M and M ′ [. . . ] have the same cardinal number. Both (propositions) are certain and
they do not conflict with each other if one carefully observes the distinction between reality and
number. One should therefore say: the set M has more reality than M ′, because it contains as
parts M ′ and M ′′ in addition; the cardinal numbers corresponding to them are however equal.
When will these easy and enlightening truths be finally acknowledged by all thinkers?” (Cantor
1887, my emphasis).
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of number applicable to both finite and infinite sets.
The first kind of number that Cantor developed is the cardinal number or
cardinality, card(A) of a set A. According to the notion of cardinality, two sets
have the same size if and only if they are equinumerous, i.e. if there exists a
one-to-one correspondence between them (cfr. Potter 2004, Fletcher 2007):
card(A) = card(B) iff A and B are equinumerous;
card(A) ≤ card(B) iff A is equinumerous with a subset of B.
The order of a set is disregarded in case of cardinal numbers: cardinals describe
the size of a set in such a way that every method of counting gives the same result
(Weisstein n.d.).
The second kind of number that Cantor developed is the ordinal number, or
order type of a well-ordered set (A,6).5 Order types encode whether structures are
isomorphic, i.e. whether there exist an order-preserving mapping between them
(Potter 2004, p. 179):
ord(A, r) = ord(B, s) iff (A, r) and (B, s) are isomorphic;
ord(A, r) 6 ord(B, s) iff (A, r) is isomorphic to an initial subset of (B, s).
The ordinal numbers have the following structure: every ordinal number has an
immediate successor known as a successor ordinal; and for any infinitely ascending
sequence of ordinal numbers, there is a limit ordinal which is greater than all
the members of the sequence and which is not the immediate successor of any
member of the sequence. The first ordinal number is the empty set, Ø, the finite
ordinal numbers are those obtained by starting with Ø and repeatedly taking the
successor (Bagaria 2001). In set theory the natural numbers are defined as the
finite ordinals. The first transfinite ordinal number, i.e. the first ordinal number
greater than all natural numbers, but not an immediate successor of any of them,
is ω. Thus, after all the finite numbers comes the first transfinite number, ω,
which is followed by ω + 1, ω + 2, . . . , ω + ω = ω · 2, . . . , ω · n, ω · n + 1, . . . ,
ω · ω = ω2, ω2 + 1, . . . , ωω, . . . and so on and on (Ferreirós 2007).
Note that ordinals describe the ‘size’ of a set in the sense of its numerical
position in a sequence, whereas cardinals describe its ‘size’ regardless of order, only
5 A set is well-ordered if it is equipped with an ordering relation under which every non-empty
subset has a least element.
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in terms of what is called the set’s “power”. That these are two different notions
of size is clear from the fact that a given set may be bigger than another when
regarded as an ordinal, but not when regarded as a cardinal. For example, ordinal
numbers ω+1, ω+2, . . . are bigger than ω in the sense of order, i.e. as ordinals, but
they are not bigger in the sense of equinumerosity, i.e. as cardinals (Weisstein n.d.).
In fact, to every infinite cardinal correspond many infinite ordinals.
On the assumption of the axiom of choice,6 which implies that every set can
be well-ordered and can therefore be associated with an ordinal number, the
cardinals can be enumerated through the ordinals; in fact, the two can be put
into one-to-one correspondence (Weisstein n.d.). This leads to the definition of
cardinal number for a set A as the least ordinal number b such that A and b are
equinumerous (Weisstein n.d., Bagaria 2001). Cantor believed that every set could
be well-ordered and used this correspondence to define the ℵ ’s, “alephs”. For any
ordinal number α, ℵα = ωα (Weisstein n.d.). All the finite ordinals are cardinals,
and the first infinite cardinal, i.e. the cardinal number of N is denoted by ℵ0. The
sequence of the well-orderable infinite cardinals looks like this (Bagaria 2001):
ℵ0,ℵ1,ℵ2, . . . ,ℵω,ℵω+1,ℵω+ω, . . . ,ℵω2 , . . . ,ℵωω , . . .
Importantly, Cantor used his notion of cardinality to compare relevant sets
and showed that there are infinite sets of different sizes. As Potter (2004, p. 153)
writes, this showed that the notion of cardinality did not only give rise to a
coherent notion of size, but also to a fruitful one. A pivotal step in the acceptance
of Cantorian set theory was his famous diagonal argument to the effect that the
cardinality of R is strictly greater than the cardinality of N.7 This argument
shows that given any enumeration of a subset of R, one can construct a number
belonging to that subset that is not in the enumeration. In other words, the proof
shows that the real numbers cannot be put in one-to-one correspondence, and
thus are not equinumerous, with the natural numbers, so card(R) 6= ℵ0.
6 We will discuss the axiom of choice in section 2.2 below.
7 The proof based on the diagonal argument was Cantor’s second proof to the effect that
the cardinality of R is strictly greater than the cardinality of N; first he gave a proof based
on the special properties of R. The diagonal proof is however very appealing for its simplicity,
and moreover can be generalized to make other cardinal comparisons. It is used in the proof of
Cantor’s theorem, which states that for every set S, the power set of S, ℘(S) – i.e. the set of
all subsets S′ of S – has a strictly greater cardinality than S. The set ℘(S) of all subsets S′
of S is called the “power set” of S, because for any set S it is equinumerous with {0, 1}S (the
correspondence puts 1 if the element i belongs to S′ and 0 otherwise), i.e. card(℘(S)) = 2card(S).
For a summary of the proof, see e.g. Feferman (1998, p. 33).
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Cantor’s work introduced some new concepts. Sets that are equinumerous with
N are called denumerable, and sets that are equinumerous with an initial segment
of N (possibly empty) are called finite. A set is called countable if it is either finite
or denumerable, and uncountable otherwise (George & Velleman 2002). Cantor’s
diagonal argument thus showed that R is uncountable.8 Other consequences of
Cantor’s theory are, for example, that the set of positive even numbers E =
{0, 2, 4, . . . , 2n, . . .} has the same cardinality as the set of the natural numbers
N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n, . . .}, i.e. card(E) = card(N), because the two sets can be put
in one-to-one correspondence. The same is true for the rational numbers, i.e. the
set Q = { nm : n,m ∈ Z,m 6= 0} (where Z = {. . . ,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}, i.e. the
set of integers) consisting of all the quotients or ratio’s of integers with non-zero
denominators: card(N) = card(Q) (Feferman 1998, p 32). Thus, we clearly see
here that cardinality gives us a notion of size on the basis of HP (see above): the
set of even number is a proper part of the set of natural numbers, and the set of
natural numbers is a proper part of the set of rational numbers, but according to
the notion of cardinality all three of them have the same size.
Thus, Cantor showed that it is indeed possibile to develop a mathematically
satisfactory notion of size which is applicable to both finite and infinite sets.
Cantor’s ideas were put to use more and more in mathematics, with the result
that these days they are largely taken for granted and are spread throughout
the whole of mathematics.9 As it was put by Fletcher (2007), the fact that
one can do calculations with infinities, i.e. that one can show, for example, that
8 A natural question to ask is whether R is, after N, the second smallest infinite set, i.e. whether
card(R) = ℵ1 (Feferman 1998, p. 38). The conjecture that this is the case is called the continuum
hypothesis. It was conjectured in 1878 by Cantor, but despite considerable effort he was unable
to prove it. Today, as a result of the work of Gödel in 1938 and Cohen in 1963, we know that, if
set theory is consistent, then the continuum hypothesis is not provable nor disprovable (George
& Velleman 2002, p. 85).
9 Serious worries arose when, at the beginning of the 20th century, paradoxes appeared in
set theory by taking its ideas to what appeared to be their logical conclusion. One example is
Russell’s Paradox, also known to Zermelo: consider the property of sets of not being members of
themselves. If the property determines a set, call it A, then A is a member of itself if and only if
A is not a member of itself. In order to avoid such paradoxes, the notion of set was adjusted as to
exclude certain collections, like the collection of all sets, the collection of all ordinals numbers, or
the collection of all cardinal numbers. Such collections are called proper classes (Bagaria 2001).
When Zermelo developed an axiom system allowing one to develop Cantorian theory in full
while avoiding all known paradoxical constructions, some measure of confidence in set theory
was restored (Feferman 1998, p. 29). The now common axiomatization is called Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, abbreviated ZFC (where C stands for the axiom of choice).
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5(ω+ 1)(ω23 + 4) = ω33 +ω4 + 5 and ℵ37 x ℵ20 = ℵ37, convinced mathematicians
that transfinite numbers were just as real as finite numbers, and that Cantor’s
theory represented a genuine advance over all previous thinking about infinity.
However, there are still a number of thinkers who object to the diffusion of
set theory in mathematics. Partly, these objections stem from fundamentally dif-
fering views concerning the nature of mathematics and the objects with which it
deals (Feferman 1998, pp. 29-30).10 For another part, objections stem from dis-
satisfaction with the weird arithmetic properties of Cantor’s transfinite numbers,
and with the fact that the part-whole principle is not respected in the notions of
size which underly set theory (Mancosu 2009).
These latter objections to set theory inspired recent mathematical develop-
ments that develop anonther general notion of number by generalizing the part-
whole principle to infinite sets (see Mancosu 2009). The most noteworthy of
those is Benci’s theory of numerosities (Benci 1995, Benci & Di Nasso 2003, Benci
et al. 2006, Benci, Bottazzi & Di Nasso 2014). Numerosities are, just as cardi-
nals and ordinals, an extension of the notion of ‘number’ to infinite sets, but in
such a way that the part-whole principle (PW) is completely respected. Hume’s
principle, however, is weakened to (Benci et al. 2006):
WHP Equinumerous sets are in one-to-one correspondence.
Numerosities have some nice properties which make that they are closer to our
intuitions regarding the concept of number than are Cantor’s ordinals and car-
dinals. For example, the numerosity of a proper subset is strictly smaller than
the numerosity of the whole set, the numerosity of a disjoint union is the sum
of the numerosities, and the numerosity of a Cartesian product is the product of
the numerosities (Benci & Di Nasso 2003). All the standard algebraic laws for
addition and multiplication hold for numerosities. As Mancosu writes, the theory
of numerosities generalizes finite arithmetic much more thoroughly than Cantor’s
theory of ordinals or cardinal numbers (Mancosu 2009, p. 641).
In addition, numerosities can be interpreted as the set of hypernatural num-
bers, and hence be used to construct infinitesimals. Set theory, on the other hand,
does not provide a natural way to introduce infinitesimal analysis. As Benci et al.
(2006) put it themselves, numerosities offer a way of unifying the construction of
10 We will discuss such objections in the next section.
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the infinitely large and the infinitely small. Moreover, numerosities can be used
to assign uniform probability distributions over infinite domains, such as for ex-
ample the fair infinite lottery on N (Benci, Horsten & Wenmackers 2016). The
theory of numerosities has however some less desirable features as well, such as for
example the fact that the numerosities one obtains heavily depends on the choice
of ultrafilter. As Mancosu (2009) shows, depending on whether the ultrafilter one
chooses contains the even numbers or the odd numbers, it will turn out that this
will affect such properties as whether the numerosity of the natural numbers is
even or odd.
Both set theory and the theory of numerosities are based upon the idea that
the finite and the infinite can be treated on the same footing. A precondition for
the acceptance of both of them is that one should accept the consistency of the
notion of infinite set, and thus the notion of actual infinity. In the next subsection,
we will go on to discuss set theory, and consider some objections against it.
2.2 The actual infinite: Set theory
The essence of set theory is the study of infinite sets, and therefore it can be de-
fined as the mathematical theory of the actual – as opposed to potential – infinite
(Bagaria 2001). It studies well-determined collections called sets, of objects that
are called members or elements of the set. In set theory, sets are given axiomat-
ically, so their existence and basic properties are postulated by the appropriate
formal axioms. The axioms of set theory imply the existence of a set-theoretic
universe so rich that all mathematical objects can be construed as sets. Set theory
is foundational in the sense that any mathematical object whatsoever can always
be viewed as a set (or a proper class11). The properties of the object can then
be expressed in the language of set theory. Any mathematical statement can be
formalized into the language of set theory, and any mathematical theorem can be
derived, using the calculus of first-order logic, from the axioms of ZFC, or from
some extension of ZFC. It is in this sense that set theory provides a foundation
for mathematics (Bagaria 2001, section 5).
According to Potter, one measure of the success of set theory is that it is
nowadays a commonplace in the toolkit of most pure mathematicians; another
11 See footnote 9.
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measure of its success is that hardly any mathematician now thinks the existence
of infinite sets might be logically inconsistent, or even incoherent. As Potter points
out, if some are finitists and oppose to the notion of infinite set, it is because they
are unconvinced by the positive arguments for the existence of infinite sets, not
because they think there is a negative argument which shows that there are none
(Potter 2004, p. 205, cfr. p. 69). However, there are still a number of thinkers
who object to the panoply of set theory in mathematics. According to Feferman
(1998, pp. 29-30), objections to set theory consist in fundamentally differing views
concerning the nature of mathematics and the objects with which it deals.
What are the features of set theory which are considered problematic by its
critics? Here we will discuss nine of them:12
1. Sets as independent existents. According to set theory, mathematics is the
study of a fixed universe of actually-infinite mathematical objects, existing
independently of our ability to construct them. Since sets are supposed to
be part of an external, objective reality, it is commonly held that the notion
of actual infinity presupposes Platonism about mathematical objects (see
e.g. Weyl 1949, Fletcher 2007, Feferman 1998).13 Platonism in set theory
reveals itself most obviously in the axiom of extensionality (if two sets A and
B have the same elements, then they are equal – or in other words, a set
is determined entirely by its members and is to be regarded independently
of any specific means of determining what these members are) and in the
axiom of choice (see number 5 below; Bagaria 2001, Feferman 1998).
2. Actual infinity. It is essential to set theory that infinite sets exist as com-
pleted objects. As pointed out by Potter (2004, pp. 70, 72), there is very
little that can be offered as a justification for the assumption of the exis-
tence of an infinite set (or an equivalent form of the axiom of infinity); the
only possibility would be to justify it relative to some other infinitary theory
12 The first seven objections are discussed in Feferman (1998, ch. 2), the last two in Benci &
Di Nasso (2003) and Mancosu (2009).
13 Alternatively, set theory can be justified by formalism or pragmatism about (higher) math-
ematics (Feferman 2009). On such accounts, however the applicability of mathematics is even
more problematic (see for example Horsten 2007, Pincock n.d.). For this reason we will discard
these alternatives in this dissertation, however, the topic of alternatives to Platonism about set
theory and their relation to the applicability problems evidently merits further discussion.
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(such as Euclidean geometry), but this undermines the foundational role of
set theory.
3. Arbitrary (sub)sets. For each set, any arbitrary combination of its elements
is supposed to exist as a well-determined set in its own right. As pointed
out by Feferman (1998, p. 45), this should not be taken to mean that only
definable subsets of a set are assumed to exist. Moreover, the axiom of
separation (for every set A and every given property – given by a formula φ
of the first-order language of set theory -, there is a set containing exactly
the elements of A that have that property; thus, separation is not a single
axiom but an axiom schema, that is, an infinite list of axioms, one for each
formula φ; Bagaria 2001, section 2.1), which can be used to define subsets of
a given set, allows for impredicative definition in case the formula φ contains
unbounded quantifiers ranging over the whole universe of sets, i.e. to define
an object by reference to a totality which includes the object to be defined
(Crosilla 2009, section 1.3.1).14
4. Power sets. For each set S, the totality ℘(S) of arbitrary subsets of S
is supposed to exist as another set, called the power set. The power set
of an infinite set can never by explicitly constructed: in the case of an
infinite set we have no idea of what counts as an arbitrary subset of it.
As a consequence, there seems to be no way of generating all the subsets
of an infinite set, and so we have no way to form the set of all of them
(Crosilla 2009, section 1.3). Moreover, by Cantor’s theorem, for any set S
the cardinality of ℘(S) is strictly greater than that of S, and thus formation
of power sets leads to higher and higher infinities. In addition, according
to Feferman (1998, p. 45), the existence of power sets justifies impredicative
definition, for a subset S′ of a set S can be singled out by reference to the
power set (for example, as the intersection of all subsets X of S satisfying
a given condition).
5. The axiom of choice. For every set A of pairwise-disjoint non-empty sets,
there exists a set that contains exactly one element from each set in A. The
objection against this axiom is that it asserts existence of an object without
14 We will discuss impredicative definitions in a bit more detail in relation to predicativism in
section 3.2.
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providing any means to construct it uniquely (Feferman 1998, p. 40). It
has rather unintuitive consequences, such as the Banach-Tarski paradox,
which says that the unit ball can be partitioned into finitely-many pieces,
which can then be rearranged to form two unit balls (Bagaria 2001, section
2.1). The axiom of choice is equivalent to the well-ordering principle, which
asserts that every set can be well-ordered, i.e. it can be linearly ordered so
that every non-empty subset has a minimal element (Bagaria 2001, section
2.1).
6. Relations and functions as sets. A relation R between elements of a set
S1 and those of a set S2 is in set theory simply an arbitrary set of pars in
S1 x S2. Similarly, functions from S1 to S2 are many-one relations. This
reduction goes far beyond the mathematician’s experience; in particular,
the reduction of functions to sets goes far beyond the previous conception
of functions as given by laws (Feferman 1998, p. 45).
7. Objectivity of truth and classical logic. The meaning of statements is given
by their truth conditions, that truth is independent of our means of knowing
it. A statement is true or false independently of our ability to verify it,
because there is supposed to be a certain fact of the matter (Fletcher 2007).
The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) is accepted for every proposition P .
As a consequence, proof by contradiction is an accepted method. Coupled
with LEM, the usual laws of quantification yield the possibility to establish
an existence result ∃xP (x) from a contradiction derived from ∀x ¬P (x),
without any indication as to how to produce an element x to satisfy P (x)
(Feferman 1998, p. 45).
8. Weird algebraic properties for infinite sets. The idea behind transfinite num-
bers is that they allow one do arithmetic with infinite numbers in a way that
is analogous to the arithmetic on finite numbers (see section 2.1 above).
However, Cantor’s theory has weird algebraic properties. For example, if a
and b are cardinal numbers, then (Benci & Di Nasso 2003, Benci et al. 2006):
(2.1) a+ b = a× b = max(a, b)
whenever a is infinite and b 6= 0. That is, when counting cardinal numbers
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one may add elements to an infinite set without making the set bigger.
Furthermore, if one adds an element at the bottom of an infinite well-ordered
set, its ordinal number does not change, while its ordinal number becomes
bigger if the element is added at the top (Benci & Di Nasso 2003):
(2.2) 1 + ω = ω < ω + 1
9. Part-whole principle not respected. The set theoretical conceptions of size
and number do not satisfy the intuitive principle that the whole is always
bigger than a proper part of it (see section 2.1 above).
Note that these differing views concerning the nature of mathematics and
the objects with which it deals also influence the conception of what is a proof
in mathematics. This issue rises, for example, with regard to Cantor’s diagonal
argument: if one does not accept completed infinity, then the diagonal argument
merely shows that given any collection of real numbers, a real number which is
not yet in the collection can be constructed (Potter 2004, p. 138, cfr. Feferman
1998, p. 46). That is, if one does not accept completed infinity, then the diagonal
argument does not show that there are more real numbers than natural numbers.15
Following up on the above objections to set-theory, alternative schemes for the
foundations of mathematics have been developed, with the aim of demonstrating
that everyday mathematics can be accounted for in a direct and straightforward
way on philosophically acceptable, non-Cantorian grounds. The results that have
been obtained in this direction led Feferman to conjecture that
“a case can be made that higher set theory is dispensable in sci-
entifically applicable mathematics, that is, in that part of everyday
mathematics which finds its applications in other sciences. Put in
other terms: the actual infinite is not required for the mathematics of
the physical world” (Feferman 1998, p. 30, emphasis in the original).
15 Note furthermore that Cantor’s diagonal argument is a reductio ad absurdum and that
therefore the acceptance of the conclusion relies on the Law of the Excluded Middle. There is
also another proof to the effect that the reals are of a higher-order infinity than the rationals
(which is not a reductio), namely Borel’s proof to the effect that any countable subset of reals
is infinitesimal with respect to all reals (Chaitin 2006, section 2.2). However, Borel also proved
that most reals are inaccessible to us, since they can never be picked out as individuals using
any conceivable mathematical tool. In Borel’s view all these reals, and thus most reals, are
“mathematical fantasies” (Chaitin 2006, section 2.5).
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2.3 The potential infinite: Constructive mathematics
In the previous section we have seen that even though set theory is accepted by
the majority of the mathematical community and permeates the whole of present-
day mathematics, this does not mean that this status quo goes undisputed. Some
mathematicians take concepts such as Cantor’s transfinite numbers, axioms such
as the axiom of choice, and paradoxes such as the Banach-Tarski paradox as signs
that the discipline has strayed too far from the realm of ideas accessible to the
human mind (Maloney 2008). Constructivism can be seen as a conservative at-
titude towards this issue, aiming to build and to keep mathematics within the
realm of what is accessible to the human mind.16 According to constructivists it
is epistemologically problematic or meaningless to talk of some particular mathe-
matical object if that object is not constructed. In classical mathematics such talk
is allowed, for it’s logical principles – i.e. classical logic – permit to conclude that
a certain object exists if the assumption of its non-existence leads to a contradic-
tion. Constructivism, in other words, rejects the classical mathematical practice
of taking mathematical objects to exists independently of our ability to find or
construct them.17
A particular notion that is considered problematic is set theory’s notion of
infinity as actual infinity.18 In fact, constructive mathematics can be seen as
the project of showing that actual infinity is not indispensable for mathematics.
Constructivism rejects the notion of actual infinity, and adopts potential infinity
instead. In the constructive view, infinite sets and infinite objects are never ‘fin-
ished’, but rather are perceived as developing in the course of time (Waaldijk 2005,
p. 24).
To illustrate the difference between actual and potential infinity, we will start
by considering some examples of mathematical concepts which change their mean-
ing according to whether infinity is understood actually or potentially. As an
actually infinite collection, the natural numbers are understood as the set of all
16 There are several versions of constructivism, and the notion of infinity and its potentiality
takes in each of these theories a (slightly) different shape. We will not go into these differences
in this section; the interested reader can consult (Bridges & Palmgren 1997).
17 ‘Finding’ and ‘constructing’ an object is for constructivists the same thing (cfr. Schechter
2001).
18 Some versions of constructivism do accept the natural numbers as an actually infinite
collection. In this section, we will be talking about versions of constructivism that do not. We
will say a bit more about different versions of constructivism in section 3.2.
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natural numbers N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}, thought of as given once and for all. As
a potential infinity, instead, the natural numbers are understood as a generating
process 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → . . ., which can be continued as long as one pleases.
Importantly, thought of as a potentially infinite collection, at any stage of the
generating process, the collection of natural numbers has only a finite number
of elements. Also other mathematical concepts in which a reference is made to
the notion of infinity can be understood in different ways. For example, the sum
of an infinite series
∑∞
n=1 an, is as an actual infinity understood as the addition
of infinitely many quantities, and as a potential infinity instead as the limit of
finite sums,
∑N
n=1 an. Similarly, an integral
∫ b
a f(x)dx, is as an actual infinity,
understood as the addition of infinitely many infinitesimal areas f(x)dx, and as
a potential infinity defined in terms of the supremum and infimum of finite sums
of areas. We could thus say that in case of potential infinity, the reference to
infinities is merely apparent, infinities are ‘explained away’ in finite terms (cfr.
Fletcher 2007). Now, in modern analysis infinitesimals and infinite quantities
are banished in favor of arbitrarily small positive numbers ε and arbitrarily large
natural numbers N . Did modern analysis banish actual infinity? No, underlying
these uses of potential infinity are two uses of actual infinity: the concept of an
actually infinite set (e.g. the set of all natural numbers, N , the set of all real
numbers, R) and the concept of infinite quantifiers, ranging over actually infinite
sets (‘for all x,. . . ’, ‘there exists a δ . . . ’). Thus, in modern analysis – and conse-
quently in the physics that uses it – potential and actual infinity are intertwined
(cfr. Fletcher 2007).
The difference between actual and potential infinity is perhaps most clear in
the concept of the continuum. Classically conceived, real numbers are (following
Cantor) equivalence classes of completed Cauchy sequences of rationals {rn}, each
of which represents a determinate position on the rational line, and which, taken
together, form an uncountable set: the classical continuum.19 Constructively con-
ceived, real numbers are uncompleted Cauchy sequences of rationals < rn >, each
of which, at each stage in their determination, represents an open interval on the
rational line, and which, taken together, form an indefinitely refinable coordinate
system within the continuum.20 Thus, classical real numbers are actually infinite
19 We will discuss Cantor’s conception of the continuum – as well as other conceptions – in
more detail in section 3.1.
20 Note that the criterion for Cauchy convergence, too, differs in the constructive from that
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objects: they are infinite Cauchy sequences of rationals {rn} which are assumed to
be completely given. Constructive real numbers, instead, are potentially infinite
objects: they are Cauchy sequences of rationals < rn > which can be indefinitely
extended. Constructive real numbers are never completely given and are said to
generate the real number to which they converge. The dimensionless points which
constitute the classical continuum are within constructive mathematics conceived
as unattainable theoretical limits to the process of dissection.
Many theorems of classical real analysis have a constructive counterpart –
although sometimes with a strengthened hypothesis or a weakened conclusion
(cfr., e.g., Bridges & Dedui 1997). There are, however, classical theorems which
do not have a constructive counterpart, that is, theorems which cannot be proved
in constructive mathematics – i.e. using intuitionistic logic – and it can be proved
that they cannot.21 Also the converse obtains: constructive theorems which are
classically false. Here we will discuss one such example, which is particularly
relevant to the case of phase transitions: the constructive theorem to the effect
that any function defined on every real number is continuous. To be precise, this
is not in all systems of constructive mathematics a theorem. It is a theorem in
Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis, where it is a consequence of the representation
of real numbers as choice sequences. Brouwer also assumes the principle of bar
induction, which leads to the stronger theorem that any function on an interval
[a, b] is uniformly continuous (see e.g. Brouwer 1927/ 1967, ?).22 In Bishop’s
constructive analysis there is no continuity theorem, but all the obvious ways of
defining a discontinuous function fail (see e.g. Beeson 1985).
Why are there no discontinuous functions defined on every real number in
constructive mathematics? This may be recognized in the following way. Recall
that constructive real numbers are uncompleted Cauchy sequences of rationals
< rn >. Suppose that f is a function from R to R, and take x =< rn > and
in the classical framework: In classical mathematics, a sequence of rationals {rn} satisfies the
Cauchy criterion for convergence if for any positive real number ε, there exist a natural number
N(ε), such that for every n > N(ε) and every p > 0, |an+p−an| < ε. In constructive mathematics,
on the other hand, a sequence 〈rn〉 of rationals satisfies the Cauchy criterion for convergence if
for every natural number k, we can effectively construct a natural number N(k), such that for
every n > N(k) and every p > 0, |an+p − an| < 1k .21 See Schechter (2001) for an example.
22 It must be noted though, that in his Cambridge lectures, Brouwer also considered ‘measur-
able functions’: functions that are defined almost everywhere on R, but need not be continuous,
and thus could be used as a way of modeling discontinuous phenomena (van Dalen 1981).
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f(x) =< sn >. At any particular stage n, we have a finite amount of information
about the terms of < rn > (plus the information that < rn > is Cauchy), which
determines an interval within which x can develop in subsequent stages of its
generation – say from x − 1j to x +
1
j . This implies that likewise, at any stage
n we have a finite amount of information about the terms of < sn >, which
determines an interval within which f(x) can develop in subsequent stages of its
generation – say from f(x)− 1k to f(x) +
1
k . Thus, f(x) can be computed within
some approximation 1k for some positive integer k if x is known within
1
j for some
positive integer j. This means that f must be continuous. This is not a rigorous
argument, but should suffice to make the continuity theorem plausible (a similar
argument see e.g. Beeson 1985).
Another approach to see why there are no discontinuous functions defined on
every real number in constructive mathematics would be to consider why any
attempt to formulate a discontinuous function will fail. Consider some function
f defined by the equation:
f(x) =
0 if x ≤ 01 if x > 0
Recall that a function is a rule f which enables us, when given a real number
x, to compute another real number f(x), in such a way that when x = y, then
f(x) = f(y). Thus, in order to compute our f(x), we must for any given real
number be able to determine whether x ≤ 0 or x > 0. Suppose we have some
x =< rn > of which we know that up to some stage n, all digits of x are 0. At this
stage n, we cannot determine whether f(x) is 0 or 1. In fact, no finite amount of
computation will guarantee that we will be able to tell whether x ≤ 0 or x > 0,
so we have no guarantee that we will ever be able to compute f(x). Thus, the
above function f is not a function according to the constructivist, since it does
not tell us how to compute it at the point of discontinuity. A similar argument
applies to all discontinuous functions (see e.g. Beeson 1985).
It is however possible to obtain discontinuous transitions in constructive math-
ematics if we do not consider functions defined on every real number, but instead
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allow partial functions.23 To take a simple example:
g(x) =

−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
We can constructively define such an g as a map g : S → R, where S = {x ∈
R | x < 0 or x = 0 or x > 0}. Now, classically S is all of the reals, but
constructively S is only a subset of the reals. The function g is thus partial in the
sense that it is not defined on all of R. That this is the case, follows from the finite
amount of information we have about constructive real numbers at each stage of
their developments. To see this, consider a constructive real number x =< rn >
of which we know that up to some stage n all digits of x are 0: we have no
guarantee that we can ever determine which of x < 0, x = 0, or x > 0 is the case.
Thus, an element x ∈ S is a real number together with the information whether
x is negative, zero, or positive. Note that R\S = Ø, i.e. the complement of S
is empty: there is no real number which is neither negative, zero, nor positive.
Thus, S is not all of R, but neither is there a real number which is not in S.
As Bauer puts it, S should be regarded as R with extra information (personal
communication, see also Bauer 2012).
The most well-known – logical – difference between classical and constructive
mathematics is without doubt the invalidity in constructive mathematics of the
classical Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM). The invalidity of LEM in constructive
mathematics is a consequence of the view of infinite mathematical objects as ever
developing and never completely given: in constructive mathematics it cannot,
in general, be determined whether a proposition about them is true or false. For
example, for a constructive real number x =< rn > of which we know that up to
some stage n all digits of x are 0, we have no guarantee that we can ever determine
whether x = 0 or x > 0. As a consequence, the classical law of trichotomy fails
for constructive real numbers. That is to say, in classical mathematics, but not in
constructive mathematics, it is the case that for all real numbers x, y either x < y,
x > y, or x = y. It has been argued in the literature that in virtue of this failure of
trichotomy, constructivism fits well with the practice of measurement in physics, in
23 I thank Andrej Bauer for making me aware of this.
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which we always have some measurement error (e.g. Bauer 2012, Dummett 2000).
We will discuss this in section 3.3.
It is important to note that the invalidity of LEM in constructive mathematics
does not imply that there is no use for contradiction in constructive mathematics.
As was nicely clarified by Bauer, there are two kinds of proof which rely on
the derivation of a contradiction, and only one of them is constructively invalid
(Bauer n.d.). The first kind of proof goes as follows: to prove p, assume ¬p and
derive a contradiction. This principle of reasoning can be written as ¬¬p⇒ p, and
as such it is evident that this principle is justified by – and, in fact, is equivalent to
– LEM and is consequently constructively invalid. This is the kind of proof which
can be rightly called proof by contradiction. The other kind of proof which relies
on the derivation of a contradiction is just a proof of negation. The reasoning of
such a proof goes as follows: to prove ¬p, assume p and derive a contradiction.24
This is just the inference rule to prove a negation and is valid both classically and
constructively. As Bauer writes, proofs by contradiction can often be avoided,
proofs of negation cannot, and it is important to distinguish between the two.
In particular, with regards to a constructive perspective on physics, it should be
clear that there is no general reason why non-existence proofs – which play in
physics an important role – cannot be proved constructively.
Note further that given the invalidity of LEM in constructive mathematics,
double negation elimination is invalid and thus a proposition P and its double
negation ¬¬P are not equivalent (cfr. Bauer 2012). Whereas P holds if there
is evidence supporting it, ¬¬P holds if there is no evidence that there is no
evidence of P , i.e. ¬¬P holds when P cannot be falsified. Therefore, when we
have ¬¬P , we can say that P is potentially true. As Bauer explains, there is
a translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, called the double negation
translation, which transforms a given proposition by placing double negations in
front of every quantifier and logical connective. In terms of our terminology, it
inserts the adverb “potentially” everywhere, so the intuitionistic mathematician
can interpret the utterances of his classical colleague as statements about potential
truth. Unfortunately, there is no such translation for the opposite direction (Bauer
2012).
24 Note that a proof by contradiction can only be obtained from a proof of negation by plugging
in ¬p in place of p, if double negation elimination – or LEM – is assumed. Hence this trick works
only classically.
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In sum, constructive mathematics differs from classical mathematics before
all else in its conception of infinity. Whereas in classical mathematics an infinite
collection is thought of as given once and for all, in constructive mathematics
a collection is infinite if it can be indefinitely extended, and hence the notion
refers to arbitrarily large but finite quantities. As a consequence, constructive
real numbers are Cauchy sequences of rationals < rn > which can be indefinitely
extended and are never completely given. At each stage of their generation,
constructive real numbers have an extension. An important consequence of the
constructive conception of the continuum is that all real-valued functions are
continuous.
For a long time – basically, since the appearance of Brouwer’s dissertation in
which he first proposed intuitionism (a version of constructivism) as a foundational
framework for mathematics, until 1967 – it was thought that constructive math-
ematics was much too weak to be useful in the sciences (Bridges & Dedui 1997).
In 1967, however, this situation changed abruptly thanks to the appearance of
Errett Bishop’s Foundations of Constructive Analysis. Bishop developed, more or
less from scratch and without commitment to the (quasi-)metaphysical principles
which underlay the work of Brouwer, large parts of modern analysis by rigorously
constructive methods. Why, then, isn’t constructivism more popular than it in
fact is? I think we can agree with Dummett (1977) that, at least for an important
part, constructivism is unpopular because from purely mathematical considera-
tions it is pointless. The advantage of constructive over classical mathematics
regards primarily philosophical considerations. Since the problems surrounding
infinite idealizations which are discussed in this thesis are indeed philosophical
rather than technical, constructive mathematics might have relevant benefits over
classical mathematics in this context. We will discuss applicability of construc-
tive mathematics in physics with regard to case study 1, statistical-mechanical
theories of phase transitions, in chapter 4.
2.4 The infinitely small: Nonstandard analysis
In early stages of calculus, up to the first years of the nineteenth century, infinites-
imal quantities were widely used to develop many of the classic results of analysis.
Traditionally, an infinitesimal quantity is one which, while not necessarily coincid-
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ing with zero, is in some sense smaller than any finite quantity. An infinitesimal
number is one which, while not coinciding with zero, is in some sense smaller than
any finite number. This sense has often been taken to be the failure to satisfy the
Principle of Archimedes, which amounts to saying that an infinitesimal number is
one that, no matter how many times it is added to itself, the result remains less
than any finite number (Bell 2005).
Infinitesimals have been very useful in practice, but their apparently incon-
sistent character has been bothering mathematicians ever since their earliest ap-
pearance in the mathematics of the Greek philosopher Demokritos c. 450 BCE
(Bell 2005). In Euclidean mathematics they were banished, only to reappear in
the sixteenth century (idem.). Famously, Berkeley in the 18th century called them
“ghosts of departed quantities”, in the 19th century they were execrated by Can-
tor as “cholera-bacilli” infecting mathematics, and in the 20th Russell condemned
them as “unnecessary, erroneous, and self-contradictory” (Bell 2005). Finally,
infinitesimals were supplanted in the foundations of analysis when the rigorous
concept of limit made their appearance superfluous. With the work of Bolzano
and Weierstrass in the 19th century, in modern analysis infinitesimals and infi-
nite quantities are banished in favor of arbitrarily small positive numbers ε and
arbitrarily large natural numbers N .25
This situation changed in 1960 with the work of the mathematical logician
Abraham Robinson, which used the concepts and methods of the then recently
developed branch of mathematical logic called model theory to provide a suitable
framework for the development of the differential and integral calculus by means of
infinitely small and infinitely large numbers (see Robinson 1996, p. xiii). A basic
fact in model theory is that every infinite mathematical structure has nonstandard
models, i.e. non-isomorphic structures which satisfy the same elementary proper-
ties. The existence of nonstandard models was first shown by Thoralf Skolem in
the late twenties, which first, in the fifties, led to an intensive study of nonstan-
dard models of arithmetic. Robinson had the idea of systematically applying that
model-theoretic machinery to analysis. By considering nonstandard extensions of
the real number system, he was able to provide the use of infinitesimal numbers
25 Physicists, however, never abandoned the use of infinitesimals as a heuristic device for
the derivation of correct results in the application of the calculus to physical problems. Thus,
the proscription of infinitesimals did not succeed in extirpating them; they were, rather, driven
further underground (Bell 2005).
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with rigorous foundations, thus giving a solution to a century-old problem (Di
Nasso 1999).
Robinson’s nonstandard analysis (NSA) is an extension of mathematical anal-
ysis embracing both infinitely large and infinitesimal numbers in which the usual
laws of the arithmetic of real numbers continue to hold. By an infinitely large
number is meant one which exceeds every positive integer; the reciprocal of any
one of these is infinitesimal in the sense that, while being nonzero, it is smaller
than every positive fraction 1n . There are a number of ways of presenting non-
standard analysis. Here, I will follow Bell (2005) in presenting a sketch of one of
them.
The nonstandard universe ∗U = (∗U, ∗ ∈) is an extension of the standard
set-theoretical universe U = (U,∈), i.e. a set U containing the classical real line
R which is closed under the usual set-theoretic operations of union, power set,
Cartesian products and subsets, where ∈ is the usual membership relation on U .
L(U) is the extension of the first-order language of set theory to include a name u
for each element u of U . Using the well-known compactness theorem for first-order
logic, U is extended to ∗U , called a nonstandard universe, satisfying the following
key principle:
Saturation Principle. Let Φ be a collection of L(U)-formulas with
exactly one free variable. If Φ is finitely satisfiable in U , that is, if for
any finite subset Φ’ of Φ there is an element of U which satisfies all
the formulas of Φ’ in U , then there is an element of ∗U which satisfies
all the formulas of Φ in ∗U .
The saturation property, as Bell explains, expresses the intuitive idea that the
nonstandard universe is very rich in comparison to the standard one. While in
the standard universe U there may exist, for each finite subcollection F of a given
collection of properties P , an element of U satisfying the members of F , there
may not necessarily be an element of U satisfying all the members of P . In
the nonstandard universe ∗U , to the contrary, the saturation principle guarantees
the existence of an element of ∗U which satisfies, in ∗U , all the members of P .
For example, suppose the set N of natural numbers is a member of U ; for each
n ∈ N let Pn(x) be the property x ∈ N & n < x. Then clearly, while each
finite subcollection of the collection P = Pn : n ∈ N is satisfiable in U , the whole
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collection is not. In ∗U , to the contrary, the whole collection P is satisfiable; an
element of *U satisfying P in ∗U will then be a “natural number” greater than
every member of N, that is, an infinite number.
From the saturation property it follows that ∗U satisfies the important
Transfer Principle. If σ is any sentence of L(U), then σ holds in U
if and only if it holds in ∗U .
The transfer principle, as Bell writes, asserts that all first-order properties are
preserved in the passage to or “transfer” from the standard to the nonstandard
universe.
The members of U are called standard sets or standard objects; those in ∗U−U
nonstandard sets or nonstandard objects. Thus, ∗U consists of both standard and
nonstandard objects; the members of ∗U will also be referred to as *-sets or *-
objects. Since U ⊆ ∗U , under this convention every set (object) is also a *-set
(object). The *-members of a *-set A are the *-objects x for which x∗ ∈ A.
If A is a standard set, we may consider the collection Â, called the inflate of A,
consisting of all the *-members of A (this is not necessarily a set nor even a *-set).
The inflate Â of a standard set A may be regarded as the same set A viewed from
a nonstandard point of view. While clearly A ⊆ Â, Â may contain nonstandard
elements not in A. It can in fact be shown that infinite standard sets always
get “inflated” in this way. Using the transfer principle, any function f between
standard sets automatically extends to a function, also written f , between their
inflates. Thus, if A = (A,R, . . .) is a mathematical structure, we may consider
the structure Â = (Â, R̂). From the transfer principle it follows that A and Â
have precisely the same first-order properties.
Now suppose that we have a set U of which the set N of natural numbers is a
member. Then also the set R of real numbers is a member of U , since each real
number may be identified with a set of natural numbers. R may be regarded as
an ordered field, and the same is therefore true of its inflate R̂, since the latter
has precisely the same first-order properties as R. R̂ is called the hyperreal line,
and its members hyperreals.
A standard hyperreal is just a real, for emphasis we shall refer to it as a stan-
dard real. Since R is infinite, nonstandard hyperreals must exist. The saturation
principle implies that there must be an infinite (nonstandard) hyperreal, that is,
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a hyperreal a such that a > n for every n ∈ N.26 In that case its reciprocal 1a is
infinitesimal in the sense of exceeding 0 and yet being smaller than 1n+1 for every
n ∈ N. In general, we call a hyperreal an infinitesimal if its absolute value |a| is
less than 1n+1 for every n ∈ N. In that case the set I of infinitesimals contains not
just 0 but a substantial number (in fact, infinitely many) other elements. Clearly
I is an additive subgroup of R, that is, if a, b ∈ I, then a− b ∈ I.
The members of the inflate N̂ of N are called hypernatural numbers. As for
the hyperreals, it can be shown that N̂ also contains nonstandard elements which
must exceed every member of N; these are called infinite hypernatural numbers.
For hyperreals a, b we define a ≈ b and say that a and b are infinitesimally
close if a − b ∈ I. This is an equivalence relation on the hyperreal line: for each
hyperreal a we write µ(a) for the equivalence class of a under this relation and call
it the monad of a. The monad of a hyperreal a thus consists of all the hyperreals
that are infinitesimally close to a: it may be thought of as a small cloud centred
at a.
A hyperreal a is finite if it is not infinite; this means that |a| < n for some
n ∈ N. Finiteness is equivalent to the condition of near-standardness; a hyperreal
a is near-standard if a ≈ r for some standard real r. In other words, every finite
hyperreal lies infinitely close to a standard real.
It is useful to think of the notions of monad and near standardness by thinking
of different perspectives: a near standard hyperreal a, a ≈ r for some standard
real r, as well as all the other hyperreals different from r in the monad of r, may
be considered equal to r from a standard perspective but not from a nonstandard
perspective. Keisler introduced the concept of an “infinitesimal microscope” to
capture this notion: through an infinitesimal microscope we may see that there
is some infinitesimal difference between a and r, but without the microscope this
is invisible (Keisler 1986, cfr. Keisler 2007). Keisler illustrated the hyperreal line
with its monads as if seen through an “infinitesimal microscope” as in figure 2.1:
26 As Bell adds, it follows that R̂ is a nonarchimedean ordered field. One might question
whether this is compatible with the facts that R̂ and R share the same first-order properties,
since the latter is archimedean. In fact it is consistent, because the archimedean property is not
first-order. However, while R̂ is nonarchimedean, it is *-archimedean in the sense that, for any
a ∈ R̂ there is n ∈ N̂ for which a < n.
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Figure 2.1: Hyperreal line (Keisler 1986, p. 25)
When translating results obtained about the finite nonstandard reals to propo-
sitions about the standard reals, the nonstandard hyperreals can be discarded with
by means of the standard part function, st. The standard part function is a func-
tion from the finite hyperreal numbers to the real numbers, which “rounds off”
a finite hyperreal to the nearest standard real. The function st is represented in
figure 2.2 by a vertical projection. Again, an “infinitesimal microscope” is used
to view an infinitesimal neighborhood of a standard real number r; α, β and γ
represent typical infinitesimals (Bascelli et al., 2014).
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Figure 2.2: The standard part function, st. From Wikipedia, after Bascelli et al.,
2014.
Much of the usefulness of nonstandard analysis stems from the fact that state-
ments of classical analysis involving limits or the (ε, δ) criterion admit succinct,
intuitive translations into statements involving infinitesimals or infinite numbers,
in turn enabling comparatively straightforward proofs to be given of classical
theorems (Bell 2005). However, the hyperreals are also interesting from the per-
spective of modeling practice, given that they have different properties from the
standard reals. For example, since infinitesimals fail the Archimedean princi-
ple, the hyperreals are not complete,27 and can serve to build discrete models of
physical systems. We will discuss applicability of nonstandard analysis in physics
with regard to case study 2, indeterminism in Newtonian mechanics (“Norton’s
Dome”), in chapter 5.
27 We will discuss completeness in section 3.1.
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2.5 Idealization in mathematics
So far we have discussed classical mathematics (set theory), constructive mathe-
matics, and nonstandard analysis. The reader might have gotten the impression
that the two alternatives to classical mathematics that we discussed, i.e. construc-
tivism and nonstandard analysis, are each other’s opposites: whereas construc-
tivism is very careful not to introduce nonconstructable elements in the theory,
nonstandard analysis happily extends classical mathematics, by means of includ-
ing infinitely large and infinitely small numbers at the fundamental level. This
is in fact a common view about the relation between these three mathematical
systems. We find this view for example expressed by Bishop:
“[Constructive mathematics and nonstandard analysis] are at op-
posite poles. Constructivism is an attempt to deepen the meaning of
mathematics; nonstandard analysis, an attempt to dilute it further”
(Bishop 1972, quoted in Sanders 2017, p. 19).
Meaning, for Bishop, means computational content. That is, according to Bishop,
mathematics is meaningful when every statement has numerical meaning and
every object has an algorithmic description, i.e. it has been built using (and can in
principle be reduced to) algorithmic reasoning (Sanders 2017, p. 17). Nonstandard
analysis is not meaningful in Bishop’s view, because, as he sees it, the presence
of ideal objects (in particular infinitesimals) in nonstandard analysis yields the
absence of computational content (Sanders 2017, Sanders 2018).
Sanders shows that this is not completely true: there is substantial compu-
tational content in nonstandard analysis, for working with infinitesimals comes
down to making explicit calculations. As he puts it, infinitesimals actually provide
an elegant shorthand for expressing computational content (Sanders 2017, p. 24).
Sanders thus challenges the binary view that mathematics is either constructive
or not. In his view, rather than being altogether non-constructive, classical non-
standard analysis inhabits the twilight zone between the constructive and the
non-constructive: it is not the former as it (explicitly) includes the law of the ex-
cluded middle, but it also has ‘too many’ constructive properties to be dismissed
as merely the latter (Sanders 2018, p. 49).28
28 It should be kept in mind, however, that nonstandard analysis – at least, in its usual
development – involves quite non-constructive axioms. The usual development of Robinson’s
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So, how can we understand Bishop’s view that nonstandard analysis amounts
to the delution of meaning?29 Why are infinitesimals and infinite numbers sus-
pect? To better understand the different views on mathematical ontology, and in
particular why, according to some, ideal elements such as infinite numbers and
infinitesimals are suspect, we will discuss these views in relation to the notion of
idealization in mathematics.
It is quite common in mathematics to speak about “ideal” (or “imaginary”, or
even “impossible”) elements in contradistinction to “real” elements. This linguis-
tic practice can be explained by means of some kind of distinction, for example of
a metaphysical, epistemological, or psychological nature (cfr. Cantù 2013). Meta-
physically, it has been common to distinguish between formal and real elements,
where the latter as opposed to the former have a counterpart in the physical world.
For example, one might distinguish between a line segment, which is a represen-
tation of something real, and an infinite straight line, which has no counterpart
in the physical world (Cantù 2013). From an epistemological perspective the dis-
tinction might be traced between different grades of knowledge: higher or lower
certainty, greater or smaller perspicuity, higher or lower difficulty, or greater or
smaller efficiency of proofs. For example, one might distinguish between theories
that can be proved to be consistent and theories that cannot, or between finitary
and infinitary theories (Cantù 2013). From a psychological perspective there is
a distinction between elements that can be intuitively conceived, and elements
that cannot be intuited or represented. For example, the concept of unit and
the process of iteration are often conceived as intuitively conceived. According to
Bishop “[t]he positive integers and their arithmetic are presupposed by the very
nature of our intelligence and, we are tempted to believe, by the very nature of
intelligence in general”; therefore, in his view, “[t]he development of the positive
integers from the primitive concept of the unit, the concept of adjoining a unit,
and the process of mathematical induction carries complete conviction” (Bishop
nonstandard analysis proceeds via the construction of a nonstandard model using a free ultrafilter,
the existence of which is only slightly weaker than the axiom of choice in ZFC (Sanders 2017,
p. 20, n. 20; cfr. section 2.2 in this thesis). Alternatively, there are constructive developments
of NSA which do not make use of free ultrafilters (e.g. Palmgren 1998, see also the references in
Sanders 2017, section 3.3).
29 To be clear, I will not be concerned with exegesis of Bishop’s writings; rather, I will consider
how this idea fits with the constructive conception of mathematics as we have discussed in this
thesis (see section 2.3.).
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1967, quoted in Bridges & Palmgren 1997, section 3.1).
Where exactly the border between real and ideal elements is located, differs
between mathematical frameworks. For, as we have seen above, in (classical)
nonstandard analysis, the nonstandard objects – i.e. the infinitesimal and infinitely
large numbers – are typically conceived as ideal, in contradistinction to the real
numbers which are conceived as just that: real. In constructive mathematics,
to the contrary – as we have seen in section 2.3 – the classical real numbers
are conceived as ideal limits of the process of dissection. Thus, to answer the
above question how we can understand the view that nonstandard analysis is
a delution of meaning, we note that from the standard constructive perspective
classical nonstandard analysis can be seen as double idealization: already the
classical real numbers (limits of infinite sequences of reals) are ideal objects, and
the nonstandard elements (infinite numbers and infinitesimals) are another step
away from what is accessible to the human mind.30
Not only do classical and constructive mathematicians place the border be-
tween real and ideal elements differently, the distinction also has a different justi-
fication. As we discussed in section 2.3, constructivism can be seen as a reaction
to the abstract nature of classical mathematics (set theory) and its aim is to build
and keep mathematics within the realm of what is accessible to the human mind.
For this reason, restrictions are placed both on the objects studied and on the
methods of proof which may be applied: only those objects which are epistemo-
logically accessible are accepted, and the methods admitted guarantee that this
property is preserved when new objects are created from existing ones. The real-
ideal distinction in constructive mathematics is thus (primarily) epistemologically
motivated: real-ideal in constructive mathematics – i.e. constructed versus non-
constructed – is linked to higher versus lower certainty. This seems to be different
in case of (classical) nonstandard analysis, for if one already accepts the infinitary
objects and methods of classical mathematics, then the addition of infinite and
infinitesimal elements – which are consistent with classical mathematics and use
the same methods (classical logic) – does not seem epistemologically problematic.
Rather, it is suggested that infinite and infinitely small numbers in nonstandard
analysis are considered ideal in the sense that they are not intended by initial
30 Again, I am not arguing that this is Bishop’s view - nor the view of any actual constructivist
for that matter -, but merely that this is a way in which we can conceive the constructivist’s
objection against (the ideal objects in) classical nonstandard analysis.
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naive intuitions (Reeb 1981, quoted in Fletcher et al. 2017, section 8.2). The
real-ideal distinction in nonstandard analysis seems thus to have to do with the
distinction between the intuitable and the non-intuitable and can be said to be
psychological in character (cfr. Cantù 2013).31
It is important to note that the introduction of ideal objects – even when they
are regarded as epistemologically suspicious – is (usually) not considered to be
something in itself ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’. Bishop, for example, saw it this way:
“. . . idealistic mathematics is [not] worthless from the constructive
point of view. This would be as silly as contending that unrigorous
mathematics is worthless from the classical point of view. Every the-
orem proved with idealistic methods presents a challenge: to find a
constructive proof” (Bishop 1967, quoted in Sanders 2017).
Thus, in Bishop’s view classical – ideal – mathematics is not worthless, but rather
presents the challenge for the constructivist of finding a constructive proof and
thus giving it an epistemologically secure basis. Note that the constructivist does
have the means to talk about ideal mathematicals in his theory: as we have seen
in section 2.3, on the intuitionistic understanding of truth, ¬¬P holds if P cannot
be falsified. Thus, of classical truths which in constructive mathematics cannot
be proved nor disproved, a constructivist can say that they are potentially true
(Bauer 2012, section 1). Similarly, those objects of which the existence cannot be
proved constructively (i.e. objects which cannot be constructed), but neither can
be disproved, can be said to exist potentially in constructive mathematics.
In virtue of the use of intuitionistic logic there are thus two levels of existence
in constructive mathematics. Something similar holds for nonstandard analysis,
where there are two universes: the standard universe (which contains only the
standard reals) and the nonstandard universe (which contains besides the standard
reals also the nonstandard reals: infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers; see
section 2.4). This layered ontology, with a accompanying distinction between real
and ideal objects, is something that constructive mathematics and nonstandard
analysis have in common. This in contradistinction to set theory, which has a
very flat ontology. The flat ontology in set theory is a consequence of the use of
31 This applies, of course, only to the use of infinitesimals after Robinson. For before Robinson
with his standard analysis gave a mathematically rigorous treatment of infinitesimals, the worry
was indeed about their consistency and thus epistemological (see section 2.4).
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the law of the excluded middle – which permits to conclude that a certain object
exists if the assumption of its non-existence leads to a contradiction – and of the
fact that all elements – in particular the finite and the infinite – are treated on
the same footing (see section 2.2).
In sum, even though constructive mathematics and nonstandard analysis in
some sense are each others opposites – namely, in that the former has a restricted
and the latter an extended domain with respect to set theory – in another sense
they are more similar to each other than to set theory. Namely, whereas set theory
has a flat ontology, both constructive mathematics and nonstandard analysis have
a layered ontology with a distinction between real and ideal elements.32
32 I thank Sam Sanders (personal communication) for suggesting me to think about the dis-
tinction between set theory, constructive mathematics, and nonstandard analysis in this way.
Chapter 3
The continuum
The idea of never reaching the area of the circle, no matter how far
one might go in the sequence of polygons, although one approaches
it arbitrarily closely, strains the power of imagination to such a
degree that it will tend, at all cost, to bridge this gap extending,
as it were, between reality and the ideal. Under this psychological
pressure the – infinitely small or infinitely large? – step is taken
that leads to the assertion: the circle is a polygon with infinitely
many infinitely small sides.
- W.G. Hankel (1874)1
A prominent example of a mathematical entity that is considered to be in-
dispensable to science is the real number system or continuum. In the physical
sciences, many things – entities, such as electrons and planets; constraint surfaces,
such as table tops and domes; and dynamical variables, such as forces, positions,
and velocities – are mathematically represented by functions defined on Rn, the
n-dimensional space of real numbers (Stemeroff & Dyer 2016). Why do we model
physical quantities using R? “One main, if not compelling, reason for taking
[physical] quantities to have real-number values is that results of measuring them
can apparently always be reduced to the position of some sort of pointer in space
and space is modelled using R” (Isham & Butterfield 2000).
That space is modelled using R is no coincidence. For the mathematical
continuum – insofar as it is right to speak about the mathematical continuum,
1 Quoted in Weyl (1949, p. 43).
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see section 3.1 below – is developed precisely to reflect our intuitions about space.
According to our intuitive conception, space is infinite not only in the sense that
it never comes to an end; at every place it is also, so to say, inwardly infinite: it
is capable of infinite division. Points in space can only be fixed step-by-step by a
process of subdivision which progresses ad infinitum (cfr. Weyl 1949, p. 41).
The history of the mathematical continuum goes back to the pure geometry
of the ancient Greeks. For them, real numbers are given as the ratio of two given
segments, and thus it is up to geometry to tell us what numbers exist (Weyl 1949,
pp. 38-39). The discovery of the irrationality of the ratio
√
2 of the diagonal and
side of a square made it clear that the fractions are not the only possible quantities
measuring ratios of line segments, and thus not the only “real numbers” (ibid).
These “gaps” on the continuous number line which are not filled by fractions
(rationals) are the irrational numbers. Applying the idea of existence to all the
points in space, the Greek geometers recognized that the continuum must be
“completed” with irrational numbers in order to make it “gapless”. Thus, in this
manner the continuum is supposed to reflect our intuition of the completeness
of space: just as space, according to our intuition, is complete in the sense that
it has no gaps which do not correspond to a physical point, the mathematical
continuum or real line is complete in the sense that it has no gaps which are not
covered by a mathematical point or real number.
Only in the 19th century did mathematics go beyond the ancient Greeks
(Weyl 1949, p. 39). At that time it was recognized that in the Euclidean de-
velopment of geometry completeness was assumed: several of its proofs assume
the existence of certain points that are supposed to be there, but their existence is
not guaranteed by the Euclidean postulates. For example, in Euclid it is assumed
that a continuous curve joining the center of a circle to a point outside of it meets
the circumference (Weyl 1949, p. 40). However, the curve and the circle might be
“gappy” – i.e. incomplete – and thus they might fail to have a point in common.
In response, several improved – set-theoretic (Cantor, Dedekind) and geomet-
ric (Hilbert) – characterizations of the continuum were developed. In particular,
when it comes to completeness, there are several different methods of filling the
“gaps” in the rational line, leading to various and under certain conditions equiva-
lent versions of the completeness axiom, and thus various versions of the (classical)
continuum. In additon, a minority of mathematicians argued that the classical
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continuum does not reflect our intuitions about space and other physical quan-
tities accurately, and developed alternative, non-classical – e.g. intuitionistic –
conceptions of the continuum.
In this chapter we will discuss different conceptions of the continuum. We will
start by discussing six classical conceptions of the continuum (section 3.1), and
then proceed by discussing three non-classical conceptions (section 3.2). In the
last section of this chapter we will consider some arguments against (the necessity
of) using the classical continuum for modeling in physics (section 3.3).
3.1 Classical conceptions of the continuum
It is common to refer to the continuum, as if it is a uniquely determined concept.
But – even if, as we will do in this section, we restrict our attention to classical
mathematics – the mathematical continuum takes different forms: in geometry
that of the straight line, in analysis that of the real number system (which can
be characterized in several different ways), and in set theory as the power set
of the natural numbers or as the set of all infinite sequences of zeros and ones
(Feferman 2009). It is often assumed that these formulations somehow express
the same concept and thus can be identified with one another – in many cases
without argument. Here we will discuss several conceptions of the continuum
and see to which extent they are instances of the same concept. We will follow
Feferman (2009) in discussing six conceptions of the classical continuum. Three
non-classical conceptions will be discussed in section 3.2.
The Euclidean continuum exists as a part of the framework of plane geometry,
and by extension spatial geometry (Feferman 2009, p. 7). The epitome of the
continuum in Euclidean geometry is the indefinitely extended straight line. As
mentioned in the introduction, the continuum is supposed to reflect our intuitions
about space, but, as Feferman explains, in Euclidean geometry these intuitions
are Janus faced (Feferman 2009, pp. 7-8). On the one hand, our language leads
us to treat points and lines as objects for which the basic relation is that of a
point lying on a line, e.g. in such statements as, “For any two distinct points
there exists a unique line on which they lie”. On the other hand, our intuitions
of points as being dimensionless – in Euclid’s terminology, as having “no parts”
– and of lines as having “no breadth”, requires us to imagine entities which have
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no substance. Alternatively, we can think of points as being “pure locations”,
but also this makes talk of a specific point lying on a line sound odd. Dispite
the fact that our intuitions must do double duty, Euclid’s postulates – except,
perhaps, the parallel postulate – are sufficiently intuitive and can immediately be
recognized as valid. The main thing to be emphasized about the conception of
the continuum as it appears in Euclidean geometry is that the concept of set is
not part of the basic picture. In general, figures in Euclidean geometry are not to
be identified with their sets of points (Feferman 2009, p. 8).
Euclid’s axioms were put into a corrected and more analytically perspicuous
form by Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometry (1899). The Hilbertian contin-
uum is here developed in the fifth axiom group – that he calls the Axioms of
Continuity – which are meant to make explicit what Euclid tacitly assumes: the
completeness of the real line. Dispensing with Hilbert’s own formulations, we may
summarize the group in a single axiom of completeness as follows (Moore 2007):
Completeness. Let all the points on a line be divided into two non-
empty sets SL and SR such that every point in SL lies to the left of
every point in SR. Then SL has a rightmost point if SR has no leftmost
one.
As with the Euclidean line, the Hilbertian continuum is not conceived of indepen-
dently, but only within the framework of plane (and spatial) geometry as a whole.
In contrast with the Euclidean line, however, set theoretical concepts are part of
this picture. As Feferman (2009, p. 13) puts it, the Hilbertian conception of the
continuum is a hybrid of geometrical and set-theoretical notions.
The notion of completeness in Hilbert’s system of geometry is directly in-
formed by the completeness condition earlier developed by Dedekind (Stetigkeit
und Irrationalzahlen, 1872).
“I find the essence of [completeness] in [. . . ] the following principle:
‘If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every
point of the first class lies to the left of every point of the second class,
then there exists one and only one point which produces this division
of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two
portions’” (Dedekind 1872, after Moore 2007, p. 72).2
2 Where I inserted “completeness”, Dedekind uses the word “continuity”. But “continuity” is
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In Dedekind’s continuum, points are conceived of as elements of a linearly ordered
set going from “left” to “right”. Any two points in that set should determine a line
segment, and since there are incommensurable lengths such as the diagonal of a
square with unit length, not all these points can correspond to rational numbers
(Feferman 2009, pp. 10-11). In fact, Dedekind notes that “there are infinitely
many points [on the line] to which no rational number corresponds” (Dedekind
1872, quoted in Bell 2005, section 5). He then goes on to fill-up the gaps in the
rational numbers through the creation of new “point-individuals” by means of
the method of cuts: a cut is a partition (A1, A2) of the rational numbers, such
that every member of A1 is less than every member of A2. Each rational number
corresponds to a cut, but there are infinitely many cuts that do not correspond to
a rational number; each cut that does not correspond to a rational number creates
an irrational number. Dedekind thus aims to “fill up” the rational numbers, so
that every point on the line corresponds to a real number. The domain of all the
cuts, and thereby the associated domain of all the real numbers, can be ordered
in such a way that it has the completeness property (Bell 2005, section 5).
The Cantorian continuum, as we have seen in section 2.3, consists of equiva-
lence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. Cantor analyzed the con-
tinuum in terms of infinite point sets, where he took the elements of these sets,
i.e. points of a line, to correspond to real numbers. A sequence a1, a2, . . . , an, . . .
of rational numbers is a Cauchy sequence – or, in Cantor’s terms, a fundamental
sequence – if for every rational ε > 0 there exists an integer N such that whenever
n ≥ N, |an+m − an| < ε. Any sequence < an > satisfying this criterion has a
certain limit, which he denotes by b. Cantor denotes the collection of all such b
corresponding to fundamental sequences by B, and defines a total ordering and
an arithmetical structure on B. In particular, Cantor defines b = b′, where b is
the limit of < an > and b′ the limit of < a′n >, to be the case when the difference
between < an > and < a′n > converges to zero. Cantor now goes on to prove that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the line and B. That is, he shows
that each point on the line corresponds to an element of B, but the converse –
“the geometry of the straight line is complete” – he assumes as an axiom:
“[T]o make the geometry of the straight line complete is only to
put forth as that geometrical property that the rational numbers lack, and should therefore be
understood as that which we call “completeness” (cfr. Moore 2007, p. 72).
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add an axiom, which simply consists in [declaring that] any numerical
quantity belongs to a certain point of the straight line [. . . ] I call
this theorem an axiom because it is in its nature to not generally be
provable” (Cantor 1872, quoted after Scoville 2012).
The idea here is that after this bijection is established, we have a rigorous foun-
dation to justify arithmetic operations on the real numbers (Scoville 2012). Thus,
the set B is just a set of symbols (refering to limits of Cauchy sequences) on
which you can “do” arithmetic, because they are in one-to-one correspondence
with (subsets of) the real line. In this manner, Cantor freed the concept of set
from its geometric origin, and paved the way for the emergence of the general
abstract set central to todays mathematics (Bell 2005, see section 2.2 of this the-
sis). Point sets soon came to be studied in their own right, and evolved into the
mathematical discipline we now call topology. Moreover, Cantor’s analysis of the
continuum and the use of the idea of one-to-one correspondence made it for the
first time possibile to compare the sizes of point sets in a definite way (Bell 2005,
see section 2.1 of this thesis)
The idea behind Cantor’s definition of the real numbers as fundamental se-
quences or Cauchy sequences of rational numbers can be used for the set-theoretic
conception of the continuum as the set of all subsets of natural numbers (Feferman
2009, section 3.6; cfr. Feferman 1998 p. 35). Namely, we can associate each ele-
ment x of R with the subset Qx of Q consisting of all the rationals r with r < x,
that is, in other words, every real number is associated with the set of all rational
numbers smaller than it. Since the rational numbers are dense in the real num-
bers,3 every real number x is then uniquely determined by the subset Qx of such
rational numbers.
Another set-theoretic conception of the continuum is that of the set of paths in
the full binary tree (Feferman 2009, section 3.5). A full binary tree T is obtained
from an initial node by successive branching to the left or right, such as in figure
3.1:
3That the rational numbers are dense in the reals means that if a and b are real numbers
with a < b, then there is a rational number p
q
such that a < p
q
< b. For a proof, see e.g. Trench
(2013, theorem 1.1.6). Note that this implies that whereas there is an uncountable number of
“gaps” in the real numbers (i.e. the irrational numbers), between any two of these gaps there is
a rational number; but at the same time the rationals are countable, whereas the irrationals are
uncountable and thus there are many more irrationals than rationals. This is in my opinion one
of the most counter-intuitive consequences of set theory.
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Figure 3.1: Full binary tree.
Every element or node of the tree has either zero or two successors, typically
called “left” and “right”. Denoting “left” by 0 and “right” by 1, we recognize this
as equivalent to the generation of all finite sequences of zeros and ones, beginning
with the empty sequence. A path in the full binary tree is a subset of T which
contains the initial node and contains with each node exactly one of its successors.
A path is thus represented by an infinite sequence of zeros and ones, and every
such sequence represents a unique path. One standard set-theoretical conception
of the continuum is as the set of all paths in T (or equivalently, as the set 2N of all
functions from N into the set {0, 1}; Feferman 2009). Given that real numbers can
be represented as (infinite) sequences of ones and zero’s (binary representation),
the set of all paths can be understood as the set of all real numbers.
As Feferman (2009, p. 1) writes, when one speaks of the continuum in set
theory, it is implicitly understood that one is paying attention only to the cardinal
number that these sets have in common, i.e. ignoring differences in structure.
However, if we do regard structure,4 then the six conceptions of the continuum
that we discussed so far are not the same. In Feferman’s view, it is by a kind
of “miracle of synergy” of these disctinct forms of the continuum that R has
proved to serve together with N as one of the two core structures of mathematics;
both pure and applied (Feferman 2009, p. 24). It might be tempting to conclude
from this synergy that one version or another of the continuum is part of the
natural order. Such a conclusion could then, in turn, function as a justification
4 For example if we, like Feferman, adopt conceptual structuralism about mathematics, i.e. the
idea that the primary objects of mathematics are structures rather than individuals such as
points, lines, numbers, etcetera (for a more detailed exposition of this view, see Feferman 2009,
section 2).
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for the completeness axiom or property, which in all of the above accounts of the
continuum is (either implicitly or explicitly) assumed.5 However, there are some
good arguments against such a view. Here we will discuss two.
First, even though to some extent the classical mathematical continuum indeed
reflects common pre-theoretic intuitions about space, it certainly does not do so
in all respects. For example, as we have seen the classical continuum is made up of
extensionless points, but it seems very counter-intuitive to suppose that something
extensive (i.e. a line) is composed only of elements that do not have an extension
(i.e. points; cfr. Bell 2005, Sommer & Suppes 1997). The claim that R accurately
reflects our conception of geometrical and physical lines has been disputed, for
example, by Gödel. Gödel’s argument was summed up by Putnam as follows: “at
least intuitively, if you divide the geometrical line [in two] you would expect that
the two halves of the line would be mirror images of each other. Yet, this is not
the case if the geometrical line is isomorphic to the real numbers” (Putnam 1992,
p. 38, as quoted in Moore 2007). In particular, one half will have an endpoint
and the other will not (Moore 2007, p. 76). Moreover, we may wonder: do we
really know or perceive that space is complete? As Moore (2007) points out, it is
widely taken for granted that physical lines are real lines, i.e. that the arithmetical
structure of the real numbers uniquely matches the geometrical structure of lines
in space, however, how can we be sure that there are no infinitesimals in space?
There seems to be no way to know that physical lines are real lines and not
hyperreal lines.
Second, a problem with the set-theoretical conception is that it requires Pla-
tonism about mathematical objects.6 Feferman’s elaborations of Weyl’s predica-
tive theory of the continuum (see section 3.2 below), as well as the work of others
(for example, the development of the calculus and geometry in strict finitism, see
5 Interestingly, Dedekind himself warned against the assumption that his continuum is em-
beded in the real world: “If space has a real existence at all it is not necessary for it to be
continuous” (1872, as quoted in Feferman 2009, p. 23 n 24). He took his continuum not to be a
reflection of the completeness of space, but rather of what it would be for space to be complete
(Moore 2007, p. 73).
6 The problem with these set-theoretical conceptions of the continuum is grasping the meaning
of “all” in the description of 2N as consisting of all paths in the full binary tree (or all functions
from N into the set {0, 1}), or the view of the set S(N) of all subsets of natural numbers as
a definite totality, so that quantification over it is well-determined and may be used to express
definite properties P (Feferman 2009, sections 3.5, 3.6). On the face of it that requires a Platonist
ontology, according to which the totality in question somehow exists independently of human
conceptions (see section 2.2 of this thesis).
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Ye 2011, van Bendegem 2002), shows however that the properties of the continuum
needed for its applications in natural science do not require it to have a definite
reality in the Platonistic sense (Feferman 2009, section 4.4). The set-theoretic
conceptions of the continuum make only sense on the assumption of Platonism;
other philosophies of mathematics led to divergent conceptions of the continuum
(Feferman 2009, section 1).
It is to non-classical notions of the continuum that we will turn in the next
section.
3.2 Non-classical conceptions of the continuum
An invariant among many conceptions that refer to the continuum is an invariance
of scale: all small pieces of a continuum have the same properties as a bigger
continuum (Longo 1999). This way of conceiving the continuum has a long history.
As Anaxagoras put it, the essential essential character of the continuum is that
(Weyl 1949, p. 41):
“Among the small there is no smallest, but always something smaller.
For what is cannot cease to be no matter how far it is being subdi-
vided.”
According to this view expressed by Anaxagoras, a continuum can be subdivided
arbitrarily many times, and the parts obtained will always be continua themselves.
This is not so according to the classical conceptions of the continuum that we
discussed in the previous section. On these conceptions, we can perform an actual
infinity of subdivisions, and doing so, we arrive at something qualitatively different:
an extensionless point or real number.
It has been doubted that such classical conceptions of the mathematical con-
tinuum accurately reflect our intuitions. For instance, the great mathematician
Hermann Weyl held that points are not part of our intuitive conception of the
continuum (Longo 1999). For this reason, Weyl complains that there is a sig-
nificant disagreement between theory and intuition, between the mathematical
continuum and the intuitive continuum:
“To the criticism that the intuition of the continuum in no way
contains those logical principles on which we must rely for the exact
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definition of the concept “real number”, we respond that the concep-
tual world of mathematics is so foreign to what the intuitive continuum
presents to us that the demand for coincidence between the two must
be dismissed as absurd” (Weyl 1918, quoted after Feferman 2009, sec-
tion 4.1).
This dissatisfaction with the set-theoretical conception of the continuum, stem-
ming from the discrepancy between theory and intuition, lay at the basis of alter-
native developments of the continuum within two foundational programs: pred-
icativism and intuitionism. On both conceptions the continuum is fundamentally
different from the classical continuum, in that it is not made up of an uncountable
infinity of extensionless points. We will discuss these two non-classical conceptions
of the continuum here in turn. Subsequently, we will discuss another conception
of the continuum, which – as we will see – is in some sense somewhere inbetween
the classical and the non-classical continuum: the nonstandard continuum.
The intuitionists and the predicativists both follow Cantor in the construction
of the real numbers, namely as Cauchy (or fundamental) sequences of rational
numbers; equality of real numbers is also defined the way Cantor did it (see sec-
tion 3.1). In order to carry this out, in each framework one must presume the
general notion of sequence of rational numbers. However, in both frameworks
one does not accept the totality of such sequences. Consequently, there is no to-
tality of real numbers, only the concept of what it means to be a real number.
Moreover, these fundamental sequences of rational numbers are regarded inten-
sionally, i.e. as described by specific formulae, not as functions determined by
their values (Feferman 2009, section 4.3). The difference between predicativism
and intuitionism is that the predicativists (at least those stemming from Poincaré
and Weyl), in contradistinction to the intuitionist, view the natural numbers – as
well as any other set which can be explicitly enumerated – as a definite totality.
Consequently, for predicativists, quantification over N and other explicitly enu-
merable sets is definite and classical logic is admissible for all statements about
them. Intuitionists, to the contrary, view N as a potential totality and reject
the law of excluded middle as applied to arithmetical statements (Feferman 2009,
section 4.3). As a consequence, intuitionists have always only a finite amount
of information about real numbers, from which Brouwer’s theorem follows to the
effect that every function of real numbers on a closed interval is continuous (see
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section 2.3). Both the intuitionists and the predicativists reject the assumption
of any completed infinite totalities of uncountable cardinality, and in particular
the set-theoretical conceptions of 2N and S(N) as definite totalities (ibid.).
Predicativism has its origins in the work of Russell and Poincaré on the para-
doxes of early set theory. According to them, (one of) the cause(s)7 of the typical
paradoxes of early set theory – in particular, of Russell’s paradox of the class of all
non-self membered classes – was that there was a vicious circle in the purported
definition, made possible by what came to be known as impredicative definitions
(Feferman 2009, p. 2). According to one notion, a definition is impredicative if it
defines an object by reference to a totality which includes the object to be defined
(Horsten 2007, section 2.4).8 Impredicative definitions are definitions that violate
what Russell called the Vicious Circle Principle (VCP). In one of its formulations
(Russell 1908, in Crosilla 2009, section 1.3):
Vicious Circle Principle. Whatever contains an apparent variable
must not be a possible value of that variable.
Thus, according to the VCP, a sound definition of a collection only refers to
entities that exist independently from the defined collection. Such definitions are
called predicative (Horsten 2007, section 2.4).9
Weyl had come to believe that the whole set-theoretical approach involved
vicious circles to such an extent that, as he says, “every cell (so to speak) of
this mighty organism is permeated by contradiction” (Bell & Korté 2009, section
3.1). In particular during the period 1918-1921 he worked on the problem of
providing the mathematical continuum with what he conceived of as a logically
7 Poincaré saw as a second cause of these paradoxes the assumption of the actual infinite.
Russell denied this part of Poincaré’s diagnosis (Feferman 2009, p. 2).
8 As we have seen in section 2.2, the Axiom of Separation allows us to form a subset of a
given set whose elements satisfy a given property (expressed by a formula in the language of
set theory). Given a set B and a formula φ(X), separation allows us to construct a new set,
the set of those elements X of B for which φ holds. This is usually informally represented
as: {X ∈ B : φ(X)}. Separation may lead to impredicativity in case the formula φ contains
unbounded quantifiers ranging over the whole universe of sets; in fact, in defining the new set by
separation we may thus refer to this very set, contradicting Russell’s VCP (Crosilla 2009, section
1.3.1).
9 As Gödel later pointed out, a Platonist would find this line of reasoning unconvincing. If
mathematical collections exist independently of the act of defining, then it is not immediately
clear why there could not be collections that can only be defined impredicatively (Gödel 1944,
cited in Horsten 2007, section 2.4).
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sound formulation. In his well-known work Das Kontinuum (1918), Weyl aimed
to provide analysis with a predicative foundation. That is, he undertook the
project of securing mathematical analysis through a theory of the continuum that
would make no basic assumptions beyond that of the structure of natural numbers
N.10 The concept of an arbitrary subset of the natural numbers was not taken as
given; only those subsets which are determined by arithmetical (i.e. first-order)
predicates are taken to be predicatively acceptable (Horsten 2007, section 2.4).
Since only sequences of rational numbers which can be explicitly described by
formulae exist according to the predicativist, and there are only countably many
formulae available at each stage of construction, and moreover principles such
as the power set axiom which imply the existence of uncountable totalities are
not available, in predicativist mathematics the real numbers constitute only a
countable infinity.
Building on work in generalized recursion theory, Solomon Feferman extended
the predicativist project in the 1960’s (see Feferman 1998, 2005). Feferman re-
alized that Weyl’s strategy could be iterated into the transfinite: those sets of
numbers that can be defined by using quantification over the sets that Weyl re-
garded as predicatively justified, should be counted as predicatively acceptable,
and so on. This process can be propagated along an ordinal path, stretching as
far into the transfinite as the predicative ordinals reach, where an ordinal is pred-
icative if it measures the length of a provable well-ordering of the natural numbers
(Horsten 2007, section 2.4). Feferman then investigated how much of standard
mathematical analysis can be carried out within a predicativist framework, and
showed that most of twentieth century analysis is acceptable from a predicativist
point of view. But it is also clear that not all of contemporary mathematics that is
generally accepted by the mathematical community is acceptable from a predica-
tivist standpoint: transfinite set theory is a case in point (Horsten 2007, section
2.4).
Until the work of Feferman, predicativism has been in a dormant state, at
least partly induced by the fact that Weyl himself in the 1920’s was won over
10 Weyl agreed with Poincaré that the natural number system and the associated principle
of induction constitute an irreducible minimum of theoretical mathematics, and any effort to
“justify” that would implicitly involve its assumption elsewhere (Feferman 1998, p. 52). Since
Weyl took the collection of natural numbers as given, his philosophical stance is in a sense
intermediate between intuitionism and Platonism (Horsten 2007, section 2.4).
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to, in Feferman’s terms, the “most radical of the radicals”: the intuitionists
(Feferman 2005, p. 25). Intuitionism originates in the work of the mathemati-
cian L.E.J. Brouwer, and is just as predicativism a product of dissatisfaction
with the ideal, nonconstructive methods used by most contemporaries (Bridges &
Palmgren 1997, section 3.1). According to Brouwer, the paradoxes of set theory
arose from illegitimate extension of the logical laws which hold for finite sets, to
infinite sets. Weyl sums up Brouwer’s view point as follows:
“According to [Brouwer’s] view and reading of history, classical
logic was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their
subsets. [. . . ] Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook
that logic for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally
applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets.
This is the Fall and original sin of set theory, for which it is justly
punished by the antinomies. It is not that such contradictions showed
up that is surprising, but that they showed up at such a late stage of
the game” (Weyl 1946, as quoted in Bridges & Palmgren 1997, section
3.1).
Thus, compared to predicativism, intuitionism is more radical in that it sees a
thread in applying classical logic to all infinite sets, even down to the natural
numbers.
This rejection of classical logic for infinite sets is philosophically justified by,
and deriving from, the conception of mathematics as free creation of the hu-
man mind. According to intuitionism, a mathematical object exists if and only
if it can be (mentally) constructed by finite beings (ideal mathematicians). An
ideal mathematician can never complete an infinite construction, even though
she can complete arbitrarily large finite initial parts of it. In accordance with
this conception, intuitionism resolutely rejects the existence of the actual infi-
nite; only potentially infinite collections are given in the activity of construction
(Horsten 2007, section 2.2). In reasoning about such potentially infinite collec-
tions, the intuitionist uses intuitionistic logic (see e.g. Moschovakis 1999). This
logic was developed by Brouwer’s student Arend Heyting, by abstracting from
what according to intuitionists a sound mathematical proof consists in. Because
these principles also underly other systems of constructive mathematics, such as
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Russian recursive analysis and the constructive analysis of Errett Bishop and his
followers, intuitionistic logic may be considered the logical basis of constructive
mathematics (Bridges & Palmgren 1997, section 3.1).
Intuitionistic mathematics diverges from other types of constructive math-
ematics in its interpretation of the term “sequence”. Normally, a sequence in
constructive mathematics is given by a rule which determines, in advance, how to
construct each of its terms; such a sequence may be said to be lawlike or predeter-
minate (Bridges & Palmgren 1997, section 3.1). Brouwer generalised this notion
of a sequence to include free choice sequences: infinite sequences of numbers (or
finite objects) created by the free will. The sequence could be determined by a law
or algorithm, such as the sequence consisting of only zeros, or of the prime num-
bers in increasing order, in which case we speak of a lawlike sequence, or it could
not be subject to any law, in which case it is called lawless (Iemhoff 2008, sec-
tion 3.4). Lawless sequences could for example be created by the repeated throw
of a coin, or by asking the creating subject to choose the successive numbers of
the sequence one by one, allowing it to choose any number to its liking (ibid.).
Importantly, a lawless sequence is ever unfinished, and the only available infor-
mation about it at any stage in time is the initial segment of the sequence created
thus far (see also section 2.3 of this thesis). This makes that the intuitionistic
continuum is fundamentally different from the classical continuum; in particular,
whereas the classical continuum is discrete, in the sense that it is composed of
individual real numbers which are well-defined and can be sharply distinguished,
the intuitionistic continuum is an essentially continuous “medium of free devel-
opment” from which the real numbers are obtained by assembling them from a
complex of continually changing overlapping parts (Bell & Korté 2009, section
3.2). As a consequence, as we have already discussed in section 2.3 of this thesis,
the intuitionistic continuum is not the union of two disjoint non-empty parts; it is
indecomposable (Bell & Korté 2009, section 3.2). As it was colourfully described
by van Dalen:
“In intuitionistic mathematics [. . . ] the continuum has, as it were,
as syrupy nature, one cannot simply take away one point. In the
classical continuum one can, thanks to the principle of the excluded
third, do so. To put it picturesquely, the classical continuum is the
frozen intuitionistic continuum. If one removes one point from the
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intuitionistic continuum, there still are all those points for which it
is unknown whether or not they belong to the remaining part” (Van
Dalen 1997, quoted in Sanders 2018).
We will now shortly discuss the continuum in nonstandard analysis. As we
have seen in section 2.4, the nonstandard continuum ∗R is different from the clas-
sical continuum R, since it contains besides the standard objects also nonstandard
objects: infinitely large and infinitesimal numbers. This extension with respect
to standard analysis makes that the real numbers in nonstandard analysis are
different from the standard real numbers and it is possible to derive new results.
Notably, the nonstandard continuum – as opposed to all other conceptions of the
continuum that we have been discussing – is not scale-invariant (Longo 1999, sec-
tion 3.1). As we have seen in figure 2.1 in section 2.4, if we look at the hyperreal
line from a nonstandard perspective – i.e. through an “infinitesimal microscope”
– we see that every real number a is contained in a monad consisting of all hyper-
real numbers infinitely close to a. Within this monad the Archimedean property
fails, which implies that – from the nonstandard perspective – the nonstandard
continuum is incomplete: it has “gaps”. Both the monad and the gaps, i.e. the
incompleteness, cannot be perceived from a standard perspective, and in that
manner the scale-invariance fails in the nonstandard continuum.
Furthermore, as was shown by Sanders (2018, p. 41), the continuum in non-
standard analysis is indecomposable from the viewpoint of the standard universe,
and decomposable from the viewpoint of the nonstandard universe. This is because,
as he explains, there is a decidable decomposition of the nonstandard continuum,
but this decomposition is essentially based on nonstandard methods, and should
therefore from a standard perspective be disqualified (ibid.). This means, as
Sanders observes, that in nonstandard analysis the standard continuum changes
the associated logic: the Law of the Excluded Middle is not available in non-
standard analysis for reasoning about the standard continuum (Sanders 2018,
pp. 49-50). Interestingly, this confirms Brouwer’s claim that logic is dependent
on mathematics: if one changes the mathematics (by extending the universe with
nonstandard elements) the logic changes with it (ibid.).
The continuum in nonstandard analysis can thus be said to be somewhere in-
between the continuous and the discrete, as well as inbetween the classical and the
non-classical. Note that many results of classical analysis hold in the nonstandard
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universe, but the continuum in the nonstandard universe is not complete. This
means that these results do not depend on what was taken to be the essential
property of the continuum: completeness. Thus, as I see it, nonstandard analysis
can help us to think about what the continuum actually is.
3.3 Against using the classical continuum in physical
modeling
Thusfar, we have seen six classical, and three non-classical (or nonstandard) con-
ceptions of the continuum. On most, but not all of these conceptions, the contin-
uum is scale-invariant; on most, but not all of these conceptions, the continuum
is “gapless” or complete; on most, but not all of these conceptions, the contin-
uum consists of an uncountable infinity of extensionless points or real numbers.
So far, we have been comparing these different conceptions of the continuum in
terms of their mathematical properties, as well as their connection to diverging
views on the nature of mathematics and its objects. But what effect would the
differences between those conceptions of the continuum have in physics? We will
compare different conceptions of the continuum with regard to the specific con-
text of the case-studies in chapters 4 and 5. In this section, we will discuss in
more general terms an argument – of Michael Dummett – to the effect that the
classical continuum is not suitable to model physical quantities, and we will dis-
cuss some arguments for disposing of the classical continuum in modeling physical
quantities, based on the appeal to empirical equivalence.
According to Dummett (2000, 2005), the classical continuum is not suitable
for modeling physical quantities, because when modeling physical quantities are
modeled by a classical continuum, properties are attributed to those quantities
which contradict our pre-theoretic intuitions regarding those quantities. Naturally,
Dummett wants to exclude physical quantities derived as derivative (e.g. velocity)
as well as physical quantities whose magnitudes are quantized from his discourse
and therefore restricts his discussion to modeling time as a classical continuum
– in his words, to the classical model of time. The classical model, Dummett
explains, models time in the following way. As we have seen in the previous
section, the classical continuum is composed of an uncountable infinity of points or
real numbers; each real number represents a determinate position on the rational
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line: a point on that line if it is rational, an dimensionless gap in that line if
it is irrational. In other words, the ordering of real numbers by magnitude is a
dense, complete linear ordering. Consequently, according to the classical model
of time – i.e. when conceiving of time by analogy with the classical continuum of
real numbers –, time looks as follows. Time is composed of durationless instants,
arranged in a dense linear ordering; since instants are durationless, no change or
motion takes place within any instant. The ordering being dense, there is between
any two instants another instant, and there is therefore no such thing as “the
next” instant after a given one. Moreover, since time is continuous (complete)
there are no gaps in the sequence of instants (2000, p. 499).
Dummett gives three examples to show that the classical model of time leads
to models of physical quantities which contradict our intuitions. All three his
examples involve discontinuities. The first example concerns a model of a surface
illuminated only by a candle, which at a certain moment “goes out like a light”,
i.e. the illumination of the surface abruptly vanishes as the candle is extinguished
(Dummett 2000, pp. 502-3). It involves a jump discontinuity as the intensity of
illumination goes instantaneously from some positive value to 0, where it remains
for some further time. In the classical model, the illumination is naturally repre-
sented by a function f(t) giving the intensity of illumination at each time t within
the appropriate interval, and having a jump discontinuity at t = t0, for some t0
within that interval. The problem, according to Dummett, is that according to
the classical model there are two distinct such functions f and g with a jump
discontinuity at t = t0, with f(t0) = 0 but g(t0) still positive, while f and g agree
for every other value of t within that interval. In other words, the classical model
represents the abrupt change as being one of two physically distinct events: one
in which the illumination vanishes at the instant of change, the surface having
positive illumination at every instant before the change (which is the situation as
described by f); and the other in which the surface continues to have a positive
illumination at the instant of change, but 0 illumination for every instant in some
interval after that instant (which is the situation as described by g). But, as Dum-
mett sees it, there are no two such distinct physical possibilities: nothing could
determine whether the surface had zero or positive illumination at the precise
instant of change, and we cannot conceive of there being any genuine distiction
between the two cases. Thus, in this case the classical model provides a means
82 CHAPTER 3. THE CONTINUUM
of differentiating between two physically different states of affairs which cannot
possibly correspond to any distinction in physical reality. In sum, according to
Dummett, the classical mathematical framework differentiates too much.
The second example concerns removable discontinuities, i.e. discontinuities
that could be removed by changing the value of the physical quantity in question
at a single instant (Dummett 2000, p. 503). Imagine a lamp which is always on
except for the one instant t = 1 at which it is off.11 According to Dummett, “our
conception of physical quantities is plainly such that this supposition makes no
sense”. That is, according to our intuitions the lamp would be off during some
interval, and not, as discribed in this model, during some durationless instant.
Accordingly, in Dummett’s view, in admitting for such removable discontinuities,
“[t]he classical model supplies descriptions for states of affairs which, being con-
ceptually impossible, should admit no description” (ibid.).
The third example concerns an infinite sequence of events which happen in
finite time. A third kind of discontinuity is exemplified by the example of a body
which oscillates with increasing rapidity in a plane between a position R 1 cm
to the right of a point M , and a position L 1 cm to its left (Dummett 2000,
pp. 503-504). It begins by swinging from M to L in 13 minute, then from L to M
in 16 min, then from M to R in
1
10 min, the n-th swing taking
2
(n+1)(n+2) min. As




10 + . . . is
n
(n+2) , so the series converges to 1; hence by 1 min after the start the body will
have made infinitely many swings. The problem with this model is in Dummett’s
view the following. Wherever we suppose the body to be 1 minute after the start,
there will be a discontinuity in its spatial position at that instant. For if f(t) gives
its position in cm to the right of M t min after the start, f does not approach
any limit as t approaches 1 from the left. The classical model of time allows us
to define such a model, but in Dummett’s view it is conceptually abhorrent that
what happens to the body for t < 1 does not tell us at all where it will be at the
instant t = 1. Its position at that instant is completely indeterminate: it might be
anywhere, so far as its past history goes. As Dummett sees it, we do not suppose
that events are as loose and separate as this (ibid.).
In sum, there are in Dummett’s view three problems with the classical model
of time. First, it differentiates too much, in that it allows for different descriptions
11 I follow Meyer (2005) in giving this physical interpretation to Dummett’s argument.
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of events which in his view are physically indistinguishable. Second, it supplies
descriptions for states of affairs which obtain only during a durationless instant,
which in his view is physically impossible. Third, it allows for descriptions of
an infinite sequence of events happening in finite time, which implies that the
state of the system at the first instant after this infinite sequence is independent
of the instant before, and this according to him contradicts how we conceive of
the evolution of physical systems in time. The right model of time, according to
Dummett, rules out this kind of models and therefore must have some kind of
continuity requirement built-in. Dummett therefore proposes to model time in
constructive mathematics (cfr. section 2.3 of this thesis), so that the possibility
to formulate philosophically problematic physics such as in these three examples
is excluded on mathematical grounds.
Another argument that Dummett offers to the effect that the classical model is
unsuitable (or undesirable) for modeling physical quantities, is that it embodies,
as he calls it, a super-realist metaphysics (Dummett 2000, pp. 497-498; Dummett
2005, p. 141). Super-realism, as Dummett puts it, postulates states of affairs that
subsist independently of even the theoretical possibility of our knowing of them
(Dummett 2000, p. 497), or that there are true propositions which we understand,
but which we cannot ever in principle come to know (Dummett 2005, p. 141). For
example, in his view, in physics the classical model embodies the assumption that
every physical quantity has, in reality, an absolutely determinate magnitude which
is accurately represented, relative to a given unit, by a classical real number. This
assumption cannot be tested: we can never, by measurement, identify a specific
real number as the magnitude of a physical quantity – to do so would require
our measurements to be infinitely precise. According to Dummett, three further
assumptions are made to uphold the assumption that every physical quantity
has in reality a determinate magnitude, namely that (1) there is a determinate
answer to hypothetical questions about what the results of ever more precise
measurements would be; (2) an infinite process will yield a determinate outcome,
namely, the limit of an infinite monotonic sequence extending into the future;
and (3) such a sequence converges to a classical real number (rather than to an
interval on the real line; Dummett 2000, p. 498).
If we model physical quantities by constructive real numbers instead, we do
not make such super-realist assumptions. First, in constructive mathematics there
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are no true propositions that exist independently of the possibility of us knowing
them; in fact, in constructive mathematics a proposition counts as true only if
its truth is constructively proven (and not, for example, if merely its negation
is disproved). Second, by modeling a physical quantity by a constructive real
number – given that, as we have seen in section 2.3, constructive real numbers
are only finitely precise – we do not assume that this quantity has in reality an
infinitely precise magnitude, nor that a sequence of ever more precise measure-
ments converges to an infinitely precise real number. Moreover, in virtue of this
finite precision – in particular, in virtue of the failure of trichotomy for construc-
tive real numbers – constructivism fits well with the practice of measurement in
physics (cfr. Bauer 2012). For example, consider a real-valued measured quantity
t and some t0. Whatever experiment we perform, there will always be a small
measurement uncertainty ∆t. We can decide that t < t0 or t > t0 holds, if by luck
t+ ∆t < t0 or t−∆t > t0. Otherwise, we might perform a more precise measure-
ment, but there is no guarantee that we can determine the matter in finite time.
Thus, we can say that constructive real numbers reflect our imperfect methods of
determining the values of physical quantities.
As we have seen in section 1.2.1, an important reason for the physicist’s ease
with infinities are limits to experimental accuracy. For example, physicists justify
the use of infinite component limits by appealing to the fact that it is virtually
impossible to detect observable differences between the behavior of infinite sys-
tems and systems consisting of a really big number of components, i.e. of the order
of 1023 or larger: the difference between the relevant values for infinite systems
and those for very large finite systems is usually smaller than the measurement
error. It seems that the same argument is available to justify the use of con-
structive, instead of classical models, in certain physical contexts. Given the fact
that measurement techniques are only finitely precise, no measurement will ever
be able to distinguish between a finitely precise constructive real number and an
infinitely precise classical real number as the value of a physical quantity. In that
sense, we can say that the constructive and classical model of a certain physical
system will be empirically equivalent. Furthermore, as we have seen in section
2.3, constructive total functions are continuous. Since datasets are necessarily
discrete, no finite collection of measurements can ever determine whether a physi-
cal quantity varies discontinuously, or rather rapidly but continuously. Thus, also
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in this respect a constructive model will be empirically equivalent to its classical
counterpart.
The argument of empirical equivalence is also used by Sommer & Suppes
(1997). They developed a constructive system of nonstandard analysis called
elementary recursive nonstandard analysis (ERNA) to show that we can “dispense
with the continuum” in physics. ERNA is an axiomatic approach to nonstandard
analysis, which has models in which the completeness axiom is replaced by an
axiom stating the existence of infinitesimals (see section 2.4 above). That is,
ERNA can be used to construct the hyperrationals ∗Q, i.e. an extension of the
rationals Q which includes all the fractions of (possibly nonstandard) integers
with nonzero denominators (Sommer & Suppes 1997, pp. 3,4). As Sommer &
Suppes argue, the hyperrationals are rich enough to carry out (large parts of)
the mathematics used for scientific purposes, which implies that completeness
is not necessary in the empirical sciences at all (Sommer & Suppes 1997, p. 4;
cfr. Impens & Sanders 2007). Importantly, as they suggest, these nonstandard
models and models based on the standard reals are empirically indistinguishable
(meaning that the difference between them is infinitesimal), and thus there seems
to be no reason to prefer the standard models on empirical grounds (Sommer &
Suppes 1997, p. 5). In sum, since proofs in ERNA do not rely on the completeness
property, and (a large part of) the mathematics used in the physical sciences can
be carried out in ERNA, Sommer & Suppes conclude that a significant portion of
the mathematics that is used in the physical sciences does not rely on the special
properties of the continuum.
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Conclusion to Part II
[A]s long as science takes the real number system for granted, its
philosophers must eventually engage the basic foundational ques-
tion of modern mathematics: “What are the real numbers, really?”
- Solomon Feferman (1998)
Given the differences in nature between mathematics (abstract) and the phys-
ical world (concrete), it might be considered hardly suprising that there are philo-
sophical problems concerning the applicability of mathematics to the physical
world. What might, to the contrary, come as a surprise is that there are many
philosophical problems in pure mathematics. For instance, one might think that
all that matters in pure mathematics is whether or not the theorems are correct
– and it is up to mathematicians, and not philosophers, to establish that. What
does a philosopher have to say about, e.g., such a well-established mathematical
theory as set theory?
Such a view misses something important, namely, how applied pure mathe-
matics actually is. The chapters in this second part have shown that there is
very much to say about mathematical systems besides whether they are math-
ematically correct or not. In relation to what we have seen in these chapters,
we will here shortly discuss three arguments to the effect that it is a mistake to
hold that pure mathematics is merely about mathematical correctness, and that
consequently philosophers have nothing relevant to say about it.
First of all, mathematical theories aim to give precise meaning to terms with
whose ordinary meaning we are already familiar. For example, we have seen that
set theory, as well as its alternatives, aims to give precise meaning to terms like set,
cardinality, larger, smaller (cfr. Potter 2004, p. 205): in application to finite sets
we take the theory to formalize the practice of counting which we have practised
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since childhood, and in application to infinite sets we take the theory to be a
natural conceptual extension of the finite case. For example, we have seen that
2ℵ0 > ℵ0, but is this true in the same sense that 4 > 2? Set theory affirms this (for
both are instances of Cantor’s theorem), but in answering such we are committed
to the idea that we should think about infinite sets in the particular manner that
set theory prescribes. Similarly, theories of the continuum or real numbers aim
to make precise our pre-theoretical understanding of the completeness of space.
Dedekind was convinced that his notion of completeness was the only way of
making precise our pre-theoretical understanding of what it would be for space
to be complete, and that – although he was “utterly unable to adduce any proof
of [his account’s] correctness, nor has anyone the power” – he was convinced that
he did not “err in assuming that every one will at once grant [its] truth” (1872,
as quoted in Moore 2007, p. 73). However, as we have seen, in fact not every one
agrees that Dedekind accurately captured our intuitions, and alternative accounts
of the continuum – mathematically equally coherent – have been developed.
Second, set theory might seem to be the quintessential example of an abstract,
purely mathematical theory, originating exclusively from intra-mathematical ques-
tions, but in fact extra-mathematical, and indeed physical and biological motives
seem to have played an important role in its development (Ferreirós 2004). Cantor
was an opponent of the atomic theory of matter, and seems to have developed his
set theory with the aim of application in natural science, linking his theory with
the constitution of matter. In his view, any satisfactory theory of nature must
begin with the assumption
“That the ultimate, properly simple elements of matter are given
in an actually infinite number, and regarding the spatial they must
be considered as totally unextended and rigorously punctual” (Cantor
1885, quoted in Ferreirós 2004, p. 27).
Cantor called the simple elements “monads” or “units”, in explicit reference to
Leibniz’ Monadology (Ferreirós 2004, p. 27). He applied his point-set theory to
give mathematical rigor to what he called the “organic explanation of Nature”,
that is, to offer a precise model of the world of monads. His first physical hypothesis
was that the set of corporeal monads is of cardinality ℵ0, while the set of etheral
monads has cardinality ℵ1, i.e. the power of the continuum (Ferreirós 2004, p. 27).
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Also Bolzano – which is often praised, also by Cantor himself, for being one
of the first mathematicians to embrace the actual infinite – believed that the
physical world was made up of infinitely many monads, which he called “atoms”.12
As is explained by Simons (2015), according to Bolzano atoms have zero volume,
and since material bodies have finite volume, every material body is made up of
infinitely many atoms. Bolzano’s physical world is a plenum: there is no space
that is not completely filled by atoms, not even a single point. But Bolzano holds
that motion is possible even in a plenum, because despite completely filling space,
the atoms in it can be compressed together without any of them coinciding and
expanded from one another without leaving holes (Bolzano 1978, sections 15, 16).
To motivate this thought, Bolzano gives the mathematical argument that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the points on any two line segments,
including segments of different sizes (idem, section 16).13
Thus, Cantor as well as Bolzano – both key figures in the history of infinitary
mathematics – held that their actually infinite sets were a direct reflection of the
nature of physical reality, in the sense that sets are composed of infinitely many
extensionless points in the same way as reality is made up of infinitely many
extensionless monads. They both believed that their mathematical results about
such infinite sets revealed truths about physical reality. Whereas this might sound
not so shocking – for also nowadays we believe that our mathematical results
reveal truths about physical reality – one might wonder whether the acceptance
of the atomic theory of matter, i.e. the theory asserting that concrete systems
are made up of finitely many extensive atoms, did not make the applicability of
infinitary mathematics to the physical world is much more complicated than it
was set out to be. That is, as I see it, there is something very intuitive in the
idea that if physical systems were indeed made up of uncountably many monads
as Cantor and Bolzano presumed, then this mathematics would apply better or
more unproblematically to them, than when – as turns out to be the case – they
12 Bolzano’s (1851) Paradoxes of the Infinite is a defence of the notion of infinity against claims
that it is paradoxical, absurd, or self-contradictory. Cantor spoke highly of this work in his 1883.
13 Simons writes instead that Bolzano motivates this thought by noting that there are just as
many points on a line of given length as there are on a line of greater or lesser length (Simons 2015,
p. 1080). This is not true: in the references that Simons gives, nor anywhere else to the best of
my knowledge, Bolzano writes such a thing. For Bolzano, the fact that two sets can be put in
one-to-one correspondence is not sufficient for these sets to be of the same size (see e.g. Bolzano
1851, section 20, cfr. van Wierst 2016, section 5).
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are made up of finitely many atoms. For example, it seems that we have much
less reason to assume that real-valued functions accurately reflect the behavior or
constitution of systems made up of finitely many atoms, than of systems made up
of an uncountable infinity of atoms. Given the finitude of physical systems at the
microlevel, it seems that the fact that our mathematics is only an approximation to
the physical world is already built-in from the start, given the mismatch between,
e.g., the infinitary nature of the mathematical continuum and the finite nature of
concrete objects in the physical world.
A third argument to the effect that pure mathematics is not only about math-
ematical correctness, is that the debate on the foundations of mathematics proves
itself to be no objective, but a subjective and also very social affair. To start,
the majority of mathematicians is only familiar with classical mathematics, be-
cause this is what is taught in high-school and regular university mathematics
classes. Objections against classical mathematics are often not known and rarely
well-understood by regular mathematicians (Waaldijk 2005). Further, mathemati-
cians often take their views on the foundations of mathematics highly personal,
and discussion about them is almost a matter of politics (Sanders 2018). To name
one famous example, Hilbert proclaimed that giving up set theory is a “betrayal
against our science” and vowed that “from the paradise, that Cantor created for
us, no-one can expel us” (Hilbert 1926).
Curiously, Einstein was apparently disturbed by the fierce struggle between
competing views on the foundations of mathematics14 and at a certain occasion
he exclaimed (Sanders 2018):
“What is this frog and mouse battle among the mathematicians?”
In this context, one might wonder how relevant the debate about the foundations
of mathematics actually is for physics. Much of the mathematics used in physics
– e.g. the calculus, differential equations, real and complex analysis, countable
algebra, the topology of complete separable metric spaces, etcetera – is prior to,
and thus – at least in some sense – independent of the introduction of abstract
set-theoretic concepts (cfr. Simpson 2009, quoted in Sanders 2017). With this in
mind, one might argue that physics is not based on set theory at all, and thus
that the debate on mathematical foundations is simply irrelevant for physics.
14 Precisely, Einstein was disturbed by the so-called Grundlagenstreit between Hilbert’s for-
malism and Brouwer’s intuitionism (Sanders 2018).
Conclusion to Part II 91
However, I contend, to better understand the relation between mathematics
and the physical world to which we apply it, one should think deeper about the
nature of the mathematics that is used in physics: what justifies its concepts and
methods? In other words: what is its foundation? This is particularly relevant, I
think, when we are concerned about philosophical problems raised by infinite ide-
alizations. If we are talking about infinite systems, do we mean actually infinite?
If we idealize a concrete system to be a continuum, do we mean it consists of an
uncountable infinity of components? Answers to these questions might be crucial
for understanding, and dissolving, these paradoxes.
In Part III of this thesis we will start this undertaking.
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Introduction to Part III
In this third part of the thesis we will discuss two paradoxes of the applied infinite.
That is to say, we will discuss two cases of physical theories that employ infinite
idealizations which raise philosophical problems in their interpretation. The para-
doxes that we will discuss are (1) the paradox of phase transitions, which regards
the use of the so-called thermodynamic limit in statistical-mechanical theories of
phase transitions (chapter 4), and (2) the paradox of Norton’s Dome, which is
a case of indeterminism in classical or Newtonian mechanics (chapter 5). Both
chapters start with a short summary of the paradox, which is followed by, first, an
exposition of the relevant physics, second, a discussion of the philosophical debate
on the paradox in the literature (to the extent that it is pertinent to this thesis),
and third, my analysis of the paradox, with a special focus on the mathematics
used in the physics. The aim of these chapters is to answer, specifically for these
case studies, the central question of this thesis: are the philosophical issues with
the infinite idealizations in these case studies relative to classical mathematics
and its notion of infinity?
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, in general the philosophical
problems surrounding infinite idealizations connect to other issues in philosophy
of science. Here, a word on the relevant issues with regard to our case studies.
Paradox (1) statistical mechanical theories of phase transitions is often discussed
in connection to the issue of inter-theory relations, in particular, with respect to
the question whether thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics (or
vice versa, depending on the notion of reduction one assumes). Phase transitions
are often taken as evidence for claims of irreducibility: the need for the thermo-
dynamic limit supposedly shows that thermodynamics is irreducible to statistical
mechanics. Statistical mechanical theories of phase transitions also relate to the
issue of scientific explanation – specifically, explaining the success of one theory in
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terms of another: the need for the thermodynamic limit seems to be an obstacle
in explaining the macrolevel phenomenon of a phase transition in terms of the
system’s behavior at the microlevel.
Paradox (2), Norton’s Dome was introduced by Norton to support his claim
that causation is a notion belonging to folk science, rather than a fundamental
principle underlying all natural processes which unifies all domains of science at
some deeper level. According to him, the Dome is an undeterministic Newtonian
system, and thus shows that not every effect is produced by a lawful necessity
from some cause. However, the Dome raises questions regarding the legitimacy
of idealizations: it is argued in the literature that in virtue of the idealizations
employed in it, the Dome falls outside the domain of Newtonian mechanics, that
is, that contrary to Norton’s claims it is not a proper Newtonian system. As such,
the Dome raises the question: how far and in which manner may we idealize, so
that we still have a legitimate idealization? It seems natural to relate the question
of legitimacy in this context to the notion of physicality; the distinction between
physical and unphysical systems is fundamental to the intuitions of physicist, but
it is never made explicit what physicality actually amounts to. In fact, it seems
that physicists remain unimpressed by the consequences of Norton’s Dome for
Newtonian mechanics, simply because they regard the Dome as an unphysical
system. Norton’s Dome thus brings up the question whether in philosophy we
may press physical theories towards their borders, or instead should focus on the
restricted domain of those systems that physicists consider to be physical, and
thus relevant.
Chapter 4
Paradox I: Phase transitions
Phase transitions are successfully analyzed and predicted within
statistical mechanics, the area of physics which analyzes macro-
scopic properties of systems in terms of the behavior of their mi-
croscopic constituents. These theories require the so-called ‘ther-
modynamic limit’ to obtain phase transitions. But systems in the
thermodynamic limit have infinite component-number and volume,
whereas the component-number and volume of concrete systems are
finite. Do our best theories of phase transitions tell us that no
phase transitions can occur in concrete systems?
4.1 The physics
To start, let us consider how common statistical-mechanical theories of phase
transitions give rise to the paradox. Statistical mechanics is the area of physics
which aims to explain macroscopic (thermodynamic) properties of physical sys-
tems in terms of their microscopic constituents. The macroscopic properties of
a statistical-mechanical system are functions of the number of its components,
and since the number of components of these systems is usually so large that
any further increase hardly makes a difference in the values of these functions,
it is standard practice in statistical mechanics to take these functions to their
limit and consider the component number of the system to be infinite. In most
cases in statistical mechanics limits are taken for mere convenience – namely, to
simplify the calculations. However, as is widely discussed in the philosophical
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debate on infinite idealizations in science, this seems to be different in the case
of phase transitions: the most successful statistical-mechanical theories of phase
transitions require taking the so-called thermodynamic limit, that is to say, these
theories require systems in which the component number and volume are taken
to infinity (in such a manner that the ratio between the two remains fixed).1
Without taking the thermodynamic limit, namely, within these theories no phase
transitions occur, and thus it is – in some sense to be spelled out below – nec-
essary to consider an infinite system in order to obtain a phase transition. As it
was famously put by Callender (2001), it seems that until we say more, these the-
ories give us a mathematical proof that the finite systems in the real world cannot
undergo phase transitions. Thus, the much debated paradox of phase transitions
consists in the fact that, on the one hand, concrete systems in the real world dis-
play phase transitions and – given the atomic theory of matter – are finite, while,
on the other hand, our best theories tell us that phase transitions occur only in
infinite systems.2
Why is it taken to be necessary to take the thermodynamic limit in statistical-
mechanical theories of phase transitions in order to show that a system displays a
phase transition? In short: it is considered necessary to take the thermodynamic
limit in these theories, because without doing so the mathematical entities which
are taken to represent phase transitions (namely, discontinuities in the functions
describing the thermodynamic properties of the system) do not appear. Let us
consider in somewhat more detail why this is the case. As is well-known, the
occurrence of a phase transition goes hand-in-hand with sudden and large changes
in the system’s macroscopic properties. For example, when vapor condenses into
liquid water there is a large and sudden decrease in the volume. The phase
1 The phase transitions with which we will be concerned are the so-called ‘first-order’ phase
transitions. These are phase transitions where the system goes from one phase to another
crossing a so-called ‘coexistence line’ or ‘phase boundary’, which corresponds to a discontinuity
in a macroscopic (thermodynamic) property, which in turn corresponds to a discontinuity in the
first derivative of the free energy of the system (see below). There are also ‘continuous’ phase
transitions, in which a system changes phase without crossing a phase boundary (for details, see
Goldenfeld 1992). Both kinds of phase transitions are philosophically interesting, but given that
the physics of continuous phase transitions is much more complicated than that of the first-order
ones, we will focus on first-order phase transitions here.
2 I agree with Shech (2013, 2015), that no paradox can be found in these facts per se, and
that, in order to obtain a paradox, assumptions have to be made concerning the representative
relationship between the infinite (abstract) and the finite (concrete) systems. However, this issue
will not concern us here.
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transition from vapor to liquid water can accordingly be represented graphically
as in figure 4.1 (read from left to right).
Figure 4.1: Phase transition in terms of volume (V) and pressure (P) (after Stanley
1971)
The abrupt change or ‘jump’ – in mathematical terms: the discontinuity – in the
graph of the volume V in figure 4.1, which occurs when the pressure reaches the
saturated vapor pressure Ps, represents in this example the phase transition from
vapor to liquid water. Now, macroscopic properties of a system – volume and
pressure included – can be obtained from appropriate differentiations of the sys-
tem’s free energy.3 Accordingly, the large and sudden changes in the macroscopic
properties which characterize phase transitions, occur when the free energy F it-
self has a singularity (meaning in this case a point where F is not differentiable).
The free energy F of a system is a macrolevel (thermodynamic) property, and it
is related to microlevel (statistical-mechanical) properties of the system via the
partition function Z:
(4.1) F = −kBT lnZ
(where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and T the temperature).4 Given that no
3 There are various kinds of free energy, each appropriate in different contexts. We will be
concerned with Helmholz free energy F = U −TS (where U is the internal energy of the system,
T the absolute temperature, and S the entropy), which is the maximum amount of work that a
system can do at a constant volume and temperature.
4 For more details, see e.g. McComb (2004).
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singularities can obtain in kB and T , we see from equation 4.1 that if F has a
singularity, then Z must have a singularity too. And this is problematic. The
partition function Z, namely, is a function of the temperature of the system and







Thus, for any finite amount of particles, Z is a finite sum of analytic functions
and hence cannot feature any singularities. This is the reason why physicists take
the thermodynamic limit, i.e. let the particle number and volume of the system
go to infinity while keeping the system’s intrinsic properties, such as its density,
constant: systems in the thermodynamic limit Z can feature singularities. For
these reasons, taking the thermodynamic limit is necessary in order to obtain the
discontinuities which are taken to represent phase transitions.
Note that the fact that it is considered necessary to idealize the system to be
infinite makes that the idealization in theories of phase transitions problematic in
a way that other idealizations are not: usually, it is not too problematic to de-
idealize idealized systems to resemble more the concrete systems they are meant to
represent (for example, we can introduce some friction in frictionless planes). But
– since phase transitions are represented by discontinuities – in the case of phase
transitions such de-idealization seems impossible: whether or not discontinuities
in Z obtain is an all-or-nothing matter and for any finite number of particles, no
matter how big, Z is analytic and no discontinuities obtain. Thus, discontinuities
– and hence the phase transitions which they are taken to represent – occur only
for infinite N . In this manner, our best statistical-mechanical theories of phase
transitions seem to tell us that phase transitions occur only in infinite systems.
In sum, the paradox of phase transitions consists in the fact that, on the
one hand, the finite concrete systems in the real world display phase transitions,
while, on the other hand, our best theories tell us that phase transitions occur
only in infinite systems. A crucial component in this paradox is the fact that
phase transitions are taken to be represented by mathematical discontinuities: it
is in order to obtain these discontinuities that taking the thermodynamic limit,
and thus the assumption of an infinite system, is necessary. We will discuss the
philosophical problems which the paradox of phase transitions raises in more detail
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in the next section.
4.2 The philosophical debate
As a result of the apparently necessary appeal to the thermodynamic limit in
statistical-mechanical accounts of phase transitions which we discussed in the
previous section, we get two – related – philosophical problems. First, how to
interpret the infinite systems obtained by taking the thermodynamic limit: how,
exactly, do they relate to the finite systems in the real world? Second, how to
interpret the discontinuities in the functions describing the microscopic proper-
ties of these infinite systems, which are taken to represent phase transitions in
statistical-mechanical theories: finite systems cannot display discontinuities in
their microscopic properties. In this section, we will discuss several takes on
these two conceptual problems with the thermodynamic limit which have been
put forward in the philosophical literature on infinite idealizations in science.
The claim that idealizing systems as infinite is necessary in statistical-mechanical
theories of phase transitions is philosophically defended by Batterman (2005).
Batterman’s view that this infinite idealization is ineliminable is motivated by
his take on the issue of how to interpret the discontinuities which denote phase
transitions in these theories. Famously, Batterman argues that these mathemat-
ical discontinuities have genuine physical significance: they represent physical
discontinuities (cfr. Batterman 2005, p. 233). What are physical discontinuities?
Batterman writes:
“As an instance of a physical discontinuity we can take the phe-
nomenon with which we are concerned, namely, the observed qualita-
tive distinctions between [. . . ] the phases of a “fluid” – gaseous, liquid,
and solid” (Batterman 2005, p. 233; emphasis in the original).
Thus, according to Batterman, physical discontinuities at phase transitions are
the observed qualitative distinctions between phases. Statistical mechanics should
thus in his view provide a qualitative characterization of phase transitions (cfr.
Batterman 2005, p. 230). Furthermore, these physical discontinuities are in Bat-
terman’s view rightly represented by mathematical discontinuities: “their faith-
ful representation demands curves with kinks” (Batterman 2005, p. 235). In
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other words, Batterman’s understanding of the infinite idealization in statistical-
mechanical theories of phase transitions as ineliminable follows from his views
that, first, statistical mechanics should provide a qualitative characterization of
phase transitions – irrespective of whether such a characterization is consistent
with microscopic theories -, and second, phase transitions understood as qualita-
tive distinctions (‘physical discontinuities’) between phases are rightly represented
by mathematical discontinuities in the functions describing the system’s macro-
scopic properties in statistical-mechanical theories.
This second view is puzzling: why would the qualitative distinctions at phase
transitions be rightly represented by mathematical discontinuities? Or, to put the
matter differently: in which sense are these ‘physical discontinuities’ discontinu-
ous? Unfortunately, Batterman does not clarify, so let us try to shed some light
on the matter. An argument to the effect that phase transitions understood as
qualitative changes are discontinuous could go as follows. One could argue that
systems at phase transitions ‘jump’ from one qualitative state into another, in the
sense that they go from one qualitative state (i.e. phase) into another, without
going through any intermediate qualitative state (phase). The problem with this
argument is that the qualitative changes at phase transitions in concrete systems
are not discontinuous in this sense: concrete systems do not immediately switch
from one state to another, but rather transition gradually into another phase.
This is because, first, driving parameters behind the phase transition – such as
temperature and pressure – are unevenly distributed in concrete, extended bodies
of matter, which makes that some regions of the system transition before others.
For example, think of some boiling water, where the upper molecules turn into
vapor before those at the bottom. Second, if – as it is usually held – macrolevel
phenomena in concrete systems can be explained in terms of the behavior of the
system at the microlevel, then actual discontinuities at the macrolevel cannot
occur: microlevel theories tell us that the particles making up the system may
change their configuration rapidly, but always continuously.5 For these reasons,
in concrete systems there often is a gray area between phases in which it is not
5 Cfr. e.g. Norton (2012, 2014), Shech (2013). If I understand him correctly, then Batter-
man takes his ‘physical discontinuities’ (at phase transitions and in other cases) to show that
macrolevel phenomena in concrete systems cannot be explained in terms of the behavior of the
system at the microlevel (2005). However, as I see it, this argument is unconvincing as long as
it is not clear exactly in which sense these ‘physical discontinuities’ are discontinuous.
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clear in which phase – if any – the system is. This gray area between phases
is ‘idealized away’ in the thermodynamic limit, where systems can be said to
be always in one phase or another. Consequently, only phase transitions in in-
finite statistical-mechanical systems – and not those in concrete systems – can
be discontinuous qualitative changes in the sense suggested here. Accordingly,
this argument does not justify the representation of phase transitions in concrete
systems by mathematical discontinuities.
Another way to argue that phase transitions understood as qualitative changes
are rightly represented by mathematical discontinuities, might be to contrast
phase transitions to another kind of changes that these systems can display, which
do not involve observed qualitative distinctions.6 Namely, one could point out
that systems can undergo two kinds of changes in their thermal properties: (1)
changes within a phase (e.g. from liquid water at some temperature and pressure
to liquid water of a higher temperature and pressure) and (2) changes between
phases, i.e. phase transitions (e.g. from liquid water to vapor), and argue that one
needs functions which are discontinuous at some points and continuous elsewhere
to represent these different kinds of changes mathematically. The qualitative
changes (‘physical discontinuities’) at phase transitions can then be said to be
discontinuous in the sense that phase transitions involve the discontinuation of
a certain qualitative state, but it is not clear why discontinuity in this sense de-
mands representation by mathematical discontinuities. Certainly, using functions
which are discontinuous at some points and continuous elsewhere is a way to
represent mathematically the distinction between phase transitions and changes
within a phase, but it is definitely not the only way to do so. It is not clear
why other mathematical signatures for phase transitions – such as for example
sufficiently steep gradients of the relevant functions – would do worse. In fact,
contrasting phase transitions to changes within a phase and representing them
by discontinuous versus continuous changes in the value of the relevant functions,
presupposes that there is a clear-cut distinction between phase transitions and
changes within a phase, which is not the case in concrete systems. As previously
discussed, in concrete systems there often is a gray area between phases in which
6 This argument presupposes that it is possible to define ‘observed qualitative distinctions’
in such a way that only (2) phase transitions – and no (1) changes within a phase – involve
observed qualitative distinctions. It is not clear to me that this can be done, but we will ignore
this issue here.
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it is not clear in which phase – if any – the system is, which makes that whether or
not a concrete system displays a phase transition is not an all-or-nothing matter.
A clear-cut distinction between phase transitions and changes within a phase is
present only in infinite statistical-mechanical systems. Accordingly, also this argu-
ment does not justify the representation of phase transitions in concrete systems
by mathematical discontinuities.
The upshot of the above is that even if phase transitions are understood as
qualitative distinctions – ‘physical discontinuities’ – between phases in statistical
mechanics, it does not follow that they should be represented by mathematical
discontinuities: we did not manage to identify a sense in which these physical dis-
continuities are discontinuous in such a manner that, as Batterman argues, they
‘demand curves with kinks’. Both arguments we presented to justify the represen-
tation of phase transitions by mathematical discontinuities already presumed an
infinite system, and therefore do not justify the appeal to infinite systems in or-
der to represent phase transitions in concrete systems. Since the alleged need for
discontinuities implies the need for an infinite idealization – the thermodynamic
limit – in statistical mechanics, it seems not true that, as Batterman argues, we
need to idealize concrete systems as infinite in statistical mechanics in order to
obtain a qualitative characterization of phase transitions. In sum, it is on Bat-
terman’s account thus clear how to interpret the discontinuities in the functions
describing the thermal properties of systems in the thermodynamic limit: these
mathematical discontinuities denote physical discontinuities which occur at phase
transitions in concrete systems – whatever they might be. How to interpret the
infinite systems obtained in the thermodynamic limit is on this account however
not clear – in fact, on this account it remains an open question why we need to
idealize concrete systems as infinite in statistical mechanics in order to represent
their thermal behavior at phase transitions.
There are alternative philosophical accounts of the use of the thermodynamic
limit in statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions which do not run into
the same problems. One route taken by several authors in the literature is arguing
that in statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions we do not – or not
necessarily – consider infinite systems. That is to say, several authors point out
that taking the thermodynamic limit (and other similar limits) does not in itself
amount to considering an infinite system. We find two different arguments to this
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effect in the literature on infinite idealizations in physics. One of these arguments
presses on a distinction between two ways of taking limits. This distinction was
the topic of two papers of Norton (2012, 2014), but can already be found in earlier
literature.7 The other argument is from Pincock (2014), which argues that when
we take limits we are, in fact, decoupling parts of the representation from their
original interpretation, and as a consequence we obtain a representation with
schematic content. We have discussed these views in the more general context of
infinite idealization in science in sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.2; here we will apply that
discussion to the specific context of the statistical mechanics of phase transitions.
As we have seen in section 1.2.2, in Norton’s view there are two different ways
in which limits are used in physical practice: (1) as approximations, which means
that one tracks the behavior of a system’s properties as the number of components
becomes arbitrarily large, or (2) as idealizations, which means that one considers
an actually infinite system as a surrogate for large systems of finitely many com-
ponents (Norton 2014, p. 205). Importantly, according to Norton, when one uses
a limit as (1) an approximation, one takes this limit in order to obtain proposi-
tions, which can be used to analyze finite systems because these propositions are
approximately true of (large enough) finite systems, in the sense that the differ-
ence between the limit-value and the actual value of the function describing the
properties of the system is small – in general much smaller than the measurement
error; when one uses a limit as (2) an idealization, to the contrary, one takes this
limit in order to obtain an actually infinite system, which – one hopes – can be an-
alyzed instead of the finite system, because some of the properties of the infinite
system approximate some of the properties of the target system (Norton 2012,
section 2.1; see section 1.2.2 of this thesis).
As Norton shows however, things often go wrong when using limits as ide-
alizations: the properties of limit systems might not agree with the limit of the
properties of finite systems, and one obtains either an unsuitable idealization or
no idealization at all (Norton 2012, section 3; section 1.2.2 of this thesis). For
this reason, he argues that it is often better to dispense with idealizations and
consider just approximations. In particular in statistical-mechanical accounts of
phase transitions, in Norton’s view, we do not need to employ idealizations: ap-
proximations are sufficient. That is to say, in his view we can simply consider
7 For an overview, see Mainwood (2005).
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the propositions obtained by taking the thermodynamic limit (i.e. the approxi-
mations) and there is no need to consider an infinite system (i.e. the idealization):
“In this particular case of phase transitions [. . . ], if infinite idealizations are em-
ployed, far from being ineliminable, the infinite idealizations can be and should
be eliminated” (Norton 2012, p. 223).
The key point of Norton’s views for our purposes is that when we take the
thermodynamic limit to generate an idealization, we consider, according to him,
a system consisting of an actual infinity of components (cfr. Norton 2012, p. 215,
Norton 2014, p. 197). When, instead, we use the thermodynamic limit only to
generate approximations, in his view we consider a system’s properties as the
number of components becomes arbitrarily large (Norton 2012, p. 225). Disposing
of the infinite idealizations thus comes down to disposing of the actually infinite
systems in favor of systems of any large enough but finite size. Thus, in other
words, in Norton’s view we use the thermodynamic limit in the ‘good’ way when
we do not take it to constitute an actually infinite system, but when we consider
systems of any (large enough) finite number of components instead.
On Pincock’s account, what Norton calls ‘idealizations’ do not even occur in
physical practice. According to Pincock, as we have seen in section 1.1.1, when
we take infinite limits in physics we do not ever assume that these quantities are
infinite (Pincock 2014). This is because, as Pincock puts it, “false assumptions
take us from an interpreted part of a scientific representation to an idealized
representation where the particular part is no longer interpreted” (Pincock 2014,
p. 2963). Thus, in Pincock’s view, the false assumption of an infinite component
number N in the thermodynamic limit, changes the representation in which N
denotes the components number into one in which N is a place holder. As he
puts it himself, the infinite idealization transforms the representation so that it
has merely schematic content (ibid.). This way, according to Pincock, we obtain
a representation which can be accurate no matter what the particle number is (as
long as it is large enough; Pincock 2014, pp. 2963, 2969).
It might be argued that Pincock’s conception does not accurately describe
physical practice when it comes to the statistical mechanics of phase transi-
tions, for at least some physicists working in this field clearly consider themselves
studying actually infinite systems (e.g. Lanford 1975 and Ruelle 1999, 2004, see
Norton 2014). But leaving aside the question whether or not Pincock’s account
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is descriptively accurate, I propose to read him normatively. Read in this man-
ner, on Pincock’s account we should interpret the mathematical representation
of a system in the thermodynamic limit not as referring to an actually infinite
(ideal) system, but instead we should acknowledge that this mathematical rep-
resentation does not tell us anything about the system’s size (cfr. Pincock 2014,
pp. 2963, 2969-2970). Thus, Pincock agrees with Norton that we use the thermo-
dynamic limit in the ‘good’ way when we do not take it to constitute an actually
infinite system, but when we consider systems of any finite (large enough) number
of components instead, and analyze their properties when we ignore the exact size
of these systems.
How understanding ‘infinite’ as ‘large but finite’ – instead of ‘actually infinite’
– solves the paradox of phase transitions, can be seen when we take into ac-
count Pincock’s view that the infinite idealization transforms the representation
so that it has merely schematic content. As we have seen, according to Pincock
the false assumption of an infinite component number N that we make when
taking the thermodynamic limit, changes the representation in which N denotes
the component number to one in which N is a place holder. This means that –
instead of telling us that for infinite N , the system will display a phase transition
– statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions which appeal to the thermo-
dynamic limit will tell us that for any (large enough) number N , a system of N
components will display a phase transition.
In sum, in the views of Norton and Pincock, the appropriate use of the ther-
modynamic limit does not amount to considering actually infinite systems, but
rather gives us propositions which are approximately true of (Norton’s terminol-
ogy) or representations which are accurate for (Pincock’s terminology) systems of
any large enough but finite size: on Pincock’s account, we may consider the limit
system, but we should disregard its extensive properties – that is, we should take
the particle number N and the volume V to be merely place holders -, and thus we
should not consider such a system to be infinite; on Norton’s account we should
disregard the limit system entirely, and just consider the propositions about the
limit properties. Accordingly, on their accounts it is no problem how to interpret
infinite systems which can be obtained by taking the thermodynamic limit: they
are idealizations which can and should be disregarded. Thus, on Norton’s and
Pincock’s account, statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions which use
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the thermodynamic limit do not tell us that phase transitions occur only in infinite
systems. Furthermore, on their accounts the mathematical discontinuities need
not to be interpreted as literally true of concrete systems (denoting something
like Batterman’s ‘physical discontinuities’): the idealized, discontinuous phase
transitions which occur in infinite systems are taken to be only approximate rep-
resentations of the continuous phase transitions which occur in concrete systems.
This can be considered a benefit, because on this interpretation the consistency of
statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions which employ the thermody-
namic limit with atomism is maintained. Since it is not clear what Batterman’s
physical discontinuities actually are, in particular, in which sense they are dis-
continuous, there seems to be no reason why the mathematical discontinuities
denoting phase transitions should be considered physically real.
Thus, the views of Norton and Pincock provide a better response to the con-
ceptual problems with the thermodynamic limit than Batterman’s view does. In
particular, the paradox of phase transitions seems solved on their accounts. For
this reason, I will reject Batterman’s defense of the need for infinite systems,
and embrace Norton’s and Pincock’s view that the appropriate way to use the
thermodynamic limit is to obtain propositions which are approximately true of
or representations which are accurate for systems of any large enough but finite
size, and thus to consider, instead of actually infinite systems, systems of large
but finite size.
4.3 Analysis
In the previous section we have seen that the solution of Norton and Pincock
to the paradox of phase transitions – which we embraced – is to interpret the
thermodynamic limit as referring to systems of any large finite size and not to
actually infinite systems. Accordingly, it seems that where statistical-mechanical
theories of phase transitions which appeal to the thermodynamic limit talk of
infinite systems, this should be taken to mean systems of large but finite size. In
other words, it seems that the correct interpretation of the term ‘infinite’ in these
theories, is not ‘actually infinite’, but rather ‘large but finite’.
In my (2017) paper on the paradox of phase transitions, I took the solution
of Norton and Pincock to suggest that philosophical problems with statistical-
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mechanical theories of phase transitions might be solved by developing these the-
ories in constructive mathematics. For one might wonder whether, by embracing
the solution to the paradox proposed by Norton and Pincock, we have gotten to
the bottom of the problem: if it is philosophically pertinent to interpret infinity
as ‘large but finite’ instead of ‘actually infinite’ in statistical-mechanical theories
of phase transitions when talking about infinite systems, might it then not be the
case that it is philosophically appropriate to interpret infinity in general as ‘large
but finite’ in this context? That is, in other words, I proposed in that paper to
take the solutions of Norton and Pincock a step further and interpret infinity con-
sistently as ‘large but finite’, instead of only when talking about systems – that is,
to develop a statistical-mechanical theory of phase transitions in constructive, in-
stead of classical, mathematics. I worked out the potential philosophical benefits
of a constructive statistical-mechanical theory of phase transitions in that paper;
we will here summarize the argument, and use it for further discussion.
As we have seen in section 2.3, constructive mathematics rejects the notion
of actual infinity and replaces it with potential infinity. According to this notion,
a collection is infinite if it can be indefinitely extended, and hence the notion
refers to arbitrarily large but finite quantities (cfr. Fletcher 2007). As we have
seen in section 2.3, constructive mathematics differs from classical mathematics
– in virtue of its different conception of infinity – principally with respect to
the conception of the continuum and of functions. These differences are relevant
for both philosophically problematic aspects of thermodynamic limit discussed in
section 4.2: that systems are idealized to have an actual infinity of components,
and that the changes in thermal properties that concrete systems display at phase
transitions are idealized to be discontinuous.
Concerning the first problem, i.e. how to interpret the infinite systems in the
thermodynamic limit, we note that, since infinity is understood as potential in-
stead of actual infinity, from a constructive viewpoint talk of actually infinite
systems is meaningless. Thus, in a theory of phase transitions formulated within
constructive mathematics, we cannot idealize a system to consist of an actual
infinity of components. Accordingly, we seem to be forced to use the thermo-
dynamic limit in what we identified in the previous section as the appropriate
manner: to obtain propositions which are approximately true of or representa-
tions which are accurate for systems of any large enough but finite size (see section
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4.2). Concerning the second problem, i.e. how to interpret the discontinuities that
represent phase transitions, we note that in constructive mathematics all func-
tions defined on every real number are continuous (see section 2.3). It remains to
be seen how to construct functions describing the thermodynamic properties of
systems at phase transitions, given that the discontinuous functions obtained by
taking the thermodynamic limit in the classical theories do not even qualify as
functions within constructive mathematics, but for now we will assume that this
can be done in a satifactory way.
As I explained in my (2017) paper, a constructive statistical-mechanical theory
of phase transitions can be considered a de-idealization of classical statistical-
mechanical theories. Reasons for this are the following. As we have seen in
section 2.3, constructive real numbers are only finitely precise. That means, first,
that physical quantities and their measurement are, when denoted by constructive
real numbers, not idealized to be infinitely precise, as is the case with classical
real numbers. Second, this means that functions defined on them – and thus in
particular the functions representing the thermal behavior of the systems under
consideration – are continuous.
These continuous functions, in turn, can be considered a de-idealization with
respect to the classical discontinuous functions for two reasons. First, they may
be taken to represent the system’s microlevel components (i.e. particles) to come
apart rapidly at phase transitions, instead of making a discontinuous ‘jump’. In
contrast to the classical discontinuous functions, these constructive continuous
functions can thus be said to be consistent with microlevel theories. Batterman
might object to this argument that this is a de-idealization only with respect to
what he calls Physics, i.e. the – according to him mistaken – hierarchical pic-
ture of physics in which it is presumed that macrolevel theories can be reduced
to microlevel theories (see subsection 1.1.2). That is, in other words, Batter-
man might object that without the assumption that our statistical-mechanical
theory of phase transitions can be reduced to, or is consistent with, microlevel
theories, there is no reason to presume that these discontinuous functions are ide-
alizations. However, as we have discussed in section 4.2 above, even if we want
a qualitative representation of phase transitions – and don’t require consistency
with microlevel theories – and understand the qualitative distinctions at phase
transitions, following Batterman, as physical discontinuities, then still it does not
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seem to be necessary to denote these physical discontinuities by mathematical dis-
continuities, for it remains unclear in which sense these qualitative distinctions –
‘physical discontinuities’ – are discontinuous. Thus, Batterman presumes without
argument that qualitative changes between phases are discontinuous, which can
be regarded an idealization.
Second, continuous functions can be considered a de-idealization with respect
to the classical discontinuous functions, because, as we have seen in section 4.2
above, representing phase transitions by discontinuities idealizes both the distinc-
tion between different phases, and the distinction between changes within a phase
and changes between phases (i.e. phase transitions) to be an all-or-nothing matter.
Continuous changes instead reflect the fact that in reality both these distinctions
are gradual. For example, whereas discontinuous functions idealize systems to be
always clearly in one phase or another, continuous functions do justice to the fact
that although there are values of – e.g. – pressure and volume at which we happily
say that a certain system is in its liquid or in its gaseous phase, there are also
values at which we would say that it is in no particular phase at all.8
In sum, classical statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions which use
the thermodynamic limit idealize systems to have an actually infinite number of
components and idealize phase transitions to occur discontinuously. As a conse-
quence, systems are idealized to be always clearly in one phase or another, and the
distinction between phase transitions and changes in thermal properties within a
phase are idealized to be clear-cut. All these idealizations in such classical theories
are made possible by the classical conception of real numbers as infinite objects,
and thus the idealization of physical quantities and our measurement of them as
infinitely precise. In constructive mathematics, real numbers are considered to be
only finitely precise. As a consequence of the constructive conception of real num-
bers, talk about actually infinite systems is meaningless and functions which are
defined on all real numbers are continuous. In classical statistical-mechanical theo-
ries two philosophical problems arise: how do these infinite statistical-mechanical
systems relate to finite concrete systems, and how do the discontinuous phase
transitions in statistical mechanics relate to the continuous phase transitions in
concrete systems? No such problems would arise in constructive theories.
One might argue that we do not need to switch to constructive mathematics
8 This point is also made in Mainwood (2005) and endorsed by Butterfield (2011).
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to obtain this de-idealization: one can simply do classical statistical mechanics
without the thermodynamic limit. However, as I see it, de-idealizing statistical-
mechanical theories of phase transitions by means of switching to constructive
mathematics is, so to say, a more profound de-idealization than merely doing sta-
tistical mechanics without the thermodynamic limit, because constructive math-
ematics does not idealize real numbers to be infinitely precise, and thus the con-
structive conception of real numbers – arguably – fits better with measurement
practice in science: constructive real numbers reflect the fact that we always
have a merely finite amount of information about physical quantities. Functions
(which are defined on all reals) in the constructive framework are continuous as a
consequence of the constructive conception of the reals. Thus, whereas the clas-
sical framework allows for philosophically problematic discontinuous changes, the
constructive framework can be said to rule these out on conceptual grounds.
Importantly, however, it seems not to be the case that modeling phase tran-
sitions in statistical mechanics by mathematical discontinuities is per se philo-
sophically problematic.9 For, as we have seen in section 2.3, in constructive
mathematics we have the option to formulate discontinuous partial functions. As
explained in that section, we can constructively define a function f : S → R,
where S = {x ∈ R | x < 0 or x = 0 or x > 0}, i.e. an element x ∈ S is a real
number together with the information whether x is negative, zero, or positive. In
other words, we restrict the domain of the function to these values of which we
are sure – on the basis of the finite information that we possess – whether they
are negative, zero, or positive.
Modeling phase transitions by discontinuous constructive partial functions
seems not to come with the philosophical problems that come with modeling
them by discontinuous classical total functions. For, as we have seen in section
2.3, constructive real numbers, as opposed to classical real numbers, are always
only finitely precise. So, even though these partial functions are discontinuous,
these discontinuities mean something different than their total counterparts in
classical mathematics. Given that constructive real numbers are understood to
have only finite precision, we do not commit ourselves to what happens exactly at
the moment of phase transition. In particular, the discontinuity in the construc-
tive partial function does not imply that the system “jumps” from one state into
9 From here on I will be going beyond what I wrote in van Wierst 2017.
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another.
Thus, modeling phase transitions by constructive partial functions seems at-
tractive, given that we do not commit ourselves to what happens exactly at the
moment of phase transition. As Bauer puts it, the domain S of constructive
real numbers together with the information whether they are negative, zero, or
positive, encodes moments in time or places in space where special things happen,
such as a sudden change of density (personal communication, see also Bauer 2012).
Personally, I am not in a position to judge whether modeling phase transitions by
such constructive partial functions is feasible at all (it seems more complicated
to me than simply developing a constructive – especially, whether they can be
built-in the theory from the start, rather than as an afterthought –, but it might
be interesting to look into this possibility. Another option that maybe can be em-
bedded more unproblematically, and seems to have similar philosophical benefits,
is the following.
A further way not to commit ourselves to what exactly happens at the moment
of phase transition, is modeling phase transitions by using interval arithmetic –
either in classical or in constructive mathematics.10 In this case, rather than
restricting the domain as is done in case of constructive partial functions, we
extend the codomain to ranges of possible values. Thus, in interval arithmetic a
function f returns instead of a real x, an interval [a, b] containing x. The set of
all intervals [a, b] for the closed interval with endpoints a and b is known as the
interval domain and is denoted IR:
IR = { [a, b] | a, b ∈ R and a ≤ b}
The ordinary real numbers are embedded in R: every real x ∈ R is represented
by the interval [x, x] of zero width.
Interestingly, discontinuous functions f : R→ R can be made continuous by
letting them map to IR instead. Consider, for instance, a function f : R → R
that has value -1 for negative numbers and 1 for positive numbers. Now let
10 I thank Andrej Bauer for making me aware of interval arithmetic. I follow here his expla-
nation (in personal communication).
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f : R→ IR such that
f(x) =

[−1,−1] for x < 0
[−1, 1] if x = 0
[1, 1] for x > 0
We will not go into the details here, but such an f is continuous. As Bauer
explains (personal communication), it is quite natural to take f(0) = [−1, 1] as a
sort of “non-determinate” value beteween the two phases (negative and positive).
Another way to understand the interval value [−1, 1] is as “many results are
possible, the theory does not predict which one will occur”.
Representing the values of f as an interval [a, b] containing x, can be seen as
reflecting uncertainty in the knowledge of the exact value of physical quantities
arising from measurement error, or, as Bauer suggests, from history-dependent
evolution of systems. For these (and perhaps other) reasons, physicists tend not
to commit themselves to what exactly happens at the moment of phase transition,
and therefore the mathematical model that allows many possible answers at once
may appeal to physicists, for it seems to make their intuitions precise.
To recapitulate: discontinuities in the classical theories are problematic in the
sense that the mathematics seems to assert something specific and unrealistic
about the exact moment of phase transition – and thus about phase transitions
and phases themselves. Constructive partial functions do not make this commit-
ment, neither do (classical or constructive) functions in interval arithmetic.
Another issue to consider is the following. From the philosophical literature
on phase transitions, one might get the impression that the two problems with
statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions that we distinguished in section
4.2 – i.e. how to interpret the infinite systems obtained by taking the thermody-
namic limit, and how to interpret the discontinuities which are taken to represent
phase transitions – are intrinsically connected, or even stronger, that they amount
to the same problem. For example, as we have seen in chapter 1, in the philo-
sophical literature on the paradox of phase transitions, it is argued – as a reductio
– that if the discontinuous changes in the partition function were literally true of
concrete systems, that is, if concrete systems indeed display discontinuous changes
in their thermodynamic properties at phase transitions, then the atomic theory
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of matter would be false. For example Norton writes:
“If the atomic theory of matter is true, then ordinary thermal
systems of finitely many components cannot display discontinuous
changes in their thermodynamic properties. The changes they mani-
fest are merely so rapid as to be observationally indistinguishable from
discontinuous behavior. Indeed, if we could establish that the phase
transitions of real substances exhibit these discontinuities, we would
have refuted the atomic theory of matter, which holds that ordinary
thermal systems are composed of finitely many atoms, molecules or
components” (Norton 2012).
In other words, Norton holds that if concrete systems display discontinuous changes
in their thermodynamic properties, then they are not composed of finitely many
particles (atoms, molecules, components). This, of course, means that these con-
crete systems would be composed of infinitely many particles. Shech makes a
similar claim:
“[I]f systems are composed of finitely many particles [. . . ], then
it makes no sense to talk of concrete discontinuities. The notion of
concrete discontinuity presupposes that matter is a continuum so that
there can be an actual discontinuity.” (Shech 2013).
Shech argues that if concrete systems display discontinuous changes, then matter
must be a continuum. Note that Shech’s claim is, or at least appears, stronger than
Norton’s: Shech argues that concrete discontinuities would not only imply that the
particle number is infinite, but that it is a continuum, and thus we should add that
it is uncountably infinite. Unfortunately, neither Norton nor Shech explains why,
according to them, discontinuous changes in the thermal properties of concrete
systems would presuppose that these systems are composed of infinitely many –
or a fortiori a continuum – of particles.11
This raises the question: What exactly do the infinite systems and the dis-
continuities have to do with each other? Do discontinuous changes in thermal
11 Of course, both argue from the reductionist perspective that thermal phenomena can be
explained in terms of, or reduced to, the microscopic behavior of these systems (see section 1.1.2),
but this assumption alone does not suffice to justify the view that discontinuous changes in the
thermal properties of concrete systems would presuppose that these systems are composed of
infinitely many particles.
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properties, or concrete discontinuities, indeed presuppose that these systems are
made up of a (countable or uncountable) infinite number of particles?
In order to answer this question, we should first clarify: in which sense is
a system in the thermodynamic limit infinite? In particular, do we obtain a
continuum of matter by taking the thermodynamic limit?
As we have seen in section 4.1, the thermodynamic limit is taken by letting the
particle number N and the volume V of a (finite) statistical-mechanical system
“go to infinity”, in such a manner that the density NV remains fixed. From this
description, it seems that taking the thermodynamic limits amounts to endlessly
adding elements to a finite set (while letting it proportionally expand in volume
so that the density remains constant). Moreover, by merely endlessly adding
elements to a finite set, we will not obtain a continuum, for any countable union
of countable sets is countable, and thus strictly smaller than a continuum.12 So,
from the description of the thermodynamic limit as “letting the particle number
and volume go to infinity”, it seems, conceptually speaking, that we do not obtain
a set of particles of continuum size.
What can we say about this mathematically? It was shown by Compagner
(1989) that the thermodynamic limit is in many contexts mathematically equiva-
lent to – meaning that in calculations it gives the same results as – what he calls
the continuum limit. In the continuum limit, the particle number N of the system
increases to infinity whereas its volume V – and other quantities that refer to the
system as a whole, such as the entropy S, the temperature T , the total energy E
– remains constant (and thus finite). The size of the individual particles d goes
to zero as their number N goes to infinity. Thus, what we obtain in the contin-
uum limit, is an infinite number of infinitely small particles spread over a finite
12 It is interesting to note that Cantor himself proved about what could be considered a similar
physical situation that such a splitting does not result in a continuum, i.e. a set of cardinality
ℵ1. He wrote in a letter to the psychologist and philosopher Wilhelm Wundt (16 Oct. 1883):
“If we consider the collection of all organic cells at a given time in our cosmos,
which expands itself infinitely in all directions, it is certain that this collection con-
sists of infinitely many individuals; one can therefore state the question regarding
the “power” [cardinality, aleph] of this set, and I can prove rigorously that the
power in question is the first [ℵ0], i.e., it not a greater one.”
Cells can be regarded as three-dimensional continuous subdomains of Euclidean space, separated
from each other so that they can at most touch each other along their borders; and Cantor
proved in his 1882 paper that a set of infinitely many subdomains, having such properties, must
be denumerable, i.e., of power ℵ0 (Ferreirós 2004, p. 14).
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volume; in the thermodynamic limit, to the contrary, both the number of (finitely
sized) particles and the volume they occupy are infinite. As Compagner puts it
himself, the continuum limit works on the particles, whereas the thermodynamic
limit works on the container (1989, pp. 109-110).
What does a system in the continuum limit look like? Does matter in that
limit constitute a continuum? Norton has an argument to the effect that this
is not the case (2012, pp. 217-218). As he points out, one of the quantities
remaining constant in the continuum limit is the volume occupied by matter
Nd3. This means that in the limit, like at any stage approaching it, the system
will consist of portions of space occupied by matter surrounded by emptiness. As
the number of particles gets bigger, their size as well as the size of the regions
of emptiness surrounding them will get smaller and smaller, but at every stage
the system consists of regions with matter density unity and regions with matter
density zero. The argument is nicely illustrated with a simplified example (after
Norton 2012):
Figure 4.2: Sequence in halftone printing (Norton 2012, p. 218)
Represented in figure 4.2 is a unit square that is divided into half, quarter, eighth
squares, and so on, in stages 1, 2, 3, and so on. At each stage, half the squares are
occupied by matter – represented by shading -, and half are not. The sequence
resembles halftone printing, i.e. a printer simulating grey scales by assigning either
black or white to each point on the paper. Points on the diagonal, such as (13 ,
1
3)
will have the state “white” at all stages and thus have “white” as a limiting value.
Others will oscillate between black and white indefinitely. For example, the states
at the point (13 ,
2
5) shown in the figure will oscillate indefinitely as white, white,
black, black, white, white, black, black, and so on, and therefore do not have a
limiting value.13 Hence, in the limit there will be white points, black points, and
13 As Norton explains, the rule for computing this series requires that the coordinates be
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points with no color. The halftone printing is thus similar to the continuum limit
in that in the limit of halftone printing there will be points which are neither
black nor white, while in the continuum limit there are points which are neither
occupied by matter nor empty. As Norton argues, the halftone printing fails to
yield a unit square uniformly covered in a 50% grey tone; the continuum limit
fails to return a system with a uniform matter distribution of density 12 .
Does Norton’s argument show that systems in the continuum limit do not
consist of a continuum of matter? Well, that depends on what we take a “con-
tinuum of matter” to be. Norton, if I understand him correctly, seems to take a
continuum of matter to be a system with a uniform matter distribution of density
1
2 (see above, cfr. Norton 2012, pp. 217-218). On this conception, indeed, Nor-
ton’s argument shows that in the continuum limit we do not obtain a continuum
of matter. However, Compagner seems to think about a continuum of matter
in a different way. He seems to regard a system in the continuum limit to be a
continuum of matter, because microscopic fluctations disappear in this limit (cfr.
Compagner 1989, p. 108). That is, on Compagner’s conception a system in the
continuum limit is a continuum because its microscopic discreteness is ignored.14
Thus, on Compagner’s conception the continuum limit does result in a continuum
of matter. The same seems to hold for systems in the thermodynamic limit: since
fluctations disappear and the microscopic structure is neglected, a system in the
thermodynamic limit qualifies as a “continuum of matter” in Compagner’s sense,
but – given that the density in the thermodynamic limit remains constant – in
Norton’s sense it does not.
Let us try to answer our question: in which sense are systems in the thermody-
namic limit infinite? For Norton a system in the thermodynamic limit is infinite
in the sense that it consists of infinitely many particles, but it does not form a
continuum – where “continuum” is understood as uniform distribution of density.
For Compagner, a system in the thermodynamic limit is infinite in the sense that
it is mathematically equivalent to the continuum limit in which a continuum of
matter is obtained, but Compagner understands a “continuum of matter” in a
expanded as binary numbers: 13 = 0.010101010...
2, and 25 = 0.011001100...
2. The point is white
at the nth stage if the nth digits of the two numbers agree, and black if they disagree.
14 Cfr.: “The continuum limit emphasizes that macroscopic or classical thermodynamics is
only an approximation, which breaks down when the discrete structure of matter is important”
(Compagner 1989, p. 111).
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different way, namely, in the sense that the microscopic discreteness of the system
is ignored. It is clear, however, that neither systems in the thermodynamic limit,
nor in the continuum limit, can be considered as a “continuum of matter” as anal-
ogous to a mathematical continuum: Norton’s argument shows that the matter
distribution of systems in the continuum limit does not have the completeness
property which is essential for a mathematical continuum (see section 3.1).
So let us go on and try to answer our other question: what exactly do the
infinite systems and the discontinuities have to do with each other? In particular,
would, as Norton and Shech argue in the above quotes, discontinuous changes in
the thermal properties of concrete systems, or concrete discontinuities, presuppose
that these systems are composed of infinitely many – or a fortiori a continuum –
of particles?
To address the last issue first: I do not see why it would be the case that
discontinuous changes in the thermal properties of concrete systems presuppose
that these systems are composed of (countably or uncountably) infinitely many
particles. That is, I do not see why discontinuous changes in the configuration of
particles would be possible in an infinite system. As I see it, discontinuous jumps
in the configuration of particles are a conceptual impossibility, in something like
the sense of Dummett (see section 3.3), and whether the system consists of finitely
or infinitely many particles does not change anything about that.
Of course, it might be objected that there is no ground to hold that discon-
tinuous jumps in the configuration of particles are impossible in infinite systems.
After all, there are no infinite systems in the real world, so we have no experi-
ence with them that could justify such an assertion. We may argue that since
there are no infinite systems, we may attribute to them whatever properties we
like. And in fact, the mathematics tells us that infinite systems can display such
discontinuities. So why not just rely on what the mathematics tells us?
The problem with relying on what the mathematics tells us about infinite
systems, as I see it, is two-fold. First, it should be clarified what do we mean by
this mathematics? Which parts of it do we take to represent features of physical
systems? To which extent do we take physical systems and the mathematics that
we use to represent them to be analogous? For example, what is a “continuum
of matter”? In particular, do we take it to mean that matter is so distributed
that it is complete? Is matter idealized to consist of an uncountable infinity of
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components, just as a (classical) mathematical continuum consists of an uncount-
able infinity of points? Or do we simply mean that the microlevel discreteness
of the system is ignored? And another example: in which sense are “physical
discontinuities” discontinuous? Do they involve instantaneous “jumps” like in the
mathematical case? What exactly is it that makes that, as Batterman puts it,
they “demand curves with kinks”?
Second, it should be established which mathematics exactly are we relying
on? For as we have seen, the meaning of the mathematics, and consequently the
extent and form in which philosophical problems arise in interpreting it, differs
between mathematical systems and methods. For example, the meaning of “dis-
continuity” differs between discontinuous classical total functions and discontin-
uous constructive partial functions. Similarly, even within classical mathematics,
what “continuity” means depends on whether we use regular methods and have
R as a codomain, or rather we use interval arithmetic and take IR as a codomain.
Depending on the mathematical framework and methods we use, we do or do not
idealize systems as actually infinite; we do or do not idealize phase transitions as
infinitely sharp; we do or do not commit ourselves to what happens at the exact
moment of transition.
In answer to our question what exactly the relationship is between infinite
systems and discontinuities, we note the following. Whereas we have infinite sys-
tems and discontinuous changes in classical statistical-mechanical theories with
the thermodynamic limit, and no infinite systems and discontinuous changes in
constructive theories which use total functions, if we use partial functions in con-
structive mathematics we have discontinuities but no infinite systems, whereas
when we use interval arithmetic in classical mathematics we may have infinite
systems but no discontinuous functions. In sum, the relationship between infinite
systems and discontinuities is relative to the mathematics in which the physics is
formulated.
For these reasons, it seems to me that we should not turn to the mathemat-
ics in order to judge, e.g., whether discontinuous changes in thermal properties
presuppose that matter is a continuum.
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4.4 Conclusion
So: do our best theories of phase transitions tell us that no phase transitions
can occur in finite systems? Yes and no. If by “phase transition” we mean the
idealized concept according to which systems “jump” from one phase to another,
according to which the distinction between phase transitions and changes within
a phase is clear-cut, and according to which systems are always clearly in one
phase or another, then statistical-mechanical theories show that no finite, and
thus no concrete, system can display phase transitions. If, to the contrary, by
“phase transition” we mean the phenomenon with which we are so familiar, and
according to which systems often change gradually from one phase to another,
according to which we often cannot tell whether or not a system displays a phase
transition, or in which phase – if any – the system is, then statistical-mechanical
theories do not show that no finite, and thus not concrete, system can display
phase transitions. In other words, the answer to this question depends on what
we mean by “phase transition”.
And: are the philosophical problems with statistical-mechanical theories of
phase transitions relative to classical mathematics and its notion of actual infin-
ity? Yes and no. Classical mathematics can be seen as the cause of the paradox of
phase transitions, in the following sense. First, the paradox arises from certain ide-
alizations which are made possible in classical mathematics: infinite systems and
discontinuous functions. Second, the problem arises from the classical meaning of
the mathematics: an “infinite” system means an actually infinite system, and –
given that real numbers are understood to have infinite precision – discontinuities
represent actual “jumps” in the physical quantities. In constructive mathematics,
first, there is no possibility to formulate this mathematics and thus to idealize
systems in this philosophically problematic way, and second, the meaning of the
mathematics – such as e.g. the concept of real number – is less problematic, in
that it fits more naturally with scientific practice – constructive real numbers can
be understood to reflect the fact that there is always some measurement error.
However, modeling phase transitions in classical mathematics is not necessarily
philosophically problematic. First, there is of course the option of taking “phase
transition” in the second meaning in the paragraph above – i.e. as the vague
concept of a phase transition such as we see it exhibited in the real world – and
modeling them in statistical mechanics without the thermodynamic limit. But
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there seem to be other options as well, such as using interval arithmetic. In both
cases, however, as well as when we opt for adopting (total functions in) construc-
tive mathematics, this means that we have to let go of the idealization of systems
as displaying clear-cut, infinitely sharp phase transitions. And this might be too
high a price to pay for physicists.
Further, we can take away the following from this chapter. The paradox of
phase transitions clearly relates to the issue of consistency (see chapter 1): the
thermodynamic limit introduces an internal inconsistency in order to eliminate
an external inconsistency. The internal inconsistency introduced by the use of the
thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics, is that systems in the thermody-
namic limit are infinitely large in particle number and volume, whereas statistical
mechanics is (or is supposed to be) a theory of systems which are finite in particle
number and size (namely, concrete systems). This idealization is introduced in
order to undo the external inconsistency between statistical mechanics and ther-
modynamics: whereas systems in thermodynamics at certain values of, e.g., pres-
sure and volume display discontinuities, systems under the same circumstances in
statistical mechanics without the thermodynamic limit do not.
The view that this external inconsistency between thermodynamics and statis-
tical mechanics is problematic at all, rests on two assumptions: first, that thermal
behavior of systems can be explained in terms of their behavior at the microlevel
– or, in other words, that thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechan-
ics –, and second, that statistical mechanics, like thermodynamics should denote
phase transitions by mathematical discontinuities. The first assumption comes
from the view of physics as what Batterman called Physics (see section 1.1.2),
according to which microlevel theories such as statistical mechanics are in some
sense “more fundamental” than, and accordingly privileged over, macrolevel the-
ories such as thermodynamics. This view is held by the majority of philosophers
of science, and can be said to be the main cause of the widespread bewilderment
regarding the need for the thermodynamic limit in statistical-mechanical theories
of phase transitions.
The second assumption to the effect that statistical mechanics, like thermo-
dynamics, should represent phase transitions by discontinuities is sometimes dis-
puted in the literature (e.g. in Callender 2001). Notably, Batterman argues in
favor of this assumption, because in his view statistical mechanics should give
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a qualitative account of phase transitions. Qualitatively understood, Batterman
argues, concrete systems display “physical discontinuities” at phase transitions
which are in his opinion rightly represented by mathematical discontinuities. But
our analysis in section 4.2 revealed that even if we want a qualitative represen-
tation of phase transitions and we accept Batterman’s claim that systems display
“physical discontinuities” at phase transitions, then still it does not seem to be
necessary to denote these physical discontinuities by mathematical discontinuities.
In particular, these “physical discontinuities” do not seem to be discontinuous in
any sense of the term that makes that, as Batterman argues, they “demand curves
with kinks”.
The proposal from my (van Wierst 2017) paper to develop a constructive
account of phase transitions should be understood as a more rigorous version of
the solutions to the paradox of phase transitions offered by Norton and Pincock:
whereas the latter argue to interpret “infinity” as “large but finite” instead of
“actually infinite” merely when talking about the size of systems, I argue that we
should consistently interpret it in this manner. That is, I propose to interpret the
infinite everywhere in the mathematics as the constructivist’s potential infinity –
not only when talking about systems, but already in the definition of real numbers.
Doing so, as we have seen in section 4.3, not only we avoid both conceptual
problems with the current theories – that systems are idealized to have an actual
infinity of components, whereas the concrete systems they represent have only
finitely many components, and that the changes in thermal properties at phase
transitions are idealized to be discontinuous, whereas concrete systems can only
display continuous changes – but also we obtain a continuum which seems better
to reflect the ontology of bounded statistical-mechanical systems: discrete at the
microlevel, but in principle without a bound to their size.
Two remarks regarding this proposal are pertinent. First, as already discussed
earlier in this conclusion, adopting constructive mathematics is not the only way
to avoid the philosophical problems with statistical-mechanical theories of phase
transitions; there are other options as well. Avoiding the philosophical problems,
however, seems to require giving up idealizing systems as displaying clear-cut,
infinitely precise phase transitions. Thus, the real problem seems to come not from
the classical mathematical framework per se, but rather from the particular way
in which phase transitions are idealized. In contrast to constructive mathematics,
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however, classical mathematics does permit this kind of idealization. We can even
say, I think, that it is very natural to idealize in this way in classical mathematics,
for real numbers themselves are already idealized as infinitely precise.
Second, adopting constructive mathematics will certainly not solve all the
problems surrounding statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions. For
first, the paradox of phase transitions relates to much bigger issues such as in-
tertheory relations and the hierarchical picture of science. And second, prior to
developing alternative theories it should be established: what do we mean by the
concepts involved in the paradox, and in particular, to what extent do we take
these physical concepts to be analogous to the mathematical concepts we use to
represent them?
Chapter 5
Paradox II: Norton’s Dome
Newtonian (or: classical) mechanics is often taken to be the paradigm
of a deterministic theory: Newton’s equations of motion uniquely
determine the motions of objects given their initial positions and
velocities. However, when a point-mass is placed at the apex of
Norton’s Dome – a radially symmetric, infinitely rigid surface with
a particular shape in a gravitational field -, according to Newto-
nian mechanics it can remain forever motionless, or after an arbi-
trary time roll of the Dome in an arbitrary direction. Is Newtonian
mechanics not deterministic after all?
5.1 The physics
We will start this section with an exposition of the physics of the Dome as intro-
duced by Norton (2003, 2008). Norton’s Dome is a surface as illustrated in figure
5.1 below, which is surrounded by a downward directed gravitational field. It is
rotationally symmetric about the origin r = 0, which is also the highest point of
the Dome. The shape of the Dome is described by the equation
(5.1) h(r) = 23g r
3
2
where r is the radial distance coordinate in the surface of the Dome (i.e. the
distance from the highest point of the Dome along the surface), h is the vertical
distance below the apex at r = 0, and g is the acceleration due to gravity. A
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point-like unit mass slides frictionlessly over the surface.
Figure 5.1: Mass sliding on the Dome (from Norton 2008)
Before explaining why, according to Norton, the Dome shows that Newtonian
mechanics is indeterministic, we should clarify: why is it usually held that Newto-
nian mechanics is deterministic? Determinism, within the context of Newtonian
mechanics, should be taken to mean that the motions of objects – such as the
point mass on the Dome – within a Newtonian system are uniquely determined by
their initial positions and velocities (cfr. e.g. Norton 2003, Norton 2008, Malament
2008, Fletcher 2012). This, in turn, should be taken to mean that Newton’s laws
of motion, i.e. the differential equations which describe the dynamics of the New-
tonian system in terms of its motion as a function of time, given some initial
conditions, have a unique solution – i.e. there is a unique function describing the
position r of the object in terms of the time t such that the initial conditions are
satisfied.1
Now, Newton’s laws of motion give the following picture of the movement of
the mass. The net force F acting on the mass is the component of the gravitational
force tangent to the surface, i.e. F = d(gh)dr = r
1
2 and is directed radially outward.
Thus, at any point r on the surface of the Dome, the mass is subject to an outward
directed force field of r
1
2 . Since the force acting on the mass is known, Newton’s
1 This uniqueness is guaranteed by a theorem of the theory of ordinary differential equations
called the Picard-Lindelöf theorem. As we will see in the next subsection, this theorem has a
condition – the Lipschitz-continuity of F – which in case of the Norton Dome is violated.
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second law of motion (“F = ma”) should be sufficient to describe the motion of
the mass. Given that we have to do with a unit mass, it sets the acceleration
equal to the force field:






If the mass is initially located at rest at the apex r = 0, then the initial conditions
are the following:
(5.3) r0 = 0
(5.4) dr
dt
(0) = v0 ≥ 0
5.3 says that the mass is initially located at the apex of the Dome, r = 0, and
5.4 that the initial velocity v0 points in positive r direction (cfr. Malament 2008).
Since at the apex there is no tangential component of the gravitational force,
i.e. F = 0, one obvious solution to 5.2 for all times t is a trivial one:
(5.5) r(t) = 0
Equation 5.5 describes the mass simply remaining at rest at the apex for all times
t. However, as Norton argues, this is not the only possibility, for also the following





4 for t ≥ T
0 for t ≤ T
Note that T here can be any time whatsoever. Newtonian mechanics gives no
guidance as to what T should be. So what we have is an uncountable infinity
of solutions according to which the mass sits at rest at the apex of the Dome
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for some time T , whereupon it moves off in some arbitrary radial direction. The





2 for t ≥ T
0 for t ≤ T
We see that also these solutions satisfy Newton’s second law, by noting that a(t) as
given by 5.7 is the square root of r(t) as given by 5.6, as required by 5.2. Thus, in
case of the Norton Dome the motion of the mass is not uniquely determined: both
5.5 and 5.6 satisfy conditions 5.3 and 5.4. In other words, there is in Newtonian
mechanics no way to determine whether or not the mass will start sliding off the
Dome, and if it does, at which time T – and, additionally, in which direction – it
will do so. The Dome thus seems to contradict the idea of Newtonian mechanics as
a deterministic theory, in that some initial conditions are compatible with many
futures. As Norton puts it, Newtonian mechanics allows thus for “spontaneous
acceleration” (Norton 2003, Norton 2008).
As Norton points out, one might consider to object that such spontaneous
acceleration is prohibited by Newton’s first law (in its instantaneous form: “In
the absence of a net external force, a body is unaccelerated”; cfr. Norton 2003,
p. 14). That is, one might argue that given that there is no net force on the
mass at t = T , by this law the mass should remain at rest. However, as Norton
shows, the motions of 5.6 are completely in accordance with Newton’s first law:
for times t ≤ T , there is no force applied (since the mass is at position r = 0,
where the gravitational component of the tangential force F = 0) and the mass
is unaccelerated; for times t > T , there is a net force applied (since the mass
is at a position r > 0, where F > 0), and the mass accelerates in accord with
F = ma (ibid.). At the particular time t = T , we can see from substitution into
5.6 that the mass is still at the apex and from substitution into 5.7 that it has
an acceleration a(0) of zero. Thus, at t = T there is no force and the mass is
unaccelerated; at any t > T , there is a non-zero force and the mass accelerates
accordingly. This, as Norton argues, is exactly what Newton’s first law demands.
In sum, Norton holds that his Dome shows that Newtonian mechanics is not
a deterministic theory, because there is a Newtonian system, namely the Dome,
for which Newton’s laws do not determine whether or not the point mass placed
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on the apex will start to move, and if so, when and in which direction it will do
so. Surely, whether or not the Dome shows Newtonian mechanics indeterministic
crucially depends on whether or not it is appropriate to apply Newton’s laws to
it – that is, in other words, whether or not the Dome is a proper “Newtonian
system”. Perhaps surprisingly, what does and what does not count as a proper
Newtonian system is not a clear-cut matter, and depends – among other things2
– on the unsettled issue of which kind of idealizations should be admitted within
this theory. In the philosophical literature, many have argued that Norton’s Dome
involves idealizations which are improper for Newtonian systems, and thus that
it falls outside the proper “domain of application” of Newtonian mechanics. We
will discuss these arguments in the next section.
5.2 The philosophical debate
The common thread in the philosophical literature on Norton’s Dome is the
thought that one cannot decide for or against the deterministic character of New-
tonian mechanics as long as it is not clear what the proper domain of application
of this theory is, that is, what counts as a proper “Newtonian system”. In partic-
ular, it is commonly argued in the literature that it is not clear that the Dome
is a case of indeterminism in Newtonian mechanics, since it is not clear that the
Dome is a proper Newtonian system. Clearly, the Dome involves idealizations,
and whether or not these idealizations are allowed in Newtonian mechanics is up
for debate. Surprisingly, different scholars have pointed towards different ideal-
izations used in the Dome as being “improper” to Newtonian mechanics. In this
section, we will discuss those idealizations identified in the literature as improper
which involve, in some way or another, infinity: the geometrical shape of the
Dome, the geometrical shape of the mass, and the initial state of the mass on the
Dome.
We will start with the geometrical shape of the Dome. As is clear from the
previous section, the Dome works as a constraint surface for the particle: it im-
2 As we will discuss below, Wilson (2009) argues that what is commonly referred to as
“classical (or Newtonian) mechanics”, actually divides into three different formalisms: point
particle mechanics, the physics of rigid bodies and perfect constraints, and continuum mechanics
– each of them with descriptive gaps which reach all the way to their cores, and which often give
mutually incompatible analyses of the same issue. No combination of these formalisms can fill
all the gaps in our physical theorizing, in Wilson’s view.
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poses conditions on the motion of the point particle and thus on the force F
acting on it. There is one point of the Dome which is special: the apex. As we
have seen in the previous section, the apex is the only point at which there is no
tangential component to the gravitational force, and – consequently – the only
point at which the mass remains unaccelerated.
Mathematically, the geometrical shape of the Dome – in particular, at the
apex – can be seen as the cause of the indeterminism in the following sense. As
we have seen in the previous section, it is usually held that Newtonian mechanics
is a deterministic theory, because the motions of objects – such as the point mass
on the Dome – in a Newtonian system are uniquely determined by their initial
positions and velocities, meaning that Newton’s laws of motion, i.e. the differential
equations which describe the dynamics of the Newtonian system in terms of its
motion as a function of time given some initial conditions have a unique solution.
The uniqueness of this solution is guaranteed by the Picard-Lindelöf theorem
from the theory of ordinary differential equations. This theorem, however, has
a condition: the differential equations have a unique solution iff the function F
satisfies a Lipschitz condition or is Lipschitz continuous.3 As was already noted
by Norton, at the apex of the Dome, F does not satisfy the Lipschitz condition
(2008, p. 788). Thus, in virtue of its shape, the Dome makes the force F acting
on the mass non-Lipschitz, and this, in turn, makes the indeterminism possible.
Should geometrical shapes such as the Dome with its singularity at the apex,
which make the forces acting on them non-Lipschitz, be allowed in Newtonian
mechanics? Some philosophers argued that non-Lipschitz forces do not belong
to Newtonian mechanics (e.g. Earman & Friedman 1973). Others, instead, ar-
gue that requiring Lipschitz continuity is ad hoc, and one cannot rule out these
Lipschitz-indeterministic systems without relying on the notion of determinism
(Fletcher 2012). Importantly, as Norton pointed out, Lipschitz continuity a suf-
ficient, but not a necessary condition for determinism (Norton 2008, p. 797).
There are good arguments to exclude the Dome as a proper Newtonian system
in virtue of its shape at the apex. Malament (2008) has shown that at the apex,
3 F is Lipschitz continuous or satisfies a Lipschitz condition on its domain D if and only if
there is a constant L ≥ 0 such that ∀x, y ∈ D, |F (x) − F (y)| ≤ L|x − y|. Lipschitz continuity
thus expresses that the function has a bounded derivative. The force function F on the Dome
is not Lipschitz at the apex: F ′ = 12√r at r = 0 is infinite, and thus not bounded. For a proof
that the Lipschitz condition is violated, see the appendix to Norton (2008).
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the Dome surface is once, but not twice differentiable (elsewhere it is infinitely
differentiable).4 This means in particular that the Gaussian curvature of the
surface blows up and goes to infinity as one approaches the apex (Malament 2008,
p. 2). Importantly, the second derivative of the Dome surface corresponds to the
mass’ acceleration, and thus this singularity at the apex implies that at that
point the acceleration of the particle is not well-defined (Malament 2008, p. 16).5
Furthermore, Malament showed that this means that a mass placed at the apex
of the Dome can only stay on the Dome’s surface if its initial speed is 0; with
positive speed, no matter how small, the mass would fly off the Dome immediately
(Malament 2008, section 5). Norton responded to this concern that we could
consider the mass to be constrained to the surface of the Dome by a perfectly
rigid wire that provides the necessary constraint force to keep the mass on the
surface of the Dome (Norton 2008, p. 790). However, according to Stemeroff &
Dyer (2016), this would in no way alleviate Malament’s concerns, for according to
them, the problem that Malament raised stems from the fact that the differential
calculus simply cannot be applied on the Norton Dome (2016, p. 22).
According to Stemeroff & Dyer, motion, as construed within any conception
of the world based on the differential calculus, is defined to have a certain struc-
ture “in the small” (2016, p. 15). This means, in particular, that we can define
a differential to the force function that approximates the behavior of the func-
tion in the infinitesimal neighbourhood of any point. According to them, the fact
that the force function depends on the velocity function, and the velocity func-
tion does not have this structure in the small (its derivative w.r.t. time, i.e. the
acceleration is not well-defined at the apex), the force function does not have
the right structure in the small either (Stemeroff & Dyer 2016, p. 23). Since, as
they put it, the differential structure breaks down in the infinitesimal neighbour-
hood around the apex, Newton’s second law cannot be applied there (Stemeroff &
Dyer 2016, p. 21). Therefore, as they argue, Newtonian mechanics simply cannot
accommodate motion of a mass on the Norton Dome.
We will now proceed with a discussion of another idealization employed in the
Norton Dome which has been diagnosed in the literature as improper for Newto-
4 Note that F has to be twice differentiable in order to satisfy the above Picard-Lindelöf
theorem (cfr. Malament 2008, p. 2).
5 One might argue that it is essential to Newtonian mechanics that we be able to assign
accelerations to particles; Malament does not take a stand on this issue (Malament 2008, p. 16).
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nian theories: the geometrical shape of the mass. As discussed before, the mass
is a point, and therefore has zero extension in space and infinite density. There
have been presented in the literature two different reasons why this is problematic:
first, because this requires the infinite idealization of the Dome as infinitely rigid,
and by the slightest relaxation of this idealization the indeterminism disappears,
and second, because this gives a conceptual mismatch with the extended Dome.
We will discuss these views here in turn.
As was pointed out by Korolev (2007), the fact that the mass is an extension-
less point means in particular that the force is applied to just one point and thus
produces infinite pressure on the surface of the apex. In order to compensate for
this infinite pressure, the Dome has to be idealized as absolutely non-deformable,
i.e. infinitely rigid. Without this idealization, Korolev argues, the infinite pressure
would cause an infinite well in the Dome, as illustrated in figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The Dome deformed by the point mass (after Korolev 2007)
The idealization of the Dome as infinitely rigid comes down to ignoring elastic
phenomena, namely the deformation that would occur in the Dome as a response
to the force applied to it by the mass. Korolev demonstrates that if some elastic-
ity was taken into account, no matter how small, it would deform sufficiently to
prevent the indeterminism. To be more precise, the elasticity destroys the singu-
larity at the apex, which means that the Lipschitz indeterminism disappears. As
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Korolev argues, the problem of the point mass on the apex of the Dome “cannot
even be set up properly within the classical theory of elasticity” (Korolev 2007,
p. 13). Thus, on Korolev’s view, the indeterminism of the Dome case is as a re-
sult of an infinite idealization (i.e. the idealization of the Dome as infinitely rigid)
which makes the Dome inconsistent with the theory of elastic phenomena.
According to Wilson, the problem with the point mass on the Norton Dome
involves a conceptual mismatch between an extended and an unextended object
(Wilson 2009, p. 185 n. 11). Wilson argues that what is commonly referred to
as “classical (or Newtonian) mechanics”, actually divides into three different con-
ceptual frameworks which often give mutually incompatible analyses of the same
issue: mass point particle mechanics, the physics of rigid bodies and perfect con-
straints, and continuum mechanics. Each of these three conceptual frameworks,
according to Wilson, has descriptive gaps which reach all the way to their cores;
they appeal to each other locally to fill these gaps, but this cannot be done glob-
ally, and there will always remain some explanatory gaps in our physical theorizing
(Wilson 2009, p. 174). Now, as he explains, unextended point-masses such as the
one on the Norton Dome are object of mass point particle mechanics, whereas ex-
tended yet perfectly rigid geometrical shapes such as the Dome are object of the
physics of rigid bodies (Wilson 2009, p. 176). This is according to him particularly
problematic with regard to the force acting on the particle: in Norton’s example,
the total applied force appears as the constant downward directed gravitational
force, which is then apportioned into two sub-categories in different amounts, de-
pending on the position at the Dome; such a decomposition of force is part of the
physics of rigid bodies and perfect constraints, but is rejected by mass point par-
ticle mechanics (Wilson 2009, pp. 177-178). According to Wilson, this division of
forces is how Norton’s loss of determinacy secretly enters the scene (Wilson 2009,
p. 178).6 Thus, in Wilson’s view the idealization of the mass as an extensionless
point-particle is problematic in combination with the extended Dome, for both
are covered by different and incompatible parts of classical mechanics.
We will now proceed with discussing the third idealization, the initial condi-
tions: the mass is placed at perfect rest at the center of the apex. As already
pointed out by Norton himself, this is an idealization, because it involves ignor-
6 Roberts (2009) has shown, however, that the decomposition of forces is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the indeterminism to obtain.
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ing perturbations and is incompatible with quantum mechanics (Norton 2008,
p. 793). Wenmackers & Vanpoucke (2016) propose a nonstandard model of the
Dome, with (infinitesimal) perturbations.7 This model is deterministic, and more-
over it makes it possible to assign probabilities to the possible values of T in the
standard Dome. Given that their contribution is, to the best of my knowledge,
the only contribution to the debate on infinite idealizations in which some model
based on non-classical (in this case, meaning nonstandard) mathematics is pro-
posed as a solution to philosophical problems, I will discuss their contribution in
detail.
As we have seen in section 5.1, in the standard model of the Dome, the time
parameter – as every other parameter – is taken to be continuous. Wenmackers
& Vanpoucke, to the contrary, take the time parameter to be discrete (t = n∆t).
Given the discrete time parameter, the differential equations of the standard model
have to be replaced by their discrete analogue, i.e. difference equations. As Wen-
mackers & Vanpoucke explain, this is standard praxis in numerical analysis, which
is often used in physics. Within the scope of standard analysis, the discrete ap-
proach using difference equations is only an approximation to the continuous
case described by differential equations – an approach that improves as the time
step ∆t decreases. Wenmackers & Vanpoucke use the discrete approach however
within the framework of nonstandard analysis: they define ∆t = tN for N ∈ ∗N
infinite, i.e. their ∆t is infinitesimal, and thus smaller than any strictly positive
real number (see section 2.4). Thus, we could say that within the framework of
nonstandard analysis, the discrete approach is actualy an improvement on the
continuous case. In the following, we will see which consequences this has for the
(in)determinism of the Dome.
On the discrete approach of Wenmackers & Vanpoucke, the velocity of the
mass drdt is approximated by the sequence
Rn−Rn−1








As we have seen above, the indeterminism arises in the standard Dome when
the mass is initially located at rest at the apex. As Wenmackers & Vanpoucke
argue, in the nonstandard model this initial condition has two possibile interpre-
7 My discussion of Wenmackers & Vanpoucke (2016) is based on an extended abstract and
presentation slides from 2016, since the related paper is not published at the time of writing of
this dissertation. Many thanks to Sylvia Wenmackers for kindly providing me with the abstract
and slides.
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tations: (1) it could mean that even with infinitesimal precision the mass is at
rest at the apex, i.e. r0 = 0 even when seen through an “infinitesimal microscope”,
or (2) it could mean that merely with standard precision the mass is at rest at
the apex, i.e. st(r0) = 0, but not necessarily r0 = 0 when seen though and “in-
finitesimal microscope” (see section 2.4). Now, if we go for interpretation (1) of
the initial conditions and consider R0 = 0 and R1 = 0, then the solution to the
difference equation describing the motion of the mass is unique: it is the constant
sequence Rn = 0 for all n, which corresponds to the trivial solution r(t) = 0 in
the continuous case (5.5 above). If we go for interpretation (2) however, and we
relax the initial conditions to R0 ∼= 0 and R1 ∼= 0, i.e. we allow the initial position
and velocity to be any infinitesimal, then we obtain for every initial condition a
unique solution. For example, take R0 = ∆t and R1 = R0 (so V0 = 0). Then:
R0 = ∆t;R1 = ∆t; R2 = ∆t + ∆t
5
2 ;R3 = ∆t + 2∆t
5




2 ; . . . .8
Thus, since each different choice for R0 and R1 results in a unique sequence Rn,
the model of Wenmackers & Vanpoucke is deterministic. Further, as Wenmackers
& Vanpoucke point out, the standard parts of the results agree with the family
of solutions found in the standard model: for small n, Rn is infinitesimal, and
for large n, Rn tends to 1144(n∆t− T )
4 +O(∆t2), and thus equals the solution of
the standard model (see 5.6 in section 5.1 above) plus some infinitesimal O(∆t2).
Consequently, for all n, Rn is from a standard perspective indistinguishable from
r(t).
In sum, Wenmackers & Vanpoucke showed that if from a nonstandard per-
spective the mass is initially at rest at the center of the Dome, i.e. R0 = 0, then
r(t) = 0 is the only solution, i.e. the mass will stay put for all time. If, however,
from a standard perspective, but not necessarily from a nonstandard perspective,
the mass is initially at rest at the center of the Dome, i.e. st(R0) = 0, but not
necessarily R0 = 0, then, for every initial condition, there is a different, unique
trajectory. So, Wenmackers & Vanpoucke showed that the indeterminism of the
Dome is a model-dependent property.
Besides the fact that there is no indeterminism in the nonstandard model of
Wenmackers & Vanpoucke, there is another benefit of the nonstandard approach:
it can serve to assign probabilities to the standard solutions. Norton wrote that
8 Wenmackers & Vanpoucke (2016) wrote R2 = ∆t+ ∆t
3
2 and R3 = ∆t+ 2∆t
3
2 + ∆t2(∆t2 +
∆t 32 ) 12 , but this seems me to be a mistake.
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assigning probabilities to the times at which the particle starts to move might
be desirable, but argues that there is no way to do so given the infinite import
(Norton 2003, pp. 13-14). This is false: with a nonstandard probability theory it
can be done (see Benci et al. 2016). Without going into all the details, we will
shortly discuss Wenmackers & Vanpoucke’s application of nonstandard probability
to the Dome.
Wenmackers & Vanpoucke use a nonstandard probability theory to obtain a
probability distribution over the values of the offset T , by assigning a probability
distribution to the (infinitesimal) values of the perturbations. As they explain,
they assign probability values in a robust manner, i.e. not just assuming a uniform
distribution of infinitesimal positions. The relation between initial conditions and
offset T values is highly nonlinear, with a higher probability for smaller T-values.
The result is that the (hyperreal) probability of st(T ) > 0 is infinitesimal (with
standard part = 0), and the (hyperreal) probability of st(T ) = 0 is one minus an
infinitesimal (with standard part = 1). In other words, the mass will start rolling
of the Dome immediately almost surely; the probability that the mass will stay
put for some strictly positive standard time is infinitely small.
In sum, in this section we discussed three idealizations employed in Norton’s
Dome which are considered problematic in the literature: the geometric shape of
the Dome, the geometric shape of the mass, and the initial conditions of the mass
being placed at perfect rest exactly at the center of the Dome. It is argued that
the geometric shape of the Dome is problematic, because it involves a singularity
at the apex, which makes that the force function is non-Lipschitz and that the
mass’ acceleration is not well-defined. It is argued that the geometric shape of the
mass, being point-like, is problematic, first, because as a consequence the mass
produces infinite pressure on the surface of the Dome (and the Dome has to be
infinitely rigid to compensate for that), and second, because conceptually it does
not match with the extensive Dome: the Dome and the mass are covered by dif-
ferent and incompatible parts of classical mechanics. It is argued that the initial
conditions are problematic, for they ignore perturbations. In the nonstandard
model of the Dome proposed by Wenmackers & Vanpoucke (2016), (infinitesi-
mal) perturbations are taken into account, which makes the model deterministic.
Moreover, on the nonstandard approach it is possible to show that the probability
that the mass will stay on the Dome for some positive time is infinitely small.
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5.3 Analysis
As we have seen in section 5.1, Norton takes his Dome to illustrate that Newto-
nian mechanics is indeterministic. In section 5.2 we have seen that various scholars
rejected Norton’s conclusion, because according to them, certain (infinite) ideal-
izations employed in the Dome make that it is not a proper Newtonian system.
In the present section, our aim is to analyze to which extent the conclusion that
Newtonian mechanics is indeterministic is relative to classical mathematics. We
will discuss, first, two kinds of indeterminism that seem to be involved in the
Dome case and whether they disappear in alternative (i.e. discrete) models of the
Dome, second, what is the justification for using alternative models, and lastly,
what the Dome teaches us about how far we may take infinite idealization.
As we have seen in section 5.1, Norton takes his Dome to illustrate that New-
tonian mechanics is indeterministic. ‘Indeterminism’ can mean different things,
and it seems that Norton uses the term in two different senses. First, Norton
uses it as meaning that a single past is compatible with multiple futures. This is
the kind of indeterminism that Norton demonstrates with the derivations from
Newton’s second law, as we have seen in section 5.1: the mass on the Dome
stays at rest on the apex until some time t = 0, and may or may not move at
any time after that. There is nothing in Newtonian mechanics that determines
whether or not the mass will move, and if it does, when, and therefore this theory
is indeterministic.
But Norton uses the term in a second sense as well. For he takes the Dome case
to show that there is no first cause which sets the mass in motion (Norton 2003,
section 6). As he writes, the mass moves during the time interval t > T only
and there is no first instant of motion in this time interval at which to locate the
first cause (Norton 2003, p. 25). Indeterminism means here the absence of a first
cause of the motion of the mass. Norton locates the indeterminism in this sense
specifically at the moment t = T : “[t]he failure of causality arises specifically at
time t = T when the system spontaneously accelerates. Before and after, the
system is quite causal [. . . ]” (Norton 2003, p. 24).
Note, to start, that it is slightly misleading to say (as Norton does in the
quote in the previous paragraph) that “at time t = T the system (spontaneously)
accelerates”. For, as we have seen at the end of section 5.1, at time t = T the
mass is at the apex and has an acceleration a(0) of zero, while at any t > T the
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mass is not at the apex and has positive acceleration. This means that the instant
t = T is not the first instant at which the mass moves; it is the last instant at
which the mass is at rest (cfr. Norton 2008, p. 788). As Malament (2008) pointed
out, the acceleration is not well-defined at the apex. Thus, rather than saying
that at t = T the mass accelerates, we should say that at time t = T everything
is as it was before, which means that there is no movement and no (well-defined)
acceleration.
Further, the problem of indeterminism in the second sense seems to be that
there is no first instant of motion during the interval t > T at which to locate
the first cause of the motion of the mass (for this interval, being open, has no
first instant) and there is nothing in the state of the system at t = T which is
productive of the acceleration (for this state is identical to the states at all t < T at
which the mass is at rest at the apex). Thus, the indeterminism or “spontaneous”
movement of the mass seems to mean here that there is no external intervention or
change in the physical environment which causes the movement, i.e. the movement
of the mass is ‘uncaused’ (cfr. Norton 2003, p. 12). The complaint thus seems to
be that the movement of the mass at time t > T is – in some sense – disconnected
from the state of the system at all times t ≤ T .
That these two uses of “spontaneous” movement are not the same and do not
necessarily come together can be seen by comparing the movement of the mass
on the Dome with that of a mass on a surface where the force acting on the
mass turns on smoothly from zero to non-zero magnitude. As pointed out by
Zinkernagel (2010, p. 9), in such cases, too, F = 0 up to some moment t = T ,
and F > 0 for t > T , i.e. the system does not continue in its original state for any
t > T even though F = 0 for t ≤ T (see also Fletcher 2012). Also in this case there
is no first instant of motion during the interval t > T at which to locate the first
cause of the motion of the mass, and there is nothing in the state of the system
at t = T which is productive of the acceleration. Thus, in case of smooth forces,
there is indeterminism in the second sense, but not in the first sense: a single past
implies a single future (that is to say, the equations of motion given some initial
conditions have a unique solution), but there is “spontaneous” movement in the
sense that there is no instant at which to locate the first cause of the motion.
The complaint that the movement of the mass at time t > T is disconnected
from the state of the system at all times t ≤ T , reminds of the critique of Dummett
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that the state of his ‘supertask’ pendulum at time t < 1 does not tell us anything
about its state at instant t = 1 (Dummett 2000, see section 3.3 in this thesis).
According to Dummett, the fault lies with the classical model of time, in which
time is made up of extensionless instants. As Dummett argues, modeling time
as a classical continuum makes it possible to model physical systems such as his
pendulum and the mass on the Dome in such a way that its state at some t < 1
does not tell us anything about its state at t = 1. This, in Dummett’s view, goes
against our conception of physical quantities and events: “we do not suppose that
events are as loose and separate as this” (Dummett 2000, p. 504). The problem
with the indeterminism in the second sense in case of Norton’s Dome, as well as
in case of smooth forces, seems exactly to be that the independence of the state
of the system at t = 1 from its state at t < 1 goes against our conception of
movement and forces.
There is no indeterminism in the first sense in discrete models of the Dome.
Zinkernagel (2010) considers a (standard) discrete approach (also known as Euler’s
method to approximate the solution to differential equations): he takes time step
size h = ∆t so that tn = nh, and defines the position of the mass r(t + ∆t) =
r(t) + v(t)∆t and the velocity v(t+ ∆t) = v(t) + r(t)
1
2 ∆t, with initial conditions
r(0) = v(0) = 0. The difference equation for the mass on the Dome is found
to be (r(tn+2) − 2r(tn+1) + r(tn))/h2 = (r(tn))
1
2 .9 Since, as Zinkernagel writes,
r(t0) = r(t1) = 0, this equation has the unique solution r(tn) = 0 for all n (and
thus the same solution in the limit h→ 0).
Interestingly, not only the Norton Dome under Euler’s method – which is
considered to be only an approximation to the continuous case – but also the
nonstandard Dome – which, as we have seen in section 5.2, is in some sense an
improvement on the standard continuous model – is deterministic in the sense
that the solutions to the equations of motion are unique. Further, in the discrete
case, the mass will not move, unless there is a force acting at the beginning of
each time segment, and thus there is also no indeterminism in the sense that the
movement seems ‘uncaused’. This confirms the hypothesis that the paradox of
Norton’s Dome is relative to classical mathematics.10
9 There are many ways to discretize a differential equation, so this difference equation for the
Dome is not unique (Zinkernagel 2010, p. 9 n. 12).
10 It has been pointed out by Waaldijk (2005, p. 24), that in many discussions in modern
physics, especially in the one on determinism, it is taken for granted, without explanation, that
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Importantly, as Zinkernagel (2010) points out, in standard examples of New-
tonian systems involving continuously varying forces the physical situation may
just as well be described via a sequence of discrete forces. That is, in such cases
modeling a continuously varying force and a sequence of discrete forces is equiv-
alent. This equivalence is absent in the Dome case – which already can be seen
from the fact that difference equations, as opposed to the differential equations,
are deterministic. Some have argued that the absence of equivalence between dif-
ferential equations and their approximations in terms of Euler’s method in case
of non-Lipschitz continuous functions is a failure of Euler’s method (Wilson 2006,
pp. 213-217; Fletcher 2012, p. 11). However, we could also argue for the contrary:
the fact that non-Lipschitz continuous functions behave erratically under Euler’s
methods can be seen as a virtue of Euler’s methods. For, as we have seen above,
as was pointed out by Stemeroff & Dyer, in case of non-Lipschitz continuous func-
tions the differential structure breaks down. If we accept (the well-definedness of)
the differential calculus as a prerequisite for (appropriate) application of Newto-
nian mechanics, as Stemeroff & Dyer do, then we could say that the inequivalence
of differential and difference equations help us to distinguish those systems that
are covered by Newtonian mechanics from those that are not.
One point that deserves further attention is the justification of using discrete
models instead of the standard continuous model. Wenmackers & Vanpoucke
(2016) justify their NSA approach to the Dome by pointing out that, since any
physical measurement is finitely precise, it is not possible to experimentally dis-
tinguish between zero and infinitesimal quantities. However, as we have seen in
section 3, since any physical measurement is finitely precise, it is also not pos-
sible to experimentally identify a specific real number as the value of a physical
quantity, for classical real numbers are infinitely precise. As we have seen in sec-
tion 3.3, Dummett objected against modeling physical quantities by classical real
numbers since it amounts in his view to adopting super-realism: it posits states
of affairs independently even of the theoretical possibility of us knowing them.
Now, as we discussed in section 5.1 above, in the nonstandard Dome of Wen-
mackers & Vanpoucke, by relaxing the initial conditions to R0 ∼= 0 and R1 ∼= 0
(allowing the initial position and velocity to be any infinitesimal), one makes room
classical mathematics is the only means available to describe the real world. As he notes, for
example the influential book Earman (1986) is guilty of making this tacit assumption.
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for perturbations. These perturbations are infinitesimal (with standard part zero)
and thus can never be empirically detected. Wenmackers & Vanpoucke argue that
given that the nonstandard model is empirically indistinguishable from the stan-
dard model of the Dome, we might as well adopt the nonstandard model to obtain
the desired result (determinism). However, if empirical indistinguishability is the
criterion for which model (and which initial conditions) are admissible, then other
– one might say: less extreme – methods would suffice. For instance, one could
adopt, instead of infinitesimals in the sense of NSA, i.e. hyperreal numbers which
are smaller than any strictly positive classical real number, numbers which are
only relatively infinitesimal, i.e. numbers which are strictly smaller than the mea-
surement error.11 That is, in the standard continuous model, as well as in the
standard discrete model, one could adopt initial positions and velocities smaller
than the measurement error and as such obtain determinism. Thus, it seems that
it is not the discrete (as opposed to continuous) model per se which solves the
issue of indeterminism in the Norton Dome, but rather undoing the idealization
of infinitely precise initial conditions (i.e. the mass being placed at perfect rest
exactly at r = 0).
However, it seems that Norton considers the idealization of the mass being
placed at perfect rest exactly at the apex as an essential feature of his Dome, and
thus the possibility to make such idealizations as an essential feature of Newtonian
mechanics. It is in his view not relevant that these initial conditions cannot be
realized or measured in the physical world. As he writes:
“The dome is not intended to represent a real physical system.
The dome is purely an idealization within Newtonian theory. On our
best understanding of the world, there can be no such system. For an
essential part of the setup is to locate the mass exactly at the apex
of the dome and exactly at rest. Quantum mechanics assures us that
cannot be done. What the dome illustrates is indeterminism within
Newtonian theory in an idealized system that we do not expect to be
realized in the world” (Norton 2008, p. 793).12
11 It has been argued that this is the sense in which physicists use the term “infinitesimal”
anyway.
12 It is curious in this context that elsewhere Norton calls the Dome a “plausible physical
instantiation” of a violation of a Lipschitz condition (Norton 2008, p. 788, n. 1). Apparently,
according to Norton a plausible physical instantiation is not something which can be realized in
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In other words, Norton is concerned with the mathematical structure of Newtonian
mechanics, not with how the theory applies to the physical world.
It should also be mentioned that not only the initial conditions cannot be
realized in the physical world: the same applies to the makeup of the Dome
and the mass. As Norton writes himself (2008, p. 795), we can consider the
Dome with its apex with infinite curvature as the limit of a sequence of domes
with apices with finite curvature. Likewise, according to Norton, the mass is the
limit of successively smaller, perfectly spherical masses of correspondingly greater
density. Both mass and Dome are thus idealizations recovered in the limit of more
realistic structures, and these limit systems themselves cannot exist in the real
world.
Importantly, as Norton writes, on any dome up to the limit, i.e. on any dome
with finite curvature at the apex, the mass will stay indefinitely according to New-
tonian theory. Recalling section 1.2.2, one might thus argue that the Dome with
its infinite curvature and the extensionless mass does not qualify as a legitimate
idealization. For, as we saw in that section, Norton argued in his (2012, 2014)
papers on idealization and approximation that a system is a legitimate idealiza-
tion only if the limiting process results in a system that is consistent and has
the intended properties.13 Since the indeterminism will not obtain for any (more)
realistic dome and mass, we have a case in which limit property and the corre-
sponding property of the limit system disagree: all systems upto the limit, i.e. all
domes with apices with finite curvature, are deterministic, whereas the limit sys-
tem, i.e. the Dome with its infinite curvature, is indeterministic. For this reason,
according to Norton’s own account, in the Dome case we do not have a legitimate
idealization.
Should we discard the Dome on these grounds? Norton himself argues that the
infinite curvature does not make the Dome an inadmissible idealization: it is “no
reason for discounting the system approached in the limit” (Norton 2008, p. 796).
We should just acknowledge, according to him, that the Dome with its infinite
curvature is a different case with qualitatively different properties that cannot
be recovered by taking limits of the properties of more realistic systems; this, in
his view, is in particular no reason to infer that the Dome is not a Newtonian
the physical world.
13 Admittedly, these papers on idealization and approximation were published several years
after his papers on the Dome (2003, 2008), so maybe Norton changed his views in the mean time.
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system (ibid.). Indeed, with respect to the question whether or not Newtonian
mechanics is indeterministic, whether or not the Dome is a legitimate idealization
according to the criteria presented in section 1.2.2 is not relevant; the relevant
question is whether or not it is a proper Newtonian system. For if it is a proper
Newtonian system, then Newton’s laws should govern the motion of the point
mass, no matter how the system is obtained.
However, as I see it, this does raise some questions about how far we may want
to take idealizations. In virtue of the idealizations employed in the Dome, e.g. the
infinite curvature at the apex, and the extensionless mass, the Dome is a purely
mathematical object. But from a mathematical point of view the non-uniqueness of
solutions to a non-Lipschitz differential equation is completely trivial. Physicists
are not interested in such cases: in physics textbooks one simply disregards non-
Lipschitz forces (Wenmackers & Vanpoucke 2016).
As a mathematical structure, Newtonian mechanics shows what is mathemati-
cally possible within that theory. One is of course free to decide, as Norton does,
that that is what one is interested in. However, both the indeterminism and the
singular solution of the mass staying on the Dome forever, are only (mathemati-
cally) possible in virtue of idealization: de-idealizing by taking into account per-
turbations, elastic phenomena, extension of the mass and apex, etcetera, would
rule out the singular solution and the indeterminism. The question is: should
we talk about “domes” and “masses”, if we idealize them to be infinitely small,
infinitely dense, infinitely rigid, etcetera? It seems a mistake to identify, for ex-
ample, the apex of the Dome with the apex of some concrete dome, for it has
completely different properties (e.g. infinite curvature, and no spatial extension).
All we know about the Dome and other idealized – e.g. Lipschitz indeterministic,
infinitely rigid, infinitely small, etcetera – systems we know mathematically, so,
as I see it, we should not be surprised by the Dome’s indeterminism.
5.4 Conclusion
So: is Newtonian mechanics indeterministic? From a certain perspective, New-
tonian mechanics is indeed indeterministic. That is, it is the case that there are
systems for which Newton’s second law does not uniquely determine the future
evolution of the system given certain initial conditions; if one is of the opinion that
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these systems fall within the proper domain of the theory, then one can say that
Newtonian mechanics is indeterministic. However, as we have seen, several ideal-
izations are necessary in order to obtain the indeterminism, and there are good
arguments to the effect that these particular idealizations are not admissible in
Newtonian mechanics.
And: are the philosophical problems with Norton’s Dome relative to classical
mathematics and its notion of actual infinity? To a certain extent. Several of the
idealizations which are necessary to obtain the indeterminism are characteristic of
classical mathematics and its notion of infinity – or, to be more precise, its notion
of the continuum. For example, the infinitely small, extensionless apex and mass.
Other idealizations necessary to obtain the indeterminism, such as the absence of
elastic phenomena and perturbations do not seem to have anything to do with
the classical mathematical framework.
To some extent, we can say that the philosophical problems with Norton’s
Dome are relative to continuous time models. For as we have seen, both the
Norton Dome under Euler’s method – which is considered to be only an approx-
imation to the continuous case – and the nonstandard Dome – which is in some
sense an improvement on the standard continuous model – are deterministic. Both
discrete models can be seen as undoing the idealization of the infinitely precise
initial conditions in the continuous case, i.e. of the mass being completely at rest
exactly at the center of the apex.
But even though the indeterminism of the Dome can be countered by de-
idealizing the infinitely small apex and mass and the infinitely precise initial
conditions, these idealizations taken together are not sufficient to obtain the in-
determinism. As we have seen, a sufficient condition for the indeterminism is
the force acting on the mass on the apex being non-Lipschitz (which in turn is
a consequence of the shape of the Dome). It has been argued in the literature
that requiring Lipschitz continuity in Newtonian mechanics is ad hoc, but in my
view there are good arguments to the effect that this is not so. Namely, with the
failure of Lipschitz continuity comes the ill-definedness of the mass’ acceleration
on the apex, or as Stemeroff & Dyer (2016) put it, the break-down of the differ-
ential structure. As I see it, a well-defined differential structure is a very natural
requirement to make in Newtonian mechanics (at least to the extent that basic
concepts such as acceleration are well-defined), and thus I agree with Stemeroff
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& Dyer (2016) that a well-defined differential structure is a prerequisite for the
appropriate application of Newtonian mechanics. Another way to obtain – as far
as I can see – the same result, is to require the equivalence of the differential
equations and the difference equations. On this basis, we can dismiss the Dome
as a Newtonian system, and the paradox is dissolved.
Further, we can take away the following from this chapter. We have seen that
there are two kinds of indeterminism involved in the Dome: first, a single past is
compatible with multiple futures (for given the point mass at rest at the apex of
the Dome, there are multiple solutions to the equations of motion), and second,
if the mass moves there is no instant at which to locate the first cause of the
movement. The first kind of indeterminism is particular for the Dome (and some
other systems, e.g. those which constrain the force working on them to be non-
Lipschitz), the second kind of indeterminism arises also in classical continuous
models in which the force turns on smoothly from zero to some non-zero value.
In a discrete model both kinds of indeterminism are absent.
There is something ironic about this. For we could say that on both discrete
approaches we are in a situation in which we (acknowledge to) have incomplete
data: the standard discrete approach captures that (our measurements of) time
and its derivatives are only finitely precise, and the nonstandard approach cap-
tures that there might be perturbations which from an empirical or standard
perspective are undetectable. The continuous approach, to the contrary, idealizes
the initial conditions and our knowledge of them to be infinitely precise. Thus,
the continuous model gives us the illusion of having the complete data necessary
to compute the evolution of the system. But, as we have seen, we obtain com-
plete information about the time-evolution of the system – namely, a deterministic
model – only on the discrete approach and not on the continuous approach. Thus,
from incomplete data we obtain complete information about the time-evolution of
the system, whereas from complete data we obtain incomplete information about
the system’s time evolution.
Further, some of the idealizations in the Dome which are necessary for the
indeterminism to occur involve external inconsistencies. Namely, the idealization
of the Dome as infinitely rigid makes the Dome inconsistent with the theory of
elastic phenomena – or with atomism in general. Also the geometrial shape of
the Dome as completely continuous, and the apex consisting of an extensionless
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point, make the Dome inconsistent with atomism. The idealization of the mass
initially being at perfect rest exactly at the apex is inconsistent with quantum
mechanics, for it ignores perturbations.
Importantly, we have seen that in virtue of the idealizations employed, the
Dome is essentially a mathematical object, for it has properties that no concrete
object can have. Given that the Dome is a mathematical object, we should not
be very surprised by, nor very interested in, the Dome’s indeterminism in my
opinion. The most relevant question that the Dome raises is, as I see it: How far
do we want to take idealization? Should we talk about “domes” and “masses”, if
we idealize them to be infinitely small, infinitely dense, infinitely rigid, etcetera?
Conclusion to Part III
I think that what is truly infinite may just be the abyss of our knowl-
edge.
- Rovelli (2011)
The infinite idealizations in the two case studies undertaken in this thesis
play a very different role and introduce very different philosophical problems. In
statistical-mechanical theories of phase transitions, infinite idealizations – in the
form of the thermodynamic limit – are introduced in order to obtain the discon-
tinuities in the partition function, which are taken to represent phase transitions.
The problem with the thermodynamic limit is that it attributes (1) discontinuous
changes at the microlevel and (2) an infinite particle number and volume to finite
systems, which is taken to be impossible in virtue of the atomic theory of matter.
In Norton’s Dome, infinite idealizations – in the form of modeling the Dome as
continuous, infinitely rigid, and with infinite curavature at the apex, and model-
ing the mass as infinitely small, and located precisely at the center at the apex in
perfect rest – are introduced in order to show that Newtonian mechanics is not a
deterministic theory. The problem in case of the Norton Dome is that Newtonian
mechanics is usually taken to be the paradigm of a deterministic theory, but the
Dome seems to constutite a very simple counterexample to the determinism of
this theory.
In both cases, the infinite idealizations lead to qualitative changes in the math-
ematics, and consequently in the physical model that this mathematics embodies.
This is most clearly the case with statistical-mechanical theories of phase transi-
tions, where these infinite idealizations are obtained by taking the thermodynamic
limit. The thermodynamic limit introduces, to start, mathematical discontinu-
ities in the partition function. The partition function represents the system’s
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microlevel properties, and consequently the discontinuities in the partition func-
tion represent discontinuities in the microlevel properties of the system. In turn,
these discontinuities in the microlevel properties introduce a clear-cut distinction
both between different phases of the system, and between phase transitions and
changes within a phase. Furthermore, the thermodynamic limit introduces an
infinite particle number and volume, which in turn implies the absence of borders
and of fluctations.
In case of the Norton Dome, the situation is a bit more complicated. Mod-
eling the Dome as continuous as well as the particular shape that is attributed
to it, make that the curvature at the apex diverges, which in turn enables the
force acting on the mass on the apex to fail the Lipschitz-continuity condition
for determinism. Further, the initial conditions for the equation of motion of the
mass being place exactly at rest at the center of the apex, are made possible by
the idealization of the Dome as being infinitely rigid, by ignoring perturbations,
as well as by the continuous time model. Taken together, these infinite idealiza-
tions lead to a model that is indeterministic, and thus in this respect qualitatively
different from more realistic structures.
As we have seen in chapter 1, the introduction of infinite idealizations into a
theory often raise issues of consistency. We distinguished between two different
kinds of inconsistency, namely, what we called internal and external inconsistency.
The first regards inconsistency between different pieces of theory, e.g. within the
theory of water waves there are two contradicting propositions: one asserting a
finitely deep, and one an infinitely deep ocean. The second regards inconsisten-
cies between different theories, e.g. continuum mechanics being inconsistent with
atomism. What role did inconsistency play in the philosophical paradoxes in our
case studies?
As we have discussed in the conclusion of chapter 4, the thermodynamic limit
introduces an internal inconsistency in order to eliminate an external inconsis-
tency. That is, the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics (apparently)
asserts that the systems under consideration are infinitely large in particle num-
ber and volume, whereas statistical mechanics is set out to be a theory of systems
which are finite in particle number and size (namely, concrete systems). In this
way, the thermodynamic limit introduces an inconsistency within statistical me-
chanics. But the thermodynamic limit is taken in order to undo the inconsistency
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between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics: since statistical mechanics is
supposed to explain thermodynamic phenomena, or to be a theoretical founda-
tion for thermodynamics, it is supposed that whenever thermodynamic systems
display phase transitions, statistical mechanical systems should do so too. On the
assumption that phase transitions should have the same mathematical representa-
tion in both theories, this means that it is supposed that whenever thermodynamic
systems display a discontinuity in the derivatives of the free energy, statistical me-
chanical systems should display a discontinuity in the partition function. Note
that these discontinuities are only problematic in statistical mechanics and not
in thermodynamics, because the former is a microlevel theory, whereas the lat-
ter is a macrolevel theory, meaning that thermodynamics is concerned with the
phenomena and explicitly ignores the microscopic make-up of the systems under
consideration.
In case of Norton’s Dome, the infinite idealizations are not introduced, as in the
case of phase transitions, to undo an external inconsistency. Rather, the infinite
idealizations are introduced in order to obtain a certain result: the indeterminacy.
Many of the idealizations involved in the Dome introduce external inconsistencies:
the idealization of the Dome as infinitely rigid makes the Dome inconsistent with
the theory of elastic phenomena, or with atomism in general; the geometrial shape
of the Dome as completely continuous, with an apex consisting of an extensionless
point and with infinite curvature make the Dome inconsistent with atomism; and
the idealization of the mass initially being at perfect rest exactly at the apex is
inconsistent with quantum mechanics, for it ignores perturbations.
It seems – at least, prima facie – that in case of the Norton Dome, the philo-
sophically problematic features of the Dome – including its indeterminism – will
disappear if external consistency is required and the Dome is de-idealized accord-
ingly. In case of phase transitions, however, de-idealizing by means of requiring
internal consistency does not seem to solve all the problems, for without the
introduction of the thermodynamic limit, systems in statistical mechanics seem
incapable of displaying phase transitions. Of course, the latter is true only on the
assumption that phase transitions in statistical mechanics should be represented
by mathematical discontinuities.
To a certain extent, both paradoxes arise from issues concerning mathemati-
cal representation. This is most obvious in the case of phase transitions, for the
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assumption that statistical mechanics should follow thermodynamics in represent-
ing phase transitions by mathematical discontinuities is problematic. Especially
given the fact that statistical mechanics is a microlevel theory which analyzes
system’s behavior in terms of statistical and mechanical microlevel properties,
whereas thermodynamics is a macrolevel theory which deals with phenomena
and explicitly ignores what happens at the microlevel, it is not at all clear why
these two different theories should conform in their mathematical representation
of phase transitions. One might argue that similar mathematical representation
is necessary for the reason that statistical mechanics should serve as a theoretical
foundation for thermodynamics, but it is unclear to me that if thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics would represent phase transitions in a different way, this
would threathen statistical mechanics’ foundational role.
The issue of representation in case of Norton’s Dome is that the Dome is
idealized to such an extent that it is very far from realizable in the physical world.
This concerns not only the idealization of the Dome as a continuum and of the
mass as a point, but also the disregard of elastic phenomena and perturbations,
as well as the infinite curvature at the apex. Thus, whereas above we wrote
that prima facie it seems that in case of the Norton Dome, the philosophically
problematic features disappear if the Dome is de-idealized, one might say that
the philosophical problems already disappear by recognizing that the Dome is an
essentially mathematical object. That is to say, mathematically there is nothing
suprising nor worrisome about the non-uniqueness of solutions to the differential
equation describing the motion of the “mass” on the “Dome”. The indeterminism
of the model starts to be disturbing only when we give the model a physical
interpretation. In which sense can we call the extensionless highest point of the
Dome an “apex”? In which sense should we identify the motions ascribed to the
massive point on the Dome with the movement of a physical body?
However, Norton is right in arguing that it is not so easy to discard the Dome
as an “unphysical” system. For although the notion of physicality seems to play a
strong role for physicists in their intuitions regarding which systems are interesting
to study, a precise definition or explication of this concept still has not been
given. Norton (2008) presents various notions of unphysicality according to which
the Dome does not qualify as an “unphysical” system. However, given that no
physicist seems bothered by the indeterminism of the Dome, it seems that for
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them the Dome actually is a unphysical system – if not uninteresting on other
grounds.
The problem of representation or applicability arose also the other way around.
That is, whereas the issue we just discussed concerns attributing a physical in-
terpretation to a mathematical model, issues arise as well concerning attributing
a mathematical interpretation to certain physical models and their properties.
For as we have seen, in the philosophical literature it was argued that physical
systems displaying discontinuous changes in their microscopic properties would
presuppose matter to be a continuum. However, it was not clear at all, first,
what a “continuum of matter” was taken to be, and second, how matter being a
continuum would be presupposed by these discontinuous changes. It seemed that
from the fact that only real-valued functions could display discontinuous changes,
it was inferred that only microlevel properties of a continuum of matter could dis-
play discontinuous changes. It was not clarified at all in which sense a continuum
of matter was supposed to resemble a mathematical continuum, nor in which way
mathematical discontinuities were supposed to resemble the hypothetical discon-
tinuities in the microscopic properties of physical systems. Furthermore, it seems
to have gone unnoticed that the thermodynamic limit – at least, as it is normally
described as “letting the particle number and volume of the system go to infinity”
– does not result in an uncountable infinity of particles, nor seems matter in the
thermodynamic limit to be – in some appropriate sense – complete. Thus, the
extent to which such a “continuum of matter” would resemble a mathematical
continuum, and thus to which extent the possibility of discontinuities obtaining
in the latter say something about the possibilities of discontinuities obtaining in
the first, remains a mystery.
Another example of the same issue is Batterman’s argument to the effect that
the phenomenon of a phase transition is a “physical discontinuity” and for this
reason “demands curves with kinks” as their rightful representation. As we have
seen, Batterman fails to clarify exactly in which sense these “physical disconti-
nuities” are discontinuous, that is, what property do they have that justifies the
analogy with mathematical discontinuities?
So, how does this all bear on our central question: Are the philosophical
issues surrounding infinite idealizations in physics relative to classical mathematics
and its notion of infinity?
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In both case studies, the philosphical problems have proven to be model-
depend in some sense. In case study 1, the philosophically problematic discontinu-
ities and infinite systems would be absent in a constructive statistical-mechanical
theory of phase transitions; in case study 2, the indeterminism disappears in a
discrete – either standard or nonstandard – model of the Dome.
However, it is certainly not true that classical mathematics is the complete
cause of the paradoxes. In case study 1, the philosophically problematic ideal-
ization – the thermodynamic limit – is introduced, because for reasons connected
with intertheory relations, one requires that phase transitions have the same math-
ematical signature in statistical mechanics as in thermodynamics: mathematical
discontinuities. Given that statistical mechanics is a microlevel theory, such dis-
continuities cause inconsistencies within statistical mechanics. Thus, more than
the classical mathematical framework, the requirement to represent phase tran-
sitions by mathematical discontinuities causes the paradox. In case study 2, the
cause of the paradox might be attributed to one or more of the idealizations
employed in the Dome which are necessary to obtain the indeterminism, or, al-
ternatively, to the fact that we give a physical interpretation to a mathematical
object which is far from realizable in the physical world.
In both case studies, the philosophical problems could easily be solved without
adopting an alternative mathematical framework. In case of statistical-mechanical
theories of phase transitions, the most natural way to avoid the philosophical
problems is to assign a different mathematical signature to phase transitions – such
as for example sufficiently steep gradients of the relevant functions – so that there
is no need to take the thermodynamic limit. In case of Norton’s Dome, the most
natural way seems to be to require a well-defined differential structure, at least to
the extent that acceleration is well-defined on the whole surface of the Dome. In
case of phase transitions, avoiding the paradox by means of avoiding to take the
thermodynamic limit has the consequence that there will be some vagueness re-
introduced into the theory, for the distinction between different phases as well as
the distinction between phase transitions and changes within a phase will no longer
be clear-cut; this can be considered a drawback if one holds that a theory of sharp,
unambiguous phase transitions is for some reason better than a theory involving
somewhat vague phase transitions, or it can be considered a benefit, because such a
theory will model concrete phase transitions more realistically. In case of Norton’s
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Dome, the consequence of requiring a well-defined differential structure implies a
loss of generality; this can be considered a drawback if one is of the opinion that
the domain of Newtonian mechanics should be as general as possible, or it can be
considered a benefit because it rules out e.g. Lipschitz-indeterminate systems, for
which there are good reasons to qualify them as “unphysical”.
However, in both case studies, switching to a different mathematical frame-
work has benefits which are not obtained with the above ways to avoid the para-
doxes within classical mathematics. In case study 1, developing a constructive
statistical-mechanical theory of phase transitions has the benefit that the meaning
of the mathematics suits better to scientific practice than classical mathematics.
Constructive real numbers, as we have seen, are only finitely precise, and therefore
in constructive mathematics – in contradistinction to classical mathematics – we
do not idealize physical quantities and our measurements of them to have infinite
precision. In Dummett’s terms, by adopting constructive mathematics we avoid
the super-realist metaphysics which comes with the classical model. In case study
2, adopting a – standard or nonstandard – discrete model of the Dome, has sev-
eral benefits as well. First, on the discrete approach we de-idealize the infinitely
precise initial conditions and allow for perturbations. Second, in the discrete case,
the mass will not move unless there is a force acting at the beginning of each time
segment, and thus there is also no indeterminism in the sense that the movement
seems ‘uncaused’. Third, the nonstandard discrete approach makes it possible to
assign probabilities to the different time-evolutions of the mass on the Dome, from
which it can be shown that the mass staying at rest at the apex for some positive
amount of time is infinitely unlikely.
What should we make of this result? What should we take it to mean that
the philosophical problems in our two case studies are to a certain extent relative
to classical mathematics?
As I see it, it is important to realize that scientifically applicable mathematics
does not need to be built on or justified by a set-theoretical foundation. Much
more modest means suffice, such as constructive, predicative, or even finitist math-
ematics. Moreover, we do not need to attribute the set-theoretical meaning to the
concepts involved in the physics. Talk of infinitely big systems does not need to
be interpreted as concerning actually infinite systems, real numbers do not need
to be interpreted as infinitely precise, etcetera. In different foundational schemes,
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mathematical concepts have a slightly different meaning, which can be used to
philosophical advantage in certain contexts of application. For example, the idea
that all science is just approximation, can already be built-in at the level of the
mathematical framework in which the theory is formulated.
To finish, how about the indispensability argument? Should we go along with
Quine and Putnam and regard the empirical confirmation of our best physical
theories which employ mathematics based on set theory as an empirical confir-
mation for (the relevant parts of) set theory itself? The fact that, as we have
seen, scientifically applicable mathematics is not necessarily founded on set the-
ory, seems already to threathen this argument. Still, we might argue that given
the fact that our best theories actually apply set theory rather than one of its
alternatives, counts as evidence that set theory somehow applies better to the
physical world than its alternatives, and thus we can conclude that set theory is
empirically confirmed.
However, there is an alternative explanation available for the fact that our best
physical theories make use of classical mathematics, or mathematics based on set
theory. For as we discussed in the conclusion of Part II of this thesis, the debate
on the foundations of mathematics proves itself to be a subjective and also very
social affair. Most mathematicians and physicists are only familiar with classical
mathematics, because this is what is taught in high school and regular university
classes. Objections against classical mathematics are often not known and rarely
well-understood, and undoubtedly the same holds for the philosophical benefits
that alternative foundational schemes might have in certain contexts.
Thusly conceived, it is no wonder that classical mathematics – and not an
alternative foundational scheme – is heavily used in our current best physical the-
ories. From this fact we should not infer, in my opinion, that it is also classical
mathematics which applies best to the physical world. I think that the philo-
sophical paradoxes which arise from the application of classical mathematics in
physics should urge us not to take classical mathematics for granted, but rather
to keep an open mind as to the question which mathematical framework to adopt
in which context.
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